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Abstract 
The purpose of the present study is to explain the incongruence between 
certain policy objectives of the tertiary education reform programme in Mexico, 
as well as some of its unexpected outcomes. Currently that incongruence is 
overlooked, whilst the disjuncture between national policy and local realities is 
explained in terms of a 'lack of motivation' which performance management 
strategies will resolve. Personal experience, suggests that, on the contrary, 
such strategies may, in some cases, aggravate underlying tensions. 
Adopting an historical and anthropological perspective on the context in which 
the reforms take place, this thesis focuses on the underlying continuity in 
national tertiary education policy of the use of a clientalist strategy of social 
control through the distribution of resources, as well as the extent to which that 
strategy is embedded in the socio-political structure of Mexican society. 
Developing Bourdieu's relational approach to social capital, this thesis firstly, 
differentiates the objectives and strategies of the World Bank and OECD 
approaches to tertiary education policy, which co-exist in the Mexican reform 
programme; secondly, it analyses the precise way in which they propose to 
transform, either directly or indirectly, the value of different capitals in the field of 
tertiary education policy; thirdly, on the basis of the comparative analysis of 
three case studies, it compares these potential areas of impact with their actual 
impact in particular contexts. 
The data analysis reveals the distinct outcomes of policy in each university, thus 
undermining World Bank and OECD assumptions concerning homogenous 
social capital which can be centrally controlled by performance management. 
The key factors identified in the comparative analysis, suggest the importance 
of increasingly linking scientific capital to university capital in a context which 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Tertiary Education Reform Programme in 
Mexico 
The national and international Context 
Mexico is currently the 12th largest economy in the World1, the largest in Latin 
America (Hogenboom, 2004), and its business leaders are amongst the richest 
individuals in the World.2 Mexico and Argentina were both considered in the 
1990's models of the successful transition to neoliberal economic agendas in 
Latin America. Yet Argentina faced financial collapse in 1999, and is slowly 
rebuilding its economy. The Mexican government was rescued by US and IMF 
loans from financial collapse in 1984 and 1994 (Marina, 2003) and continues to 
follow U.S. economic policy in the region at the cost of increasing internal 
opposition. The economic reforms provoked a peasant uprising in the State of 
Chiapas in 1994 (Olmedo, 2001) which has yet to reach a formal resolution, 
whilst in 1999 the attempt to increase student fees, provoked a 9 month student 
strike in the National University (UNAM). 
The reforms, have nevertheless marched on relentlessly during three 
presidential periods (each of six years), as have the conflicts. The results of the 
2006 presidential elections resulted in over one million protestors marching on 
the capital to protest against electoral fraud and in support of the left wing 
1 International Monetary Fund (IMF). World Economic Outlook, September 2004. 
2 Carlos Slim, the owner of Mexican Telephones (TELMEX), is the third richest person 
according to Forbes lists and 9 other Mexicans are in the top 600. 
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candidate. A teacher's pay dispute which began in June 2006 in the State of 
Oaxaca has mushroomed into a 6 month old protest movement, with six dead 
and has extended to the capital with the planting of explosives in Mexico City in 
November 2006. Faced with the occupation of the Chamber of Deputies, the 
'President Elect' required military support to enter the Chamber and complete 
the formal requirement of being sworn in as the President. 
Nevertheless, as in the economy, the divisions are also beginning to be more 
visible in tertiary education. Tertiary education reforms followed fast on the 
heels of economic reforms in Mexico, with quality assurance measures being 
pushed through at various levels. National entrance and graduation exams, 
accreditation procedures for national undergraduate programmes, 
administrative accreditation procedures, academic performance schemes, 
research evaluation and funding schemes, infrastructure funding schemes, 
were all set up within a decade. Universities and academics were encouraged 
to submit to evaluation in return for financial rewards. Those universities which 
meet the requirement of having 75% of its undergraduates registered in 
accredited programmes are admitted into a recently created 'elite' club of quality 
universities called The Consortium of Mexican Universities (CUMEX), whilst 
those which do not meet the reform requirements face having complementary 
funding reduced or suspended. The reform policy is, then, based on a system 
of financial rewards to motivate all those outside the elite club to work harder to 
get on the inside. Yet do those on the outside merely lack sufficient motivation, 
which can be resolved, consequently, by financial incentives? 
The local context 
My personal experiences at a local level lead me to doubt that the explanation 
for so many universities finding themselves 'on the outside' was solely a lack of 
sufficient motivation to change. My personal involvement during the 1990's in 
the implementation of the reform programme in the State University where I 
worked in the South-East of Mexico had lead me to question the coherence of 
some of the objectives of that programme and the efficacy of certain strategies 
used to implement them. I noted that whilst the 'Programme of Incentives for 
Teaching Performance' encouraged academic staff to focus upon individual 
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goals, the 'Faculty Enhancement Programme' (PROMEP) encouraged 
collaborative academic relations and the formation of research groups. 
Yet I also observed that not only were these objectives potentially incongruent, 
but that the outcomes were not always those which had been expected. 
Instead of the incentives programme introducing objective standards of 
academic merit, many colleagues seemed to resort to all types of strategies to 
achieve personal advantages in this scheme, and on the other hand, the 
impartial evaluation procedures were not observed. As a result, the programme 
which was called 'carrera docente' became known as 'carrera indecente' 
('indecent career', instead of 'teaching career'). The formation of research 
groups was also not without its problems. Firstly, the Directors of Faculties 
assigned the research groups as and when they could, and those researchers 
who exercise their right under the PROMEP programme to form their own group 
were viewed as an 'interest group' and a potential threat to established power 
structures. 
Hence, from a local perspective, both the objectives of certain reform 
programme strategies appeared somewhat incongruent whilst the strategies 
themselves were apparently unsuitable in the particular context, resulting in 
unexpected, even negative, outcomes. Nevertheless, in the year 2000 the 
message from the National Association of Universities (ANUIES) in its strategic 
policy document (ANUIES, 2000) was that the application of performance 
management strategies would overcome resistance to change sustained in 
inertia and tradition. The reform policy, like the economic policy at a national 
level, appeared to be out of tune with the national context. 
The social political context 
Education policy reforms in the last two decades of the 20th century had marked 
a dramatic shift from the social objectives of the post-revolutionary settlement of 
the 1920's to the skills requirements of an open-market economy of the 1990's. 
Although free, non-religious primary schooling was constitutionally mandated 
since 1867, prior to the revolution in 1910 education services had largely 
remained under the auspices of the Catholic Church, and a first objective of the 
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post-revolutionary settlement had been to make free and secular basic 
education available to all. A second objective was a national curriculum to 
assist in the construction of a national identity to unify the various ethnic 
minorities of the population as well as the different social groups formed during 
the colonial period, (criollos, mestizos, Negroes and casts). The immediate 
challenge, then, in the first half of the 20th century, was to make a national 
curriculum of primary education available to not only those in towns, but to rural 
populations not connected to the national road infrastructure. Primary 
attendance grew from 69,500 in 1950 to just over 4 million in 1990 (OECD, 
1997). However, compulsory and free secondary education was not introduced 
until 1993. The principle of, if not free, then generally affordable, tertiary 
education had been established since the founding of the National University 
(UNAM) in 1910, with the overall registration in higher education increasing 
from almost 30,000 to one and a quarter million between 1950 and 1999. 
(OECD, 1997, p. 158) 
The post-revolutionary settlement prevailed from the 1930's to the end of the 
1980's, almost the same period as the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
established and maintained political control (1929 - 2000). Although, during the 
1940's, there was a transition in economic policy from the exportation of raw 
materials to that of national industrialization protected by import controls, this 
had not affected the principal focus of education policy. Social integration and 
the construction of a national identity continued to be considered as an integral 
part of the preparation of citizens in the national project of industrial 
development, thus education policy was embedded in the socio-industrial vision 
of the nation. The neoliberal or open-market economic reforms introduced 
during the administration of President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) 
marked an abrupt change in both economic, social and education policy. It 
severed, on the one hand, the connection between economic development and 
the national industrial project, and on the other hand, education and the socio-
economic national project. Instead, tertiary education became linked to the 
priorities of a globalised market. 
Carlos Salinas, a PH.D graduate in politics, economics and government from 
Harvard University, presided over the signing of the North American Free Trade 
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Agreement (NAFTA) between the United States of Mexico, the United States of 
America and Canada, the three countries which form the geographic area of 
North America. According to the economists Middlebrook and Zepeda 
(Middlebrook & Zepeda, 2003), the rapid introduction of this economic policy, 
was made possible due to the authoritarian political and social structure in 
Mexico. Nevertheless, the exploitation of this structure to achieve the rapid 
introduction of a neoliberal economic policy lead to the creation of a business 
elite closely linked to a political elite (Hogenboom, 2004; Middlebrook & 
Zepeda, 2003). 
Some political and education commentators argued that economic liberalization 
should have a closer connection to social democratization, observing that those 
groups aversely affected by the lifting of trade barriers, particularly rural 
farmers, had limited access to democratic channels through which to voice their 
discontent. Writing in 1993, Eduardo Ibarra considered that according to the 
capacity or not of the government to resolve the problems resulting from the 
introduction of 'economic democracy' and not 'political democracy', would 
depend the viability or the failure of the government. (Ibarra Colado, 1993, p. 
124). In December of 1994 the uprising in Chiapas apparently confirmed the 
pertinence of this warning. 
President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), a PhD graduate in economics from Yale 
University, nevertheless continued with the neoliberal reforms introduced by his 
predecessor. Yet, Zedillo not only failed to resolve the Chiapas conflict but 
also, in the last year of his presidency, faced a strike by students in the National 
University. The students paralyzed the National University in Mexico for 9 
months. The reasons for this strike and the way it developed are many and 
complex, yet aspects characteristic of the debate about this strike included, 
firstly, the extent to which the student position and their questioning of the 
neoliberal model of education reform was disqualified as extremist by some 
intellectuals (Silva-Herzog Marquez, 2000), and secondly, the extent to which 
the question of the increase in fees in the UNAM was considered a purely 
economic and administrative issue and the attempt to link this to wider social or 
political issues, as irrational. (Blanco, 2000; Munoz, 2003; Trejo Delarbre, 
2000). 
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The official response to this and other acts of resistance to the introduction of 
reforms, by both students and academics, was to dismiss them as "oppositions 
to change based upon inertia and traditions". (ANUIES, 2000, p. 1) In short, 
the debate over the reasons for the strike was characterised by the absence of 
a discursive space in which these two positions, that of the priority of the social 
aims of education, or the economic utility of education, could be engaged in a 
constructive debate. Instead, the denigration or dismissal of either one or other 
of these positions was normal procedure. (Russell, 2005) 
President Zedillo, however, introduced electoral reforms, creating the Federal 
Electoral Institution (IFE). In the year 2000 the PRI lost power for the first time 
in its 70 year history to the Party of National Action (PAN), whilst nevertheless, 
retaining the majority in the Congress. 
At the turn of the century, then, Mexico faced the double challenge of adjusting 
to an economic policy based on open markets which was negatively affecting 
many, particularly the rural poor, and a reinvigorated yet fragile democratic 
political system, the protection of which required increased awareness of civil 
rights and responsibilities. 
Yet on all fronts neoliberal policies continued to be pushed through with little 
regard for the delicate situation in which the country found itself. Despite the 
previous formal allocation of autonomous status to the IFE, government respect 
for the autonomy of electoral processes and institutions was not observed, with 
the 2006 elections taking place amid accusations of continuing electoral fraud. 
Economic policies continued to favour elite business groups and tertiary 
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education reform was relentlessly pursued with complementary funds cut off to 
those universities who did not meet the required evaluation indicators. The 
CUMEX group celebrated its expansion to 15 members3. 
An alternative perspective 
The fact that a change in direction of national politics would need to take into 
account historically embedded social and political structures, if not clear to 
politicians, economists or educationalists, was clear to certain historians. The 
journal Letras Libres dedicated their December issue of the year 2000 to the 
question of whether the new government would continue to exploit the system 
of "caciques y cuadillos", the political operators of the patron-client system in 
Mexico, or achieve the transition to a system based on the law and freely 
elected representatives (Editorial-Letras-Libres, 2000) Different articles 
pointed out the entrenched nature of the cacique system in Mexican society 
dating back to the beginning of the colonial period. Lorenzo Meyer argued that 
during moments of social transition such as the war of independence and the 
revolution, the vacuum in power allowed such practices to further entrench 
themselves and to constitute themselves as forces to be negotiated with by the 
emerging fledging administrations. 
In order to centralise fragmented power groups following the 1910 revolution, 
the Institutional Revolutionary Party was formed in 1929, and proceeded to 
include these groups within the party structure. They were co-opted using the 
traditional clientalist procedure in which, in return for loyalty, the control over the 
allocation of certain resources was conceded to the leader of each group to 
3 The subsystem of public universities consists of 46 insitutions (SEP, 2006), and the number 
who have entered the CUMex group doubled in September 2006 to 15 (U2000, 2006) 
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retain his or her control over those below them in the pyramid of power. In this 
way, teachers unions, peasants unions, workers unions, State Governors, the 
army, the police, all were incorporated into a clientalist political power structure 
in which the control over resources was employed to consolidate power. 
Hence, at the beginning of a new millennium, with Mexico facing the challenges 
resulting from the adoption of a new economic system and the expectations of a 
fledgling new democratic order, we find two distinct perspectives on the path 
ahead. On the one hand, historians advising caution with respect to future 
possibilities, given the embedded nature of clientalist power structures in 
Mexican politics and society, centrally controlled through the distribution of 
resources. On the other hand, we find education specialists taking an 
autonomous approach to education policy, justifying the need to change the 
objectives of education towards issues of economic pertinence as well as 
suggesting that opposition to change (Academy, 2006) sustained in inertia and 
tradition which can be overcome by the application of performance 
management strategies which link funding to reform. 
Given my personal experience with regard to the efficacy of the performance 
management strategies, I thus decided to explore the reasons for their 
unexpected results by exploring the wider social context of the reform 
programme from a historical perspective. 
Research objective 
The objective of this research is thus to consider the apparently incongruent 
strategies and the unexpected results of the tertiary education reform 
programme in Mexico from a perspective which considers the wider historical 
social and political context of tertiary education. In particular, it remains to be 
determined whether deploying performance management procedures is an 
effective strategy to 'overcome inertia and tradition' and establish the 
assignation of resources on the basis of objective criteria, or whether such 
procedures ironically, in certain contexts, encourage 'traditional' practices. 
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Theoretical framework and Issues 
The potential relevance of contemporary analyses of social capital to this 
research objective was twofold. On the one hand, performance management 
approaches to education reform propose to achieve their policy objectives 
through the management of the performance at the institutional and individual 
level by linking performance to funding and incentives payments. This is a 
strategy based on certain assumptions concerning the type of social capital 
which exists in universities in Mexico, namely that academics will freely and 
fairly submit to an objective system of evaluation of their individual performance 
in return for a possible increase in their personal benefits. 
On the other hand, my own experience in the institution where I am employed 
as a research professor suggested that performance management strategies 
were being adapted, most, if not all, of the time, to the patron-client model, a 
specific form of social capital in which benefits are distributed in return for the 
loyalty of the members of the group. For example, directors introduced the 
procedure of confirming the authenticity of all diplomas certifying the 
productivity of academics assigned to their faculty or centre, with the 
consequence that in some faculties, only those academics which 'proved' their 
loyalty to the director obtained the required signatures and thus achieved a 
positive review from the evaluation committee. Certain members of staff which 
had been, or were, of service to the state Governor, and were rarely seen in the 
university, were awarded the maximum level in the award system, an award 
which could more than double their salary. Consequently, the performance 
strategies, far from promoting competition based on merit, apparently were 
being used to reinforce traditional clientalist practices. 
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Furthermore, although this situation was routinely criticised by academics, and 
the teachers union, (if it resisted co-option by the clientalist structure)4, no 
concerted action was ever taken in this respect. There appeared to be, if not an 
acceptance of the situation, a general opinion that this situation involved factors 
which it was beyond either individual academics or the teachers union to 
challenge. The union, as a consequence, in general limited its actions to 
intervening in particular situations in response to the personal request of a 
member, but even in those situations, if a certain sector of the university 
management got to the plaintive first, the complaint might be withdrawn, leaving 
the union in the apparent role of fabricating problems. These experiences, and 
others, sustained an unspoken understanding that things would not and could 
not change and to attempt to do so would be a somewhat na·fve self-sacrifice. 
Yet, I sense that the judgement of naivety was not in terms of a smaller power 
taking on a larger power, but in terms of not understanding the degree and 
nature of the embedded ness of the system one pretended to question. 
These personal experiences lead me to reject the notion that there was a lack 
of motivation to change, indeed such a perspective implied a lack of respect to 
all those who daily resisted in various ways succumbing to the 'logic of the 
system'. Instead I decided to attempt to make visible that unidentified system 
which maintained a level of control of the university. With this objective in mind 
4 The support of the teacher's union depends on the level of independence it can or desires to 
maintain from the university authorities and local government. In 1997 the teachers elected a 
leader who claimed she would fight for teachers pay and conditions, yet instead the teachers 
union became co-opted by the government and used as an instrument to destabilise the 
university and weaken the position of Rector. Nevertheless, this strategy was undermined by 
the fact that the administration union resisted cooption, despite the personal threats they 
consequently faced. In 2001 the teacher's union leader failed to gain re-election, and a new 
leader was elected on the basis of a campaign which rejected the corruption of the previous 
administration. The same leader was re-elected in 2005. 
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I decided to explore the historical social cultural and political context of Mexico 
as well as contemporary theories of social capital in search of a framework of 
analysis which could help identify this context of the reform programme in 
Mexico. 
Research Questions 
The questions this research consequently sets out to answer are the following: 
• Why does the Mexican tertiary education reform programme include 
apparently incongruent objectives and strategies? 
• Have the different performance management strategies achieved the 
construction of a merit based system of competitive academic 
relations in Mexican universities or, ironically, have 'traditional', non 
objective systems of relations been strengthened? 
• In what way and to what extent are different forms of capital 
embedded in the social structure of Mexican society and is it feasible 
to attempt to introduce an objective system of evaluation linked to the 
distribution of resources in the tertiary education in Mexico without 
taking them into account? 
• Does the impact of the performance management strategies vary 
between distinct institutional environments and, if so, what are the 
principal factors that account for these differences? 
• In what way can a deeper knowledge of the context of the reform 
programme improve policy design? 
Methodological issues 
My general research approach is exploratory. As mentioned above, my 
personal experience leads me to doubt the ANUIES justification of the reform 
programme strategies, and inclined me towards a historical and social 
perspective in the search for a more satisfactory account of the issues at stake. 
Nevertheless, I found no prior research which adopts this approach to the 
analysis of the outcomes of the reform programme. Furthermore, my objective 
involved the identification of a system which maintained a tacit rather than 
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objective existence. For this reason I adopted a methodological approach, 
which involved adopting an initial heuristic framework based on Bourdieu's 
concepts of habitus, fields and capital, and analysing the principal issues 
involved in the introduction of the reform programme in relation to this initial 
framework. 
The empirical research consists of a comparative case-study analysis of the 
impact of performance management policy in universities in Mexico. I chose to 
undertake the case study analyses in the provincial university where I worked 
and in the two largest metropolitan universities in Mexico City. The basis for 
the selection of these universities are set out in chapter 6, but it is worth 
mentioning here that a key consideration in the selection of these universities 
was the possibility of the establishment of semi-open interview situations with 
academics based on situations of trust due to the political and hence sensitive 
nature of issues to be discussed. The factors involved in the construction of 
relations of trust and collaboration in Mexican universities were, consequently, 
not only the object of research; they were also taken into account in the 
research design. 
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis explores the extent to which a complex model of fields capital and 
habitus can identify key factors involved in replacing a 'traditional' with a 
'performance' based system of funding. On this basis it hopes to offer a 
coherent explanation of the tensions resulting from the introduction of tertiary 
education reform in Mexico, as well as an explanation of the varying impact of 
the programme between institutions. This thesis draws attention to the 
importance of considering education systems as embedded in wider social 
practices, especially when new policies are to be introduced, in order to avoid 
not only the ineffective use of resources involved in policy implementation, but 
also the possibility of provoking unexpected negative results. 
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Chapter organisation 
Chapter one introduces the research problem the background to that problem 
and the related research questions. 
Chapter two considers the methodological issues of the research project. The 
heuristic framework guiding the initial research is set out with regard to 
methodological issues in comparative and international research in education 
and comparative case study methods, as well as Bourdieu's approach to forms 
of capital and social fields. At the end of this chapter a diagram sets out the 
initial notion of the relation of the field of tertiary education to the fields of 
national and international policy, the field of global economics and the local and 
national fields of politics. 
Chapter three explores the field of tertiary education in Mexico from the 
revolution to the current reform programme in order to determine the autonomy 
of that field in relation to the other fields considered in the initial heuristic 
framework, and the principle challenges which arose as a result of those 
relations .. 
Chapter four explores the extent to which the type of relations which exist 
between the field of tertiary education and the other social fields mentioned are 
unique to that field or whether they are related to wider social issues. This 
question is related to the feasibility of approaching tertiary education reform as 
an autonomous field as distinct from a field embedded in the social structures of 
Mexican society. 
In chapter five, I shall revise alternative approaches to the concept of social 
capital in order to, on the one hand, develop the initial heuristic framework 
based on Bourdieu's approach to forms of capital and social fields and, on the 
other hand, to identify the distinct models of social capital inherent in the 
international policy models of the OECD and the World Bank .. 
Chapter six analyses the two principal international models of tertiary education 
reform contained within the Mexican reform programme in terms of their 
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objectives to transform the field of tertiary education and the assumptions 
concerning social capital inherent in each model. I shall also compare these 
international models of tertiary education reform in search for an explanation for 
the apparently incongruent objectives of the reform programme. 
Chapter seven involves the development of three case studies of the impact of 
the reform programme in three universities in Mexico. 
Chapter eight develops a comparative analysis of the three case studies and 
develops the initial heuristic framework in relation to those results. 
In chapter nine I conclude by setting set out my answers to my initial research 
questions and the possible implications for tertiary education policy at both the 
national and international level. 
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Chapter 2. Methodological issues 
In this chapter I will firstly reflect upon the place of the current research project 
within the field of comparative and international research in education. 
Secondly, I will explain why the research approach of comparative case studies 
was the most appropriate for this research project and also, the background 
theory which provided the initial perspective in this approach; thirdly, I will 
explain how the context in which the research was undertaken and issues of 
access to information were taken into account in the research design and also 
ethical issues which arose during the research; fourthly, I will describe the 
methods of data collection and data analysis. 
Comparative and International Research in 
Education 
Given that the focus of this research is concerned with the impact of 
international policy on social capital in universities in Mexico, it is helpful to 
consider the place of this research within the body of comparative and 
international education approaches and methods. Firstly I will explore issues 
considered central to a comparative or international education research focus in 
order to subsequently explain how the comparative case study method most 
congruently addresses such issues. 
A brief account of comparative and international education topics and issues 
reveals the extent to which the field has become progressively more focused 
due to the changing international context, whilst some of the original 
methodological concerns have become increasingly pertinent. Writing after the 
first World War, Kandel noted that although an extensive literature in 
comparative education existed at that time, nevertheless, there was "no 
unanimity about the methods of research" nor about "the topics to be studied" 
(Kandel, 1936, p. 400). Kandel himself argued against statistical comparisons 
and in favour of adopting a method of research in which "an analysis and 
interpretation of educational systems in the light of national traditions and the 
current political, social and economic setting may be applied" (Kandel, 1936, p. 
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404). In this sense he did not consider that comparative education involved 
standards of measurement and comparison, but rather understanding 
differences between national educational systems: 
The purpose of comparative education, as of comparative law, comparative 
literature, or comparative anatomy, is to discover the differences in the forces 
and causes that produce differences in educational systems. This is all the 
more important today since most of the advanced nations are confronted with 
almost identical problems and yet the solutions are not universally identical. 
(Kandel, 1936, p. 406) 
Kandel apparently considered the comparative element to involve the fact that 
different nations with different contexts were facing the same challenges, and of 
the importance to understand the distinct results and solutions in each society. 
Nevertheless, an alternative definition of comparative education suggests it 
involves the comparison of two or more societies on the basis of a particular 
relationship. Cowen suggests that: 
Comparative education begins when some complex, coherent and theoretically 
stateable understanding of the relationship between at least two societies and 
their educational systems has been formed. (Cowen, 1996, p. 153) 
Crossley and Broadfoot observe that given these distinct understandings of 
comparative education, in practice a distinction between 'comparative' and 
'international' research is maintained. The objective of 'international' education 
is to "describe, analyse or make proposals for a particular aspect of education in 
one country other than the author's own country. The Comparative and 
International Education Society introduced the word 'international' in their title in 
order to cover these sorts of studies". (Postelwaite, 1989, p. xvii) (Crossley & 
Broadfoot, 1992, p. 101) 
The issue of considering analysis within a wider context continued, however, to 
retain a high profile in both fields, particularly in the current context of 
globalisation. Beattie and Brock suggest that: "The health of policy-making in 
an interdependent world must depend in part on the health of comparative 
education research in the broadest sense" (Beattie & Brock, 1990, p. 4) 
(Crossley & Broadfoot, 1992). 
Arnove writing in 1980 had already drawn attention to the increasing role of 
international policy agencies in education. Arguing that 90% of education 
budgets in the developing world, and often in the developed world, go on 
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salaries and running costs and only 10% on experimentation, he argued that the 
10% provided by international agencies thus has a huge impact: 
The programs and projects funded by the international network of donor 
agencies, in effect, establish an agenda for education activities. Priorities 
defined by the funding agencies determine where national funds will be 
committed for long periods. (Arnove, 1980, p. 52) 
More recently, Welch has further sharpened the focus by considering the 
general adoption by international agencies of new-managerialist policies. His 
research concerns how the strategies of end-user financing contained within 
this approach affect the widening gaps between rich and poor and impact local 
democracy. (Welch, 2001) 
Crossley and Broadfoot's article in 1992 was concerned with drawing attention 
to some of the outstanding problems, as well as the potential in international 
and comparative research. There main concern echoes that of Kendal in 1936, 
namely that the current interest on the part of international funding agencies in 
financing comparative education research is leading to short term research 
projects dictated by the objectives of those funding bodies, with the risk that 
research will lack "cultural and contextual sensitivity", opening the door to the 
ethical question of cultural imperialism and potential bias (Crossley & Broadfoot, 
1992). 
So whilst there is greater unanimity concerning international and comparative 
research topics due to the increased profile of international agencies which 
adopt common managerial approaches, the question of research methods 
remains a key concern. 
It can be noted at this point that the current research shares Arnove's focus on 
the increasing impact of the policies of international agencies on national policy 
design, and Welch's concern for the impact of the new-managerialist policies 
which those agencies have adopted. It can also be observed that whilst this 
research thus follows Beattie's and Brock's advice to consider the wider context 
of developments in education, it also follows Kandel's Crossley and Broadfoot's 
recommendation to analyse the impact of those policies with regard to the 
particular context. It combines both a broad and a context specific focus 
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through a comparative case study of the impact of international policy models in 
three state universities in Mexico. 
Comparative case study methods 
In this section I will consider the methods of comparative case study analysis 
and the role of initial theoretical frameworks in guiding empirical research, and 
in the following section I will explain the theoretical framework which determined 
the general research design of this case study approach. 
Some prior epistemological distinctions 
Robson observes that the case study is not a flawed experimental design; it is a 
fundamentally different research strategy with its own designs (Robson, 1993, 
p. 56). Amongst the reasons why it is distinct is the concern to take into 
account the particular context. Whereas the experimental design is based on a 
particular epistemological view which supposes that the analysis and 
interpretation of data can be divorced from its context, the case study approach 
is based on the philosophical position that understanding can only take place 
within a particular context. 
In Being and Time Heidegger (Heidegger, 1980) argued that an 
incommensurable distinction exists between the universal ontological structure 
of human being, and the context specific and culturally grounded ways in which 
that structure is given meaning. This allowed his followers to claim that "the 
meaning of human action is not accessible to a scientific theory; to understand 
the significance of human action requires an interpretive approach" (Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1993, p. 37) Hermeneutic interpretation is thus a critique of 
metaphysics, and the metaphysical pretensions of scientific theory concerning 
the social world: "We call 'metaphysical' any such account that claims to know 
objectively what is to be a human being". (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1993, p. 39) 
Hermeneutic interpretation does not pretend to be objective, instead to 
recognise our human finitude is to recognise that any understanding always 
takes place in a particular context against a background of shared practices. 
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The distinction between the rationalist epistemological approach and the 
phenomenological and hermeneutical philosophical approaches is one which 
underlies the distinction in social science methodologies between 'positivistic' 
and 'new paradigm research'. The latter term refers to such methodological 
approaches as 'post positivistic', 'ethnographic', 'phenomenological', 
'hermeneutic', 'humanistic' and 'naturalistic' (Robson, 1993, p.59). The case 
study is, Robson suggests, well suited to the characteristics of 'naturalistic 
inquiry'. 
The fact, then, that the case study is, as Robson suggests, a fundamentally 
different research strategy, is because it is based on a fundamentally distinct 
philosophical position concerning what is considered 'knowledge'. 
Nevertheless, one can still find within the discussion of aspects of case study 
research, positivistic concerns seeping back in. Such discussions can be found 
both at the level of the role of the theoretical framework, as well as at the level 
of data analysis. 
Case studies and theoretical frameworks 
The difference between Yin's 'positivistic' approach to case study methods and 
Robson's 'naturalistic' approach, can be seen in Robson's description of case 
studies, not as a fundamentally distinct approach, but as a comprehensive 
research strategy which covers "the logic of design, data collection techniques, 
and specific approaches to data analysis" (Yin, 2003, p. 14)). For this reason, 
whilst Robson considers appropriate the grounded theory approach 
characteristic of naturalistic enquiry, as best suited to case study methods, Yin 
underlines the "benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analysis" given that case study inquiry "relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion". 
In comparative case study design, it could be argued that the need to set out 
the theoretical basis of comparison is as important as setting out the empirical 
basis of comparison. As Sylke Nissen observes in a discussion of the use of 
comparative case studies "Stringing up single cases without methodological 
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connection does not fulfil the demands of the comparative method" (Nissen, 
1998, p. 410). Furthermore, it would be ingenuous to suppose that no 
theoretical framework guided the empirical research. Nevertheless, the 
differences of opinion concerning how developed the initial framework needs to 
be can be related back to the philosophical distinction concerning the nature of 
knowledge. 
Evers and Wu also consider a prior theoretical position an important element to 
be able to generalise from case study analysis. On the one hand, they would 
seem to suggest a more hermeneutical conception of meaning as the basis of 
shared understanding by arguing that in all forms of research universal theories 
are present in the very language of description or analysis used in the research. 
They refer to Popper's argument concerning general terms or universals (Evers 
& Wu, 2006, p. 515). Nevertheless, on the other hand, whilst accepting that a 
common language supports generalisations based on common terms or 
universals, they also observe that when it comes to comparative case studies, 
"the generalisations may be only as warranted as the background theory" 
(Evers, 2006, p516). 
Consequently, it is not a question of avoiding theoretical bias, as they propose 
Glaser and Strauss do in developing the notion of grounded theory, but rather of 
avoiding confirmation bias as a result of seeking to confirm the theory 
regardless of the data. They set out a method in which theory is fedforward and 
compared with the feedback patterns of interpreted experiences or 
observations, with different variations of a theory eliminated until the most 
appropriate match is found. This approach would seem to assume that at least 
one of these a priori theoretical frameworks will in fact match, or perhaps one 
would need to go back to the drawing board if it didn't. Yet perhaps it is 
precisely when it would appear necessary to go back and revise the initial 
research design that confirmation bias in fact is at its most dangerous. 
In this sense, grounded theory approach would seem a better option in that it 
includes Ever and Wu's feedforward and feedback strategy yet does not require 
a fully fledged a priori theoretical framework, with different variations to feed 
forward. Instead, it uses a skeleton framework to structure the overall 
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research interview design and an 'in-vivo' approach to data analysis. Kelle 
(Kelle, 1997) uses the term 'heuristic framework', to describe the general set of 
ideas which guide the empirical research, observing that to propose an 'open 
mind' approach to research is not to approach research with a blank mind' but 
rather to allow as far as possible, the data to 'speak for itself' within the 
heuristic framework. This approach may put the researcher in a position of 
discovering a variety of modalities, practices, etc. and possibly even 
phenomena which will de reviewed against the initially adopted framework for 
the specific analysis and theory to be developed. The problem of confirmation 
bias does not therefore arise for grounded theory, because theory is developed 
from the data analysis against the background of the initial guiding theoretical 
framework. 
The approach adopted in the current research combined the use of an initial 
skeleton framework to structure the overall research design, whilst the specific 
concepts of analysis within that framework arose partly from the analysis of the 
background social political and economic context, and partly from the in vivo 
data analysis. In short, I suggest that if one is to take into account the advice of 
comparative educationalists regarding the need for attention to context, then it 
is not congruent to set out with a detailed methodological model against which 
to measure data analysis. Instead, it is important to have a clear idea of the 
general theoretical framework and use a comparative case study approach to fill 
in the details and thereby develop the analysis. 
Yet the possibility of such an approach depends on the extent to which the 
background theory sustains it. Clearly if the methodological approach of the 
research is based on a phenomenological or hermeneutical philosophical 
position, then the theoretical framework should likewise share the same 
approach. It is in this sense that Bourdieu's theory of how the relative values of 
capital within fields vary according to the particular context is particularly 
congruent with the objectives of this hermeneutical approach. 
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Background theories guiding the initial research 
This research involves, on the one hand, an analysis of international policy 
models with regard to tertiary education, and on the other hand, an interpretive 
analysis of the type of relations which exist in universities in Mexico. The latter 
requires an understanding of the social, political and economic national context. 
Finally, by means of a comparative analysis of three case studies, the objective 
of this research is to determine the emergent properties of the ways in which 
the international policies and national contexts influence and are played out in 
the local configuration of relations in each particular university. 
Although the particular terms of analysis of the local relations would not become 
clear until the analysis of the national objectives of the reform programme had 
been determined as well as the wider national context in which they took place, 
nevertheless, it is already clear from the objectives thus far adopted that the 
focus is upon relations not identities. Mary Henkel, for example, has published 
research on the impact of policy on the "classical" notion of academic identity, 
the paradoxical ideal of strong identities within a community of equals, and a 
move towards more "professional", individualistic, competitive identities (Henkel, 
2000)). The current research is concerned to determine, within the social, 
political and economic context of each university, the relation between 
academics as actors in the social field, not as 'identities' constructed by that 
field. To the extent to which international policies change the relative value of 
capitals in that field, they have an impact on the possible range of action of 
academics within that social field. 
Bourdieu's concept of the relative forms of capital which exist within the field of 
tertiary education is considered in detail in chapter five. The purpose at this 
moment is to consider how that approach might be applied in distinct ways to 
the field of higher education. Fortunately, a recent example of the application of 
this approach exists in Rajani Naidoo's and Ian Jamieson's consideration of the 
impact of neo-liberal and new managerialism principles to higher education 
(Naidoo & Jamieson, 2005, p. 877). 
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Naidoo and Jamieson adopt the framework of Bourdieu's study of the field of 
higher education in France, where he argues that "The 'capital' invested with 
value in the field of higher education is termed 'academic capital' and consists 
in the first instance of intellectual or cultural, rather than economic or political 
assets" (Naidoo, 2005, p.8??). Hence their concern is to consider the extent to 
which market influences in tertiary education are "likely to lead to the erosion of 
academic capital and the valorisation of economic capital" (Naidoo, 2005, 
p.8?8). They consider how this change in the relative values of capital in the 
field of higher education will affect particular aspects: the pedagogic relation, 
academic professionalism, trust and risk-taking and the structure of knowledge. 
The current research project differs from that of Naidoo and Jamieson to the 
extent that in Mexico it cannot be assumed from the outset that the form of 
capital invested with the highest value in the field of higher education is that of 
academic capital. Indeed, on the basis of an analysis of the social, political and 
economic context of Mexico, the concern is to focus on precisely which forms of 
capital compete for value in the field of tertiary education in Mexico, without 
committing, at this moment, to whether that impact is principally in the form of 
consumerist influences, and whether this involves the erosion of academic or 
other forms of capital. It is in this sense, that Bourdieu's approach will be 
adopted in a 'heuristic' manner at this point: the identification of which forms of 
capital in the higher education field in Mexico have high value will be identified 
on the basis of a contextual analysis. How international policy proposes to 
change such values will be identified on the basis of a policy analysis. Finally, 
the actual values of capital within each field and the impact of policy on those 
values will be determined on the basis of case study analysis. 
The comparative case study method of data collection, intends to determine 
whether the situation varies between universities as a result of the history of its 
own particular organisational structure and its local context. Naidoo and 
Jamieson also observe the need to treat each university, indeed each subject 
area, as a separate entity: 
An enduring limitation in relation to the social theory of higher education is that 
researchers have tended to conceptualize institutions of higher education in an 
overly homogenous way. However, as shown above, the outcomes of forces 
for commodification may differ substantially across different types of universities 
and subject areas. In an era where both academic and economic forces exert 
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powerful structuring effects on universities, the field of higher education is likely 
to become the locus of power struggles over the legitimate capital required to 
attain dominance. An in-depth analysis of the impact of commodification on 
different types of universities may play an important role in contributing to 
sociological understanding of the impact of commodification on labour market 
destinations and social equity. 
In short the conceptual basis of the comparison between the case studies will 
be in terms of the forms of capital in the university, and the different degrees of 
autonomy the university field maintains in relation to other fields which 
constitute the social space, including the fields of global markets, international 
and national tertiary education policy, and the field of political power. At this 
point, the relation between these fields can be represented as in figure 1. 
This figure represents the different extents to which a university field may be 
intersected by other fields. To position a university at the left of the central field 
would be to suggest that it functions within the national field of tertiary education 
policy with the other fields of the local and national political context, the national 
economic context, the international economic context of globalisation, and the 
international context of education policy, providing the background to the field of 
national education. To position a university towards the right would indicate a 
more direct contact with other fields, as indicated in the diagram by X1, X2, X3, 
and X4. The closer the university is placed to the central axis, the more it is 
intersected by all the mentioned fields. The further the university is placed from 
that axis, indicates that one particular field is predominant.. 
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As mentioned above, Naidoo and Jamieson describe how the global market is 
impacting directly on relations within the university in England, and hence 
according to this account, universities in England could be generally located at 
point X5 (the intersection of the university field with the field of the global 
economic market), as the question of the closeness to the other fields is not 
discussed in that particular article. 
With regard to this research, from a preliminary perspective, changes in the 
national field of tertiary education policy would appear to be influenced by the 
international field of education policy which in turn responds to the neo-liberal 
approach to global economics, whilst national and local politics apparently have 
a strong influence. So, in a loose hypothetical sense, Mexican Universities 
would be found close to the line between X3 and X4. The question this 
research seeks to address by means of distinct case studies is the degree to 
which the impact of those policies differs from one university to another. 
From preliminary knowledge, the provincial university can be expected to be 
more influenced by the local political field, whilst the nature of the strikes in the 
national university indicated a strong relation to the national political field, yet 
the situation of the metropolitan university is entirely unknown. Furthermore, 
the impact of these political fields relative to that of the field of education policy 
at either a national or international level is also unknown. At this point in the 
research then, the differentiation of universities within the relational space of the 
university field is a loose notion which will be progressively developed in the 
following chapters. 
The research context and access to information 
in Mexico 
Another sense in which the context of this research needs to be taken into 
account is in the extent to which it has an impact on the actual process of 
research. 
33 
The first issue is in relation to the accessibility of information in Mexico. There 
is a lack of critical research on the impact of education policy, especially its 
impact in universities in the provinces. The lack of empirical and critical 
analysis in education research in Mexico, is in part due to a culture which 
considers such research as dangerous because it may produce results that are 
politically compromising, so that "there is a tradition of concealing information 
that is controversial (Bensimon & Bauman, p. 15) Much of the research 
undertaken concerning the impact of the reform programme limits itself to a 
description of statistical data. 
In recent years, these statistics on developments in tertiary education have 
been made available on the internet on the web page of the Secretary of 
Education (www.sep.gob.mx). Even so, the information is presented in a 
fragmented and partial way so that it is difficult to obtain useful information (see 
chapter 3, last section: Outstanding issues with regard to the impact of the 
reform programme). Another web page is the Citizens Education Observatory 
(OCE) (www.observatorio.org) which initially carried monthly debates on 
developments in education in Mexico, but has recently displayed little new input. 
A most welcome development is the links it hosts to its online journal, and the 
journals of the National Association of Universities (ANUIES) and the Journal of 
the Mexican Institute of Education Research (RMIE). 
The OCDE CERI report on Research in Education in Mexico (CERI, 2004), 
noted that the number of researchers in relation to the number of teachers in 
the education system is 0.03 per cent, and only 4 doctoral programmes and 11 
courses are recognised in the National Registry of Postgraduate studies of 
CONACYT. Furthermore, 58% of the researchers are concentrated in Mexico 
City, and there is a lack of institutional conditions to undertake research, (lack of 
reliable data, lack of access to data, etc.). (CERI, 2004, pp. 20 - 21) 
Furthermore, two distinct and often separate types of research groups exist: 
those dedicated to basic or academic investigation, and those dedicated to 
applied problem solving research. These groups are divided between those 
that work in knowledge areas (example maths teaching) and those that work on 
policy. 
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Table 1: Types of Investigation in Mexico and its impact on Education Policy 
(CERI, 2004, p. 24) 
Relation with the systems Orientation of education research 
needs and the policies 1. Basic and academic 2. Applied and development 
research research 
Relatively independent of 1.1. Centres of specialised 2.1 Researchers, centres and 
policy and focused on areas of universities, SNI researchers associated foundations with 
knowledge (excellent academic research) teacher training and 
experience and/or particular 
agents 0 groups (adults, 
indigenous, women's and 
other groups) ('organic 
'researctU. 
Involved in policy and the 1.2 High level academic 2.2 Researchers, centres and 
solution of the systems centres who advise and/or are NGO's who provide advice to 
problems involved in the design of policy education authorities and 
(directed research) others on development models 
and technology to resolve 
problems. They respond to 
needs ("I nstrumental 
research") 
Access to information required for research is normally concealed given that it is 
considered that all information possibly conceals politically sensitive 
information. Access to university information, even the most basic, would 
require permission from the highest authority. This fact had a strong influence 
on the conduct of the investigation, including the research design, favouring a 
case study method where research data is built up in a complex fashion from a 
number of sources. 
Ethical issues at stake in the research 
With respect to what Crossley and Broadfoot refer to as the need for 'cultural 
and contextual sensitivity', I have been living in Mexico for nearly 20 years, yet 
circumstances still occur daily to remind me of this issue, perhaps 
euphemistically put, of sensitivity. Indeed, this research is a clear example of 
the benefits of trying to understand instead of judging what may often seem 
unjustifiable actions, In addition, nevertheless, there is also the issue of my 
personal involvement in the events referred to in this research due to the fact 
that my husband was Rector of the Autonomous University of Campeche from 
1995 to 1999 and his period coincided with the strong promotion by ANUIES 
and SESIC of the tertiary education reform programme both in terms of 
university accountability and the reorganization of Universities in relation to the 
objectives of the PROMEP programme. As explained in chapter two, neoliberal 
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reforms in Mexico were introduced top down, a process facilitated by the 
hierarchical structure of Mexican Society, nevertheless, that introduction, 
sometimes conceived as an imposition, sometimes as coercion, provoked 
reactions amongst different social groups. In Chiapas, it resulted in an 
indigenous uprising, as the inclusion of basic grains in the opening of 
commodity markets, was considered by indigenous communities as a threat to 
their way of life based on the cultivation of the maize crop; in the National 
University it resulted in a nine month strike by students who rejected the 
increase in tuition fees in so far as it undermined the principal of free tertiary 
education; in Campeche it resulted in sending in plain clothed police to take 
control of the university and impose a new Rector, as the State Governor 
perceived the traditional spheres of control- sources of young voters and extra 
funds for political campaigns- progressively challenged by a discourse of 
university autonomy and accountability. 
Yet, reflection on the way my personal experience was concerned with the 
implementation of the reform programme, made me realise that even if I 
decided not to undertake a case study in Campeche, the events in Campeche 
were inseparable from those in the UNAM. For example, I had been witness to 
the personal report of a person present in the meeting of ANUIES in September 
1999, in which the resignation of the Rector of the National University was 
announced and details of the events in the University of Campeche were given. 
The then Secretary of Education, Dr Limon, (1994-2000) instead of decrying 
such events, merely admonished those Rectors present, arguing that they 
needed to take into account local contexts and negotiate accordingly. This 
attempt to deflect criticism by laying the blame on those who are arguably the 
victims of the events, astonished many of those Rectors present, and such a 
response was considered, on the contrary, akin to sacrificing those in the front 
line when the going got tough. Not all of those present were aware of the 
context of events in Campeche, but all were well aware that Dr Barnes, the 
Rector of the UNAM, had merely followed the policy of the Secretary of 
Education in increasing tuition fees, yet the government had not publicly backed 
the Rector, and furthermore Dr Limon was now arguing that the negative 
reaction of the students was due to a lack of the personal negotiating skills of Dr 
Barnes. 
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This personal report bore an ironic relation to a conversation my husband had a 
few months before with the then Sub-Secretary of higher education, in which he 
had suggested that the speed in which the reform programme could be, pushed 
through needed to take into account the distinct conditions of each university. 
He observed that Dr Rescendes had not appeared to consider his argument 
favourably, and indeed, felt that the critical observation had created a certain 
distance in their relation. Relating this conversation to later events, it can be 
seen that Dr Limon argued that the distinct conditions of each university 
required not the adaptation of the reform programme according to institutional 
contexts, but the use of personal negotiating skills on behalf of each Rector. 
(This may be interpreted as an example of how neo-liberal policies centralise 
policy models but decentralise responsibility for outcomes, as discussed in 
chapter six). 
This 'insider' perspective on events contrasts with the semi-official version of 
events diffused at the time, which on the one hand, laid the blame for the 
escalating strike on Dr Barnes's personal skills of negotiation, and in 
Campeche, laid the blame on the lack of 'political skills' of the Rector to 
negotiate a compromise with the Governor. To remain silent on both accounts 
would inadvertently vindicate Dr Limon's strategy to 'decentralise' responsibility 
for errors and at the same time defend a policy approach that one policy, (with 
the right leadership skills), could be fitted to all situations. 
In short, it was neither morally, nor conceptually possible for me to consider the 
impact of the reform of tertiary education in Mexico without taking into account 
my personal experience of, and knowledge of, these events. This required me 
to consider whether, as a consequence, the credibility of my research was in 
question as the issue arose concerning whether the objectivity of my 
perspective was too compromised to consider the product of that research in 
terms of academic knowledge. Nevertheless, this in turn raised the question of 
the nature of an 'objective perspective' on those events, given that only those 
involved in those events were in a position to 'know' what was going on. Such 
information is not reported in Mexico, nor in many places I suspect, and would 
not be available for future 'objective' research. In this sense, I felt morally 
37 
obliged to find a way in which to present my personal knowledge of these 
events together with more objectively researched data in such a way as to 
present an alternative, and I argue, fuller and accurate, account of what 
happened in the UNAM and in the UAC. This account would attempt to explain 
these events as part of the implications of pushing through, regardless of 
national or local circumstances, the top down implementation of the reform 
programme. Whilst I did have a privileged insight into events, there was also a 
lot I didn't know about the wider context of those events. On the one hand, then, 
my own 'alternative account' could be considered as a 'valid' contribution to the 
extent to which my personal experience of events formed part of a coherent 
account which included the wider national and global context. On the other 
hand, if the combination of my personal 'insiders' perspective on events, 
together with different 'outsiders' perspectives on the impact of the reform 
programme, in this way achieved the construction of a 'more complete' 
understanding of events for the reader, then my research, instead of being 
compromised by my personal experience, will have been enriched. I have 
presented my personal perspective in squared brackets so that the reader can 
distinguish these insights from my analysis of the data gathered. 
In short this research project had to be permanently attentive to the following 
issues: 
• difficulty of access to information, 
• personal involvement in events related to the research 
• the use of personal connections 
• questions of cultural sensitivity 
• The political sensitivity of the theme of the research. 
Research Methods 
To seek to understand the tensions arising from the introduction of tertiary 
education reforms in Mexico in relation to the national and local contexts within 
which those reforms were introduced, is not only a difficult project due to lack of 
published research on education in Mexico (see introduction), it is also made 
more difficult if one intends to take into account the extent to which hierarchical 
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social structures and political and social networks may have an influence in that 
situation. If this research aims to answer the question whether the reform model 
is incorporated in different ways and has different impacts according to the 
unique structure of the relation between academic networks, organizational 
issues and the local social and political context in each particular university, it 
was clear that research concerning each particular university context where the 
programme was introduced would contribute a valuable level of data to be in a 
position to answer my research questions. Nevertheless, this required 
considering the problem of gathering empirical information concerning a 
delicate issue, in a culture not always accustomed to critical self-reflection. 
The question of what data to gather 
With regard to the question of what information to gather, I decided to focus on 
one aspect of the introduction of the reform programme, namely the impact of 
the different incentives programmes. The new-managerialist approach involved 
management strategies which raised a number of issues: firstly, certain 
assumptions concerning both personal motivation and social relations in the 
university; secondly, the incentives programme are a key strategy in introducing 
an 'objective' evaluative culture; thirdly, certain programmes aim to measure 
'productivity' in terms of 'scientific output', whilst others are directed at the 
increased performance of research groups, and the role of such groups in the 
transferral of knowledge. 
The question of where to gather data 
Given the difficulties of access to information mentioned above, as well as the 
fact that information was in general considered as politically sensitive, the 
possibility of access to interviewee's through relations established on the basis 
of confidence was the most important criteria for the selection of universities 
where the case studies were to be undertaken. For reasons which will be 
discussed in the following chapters, relations of trust in Mexico are based on 
personal relations, rarely professional relations. I had personal contacts in the 
national and the metropolitan university in Mexico City and in the provincial 
university, where I worked in the south of Mexico. Nevertheless, in the latter 
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case, a further issue was at stake. This was personal issue, and yet, at the 
same time, woven into the introduction of the reform programmes in Mexico. 
The question of how to gather data 
The case study approach tends to use multiple methods of evidence or data 
collection to build the single case. (Robson, 1993, p. 52) Nevertheless, whilst 
the case study approach was determined by the object of this research, namely 
the field of relations in different universities in Mexico and the impact of the 
performance management strategies in those relations, the methods chosen to 
gather data concerning those relations needed to take into account the socially 
and politically sensitive nature of the information to be gathered. 
Concerning background information to each case study, the sensitivity of the 
research subject, meant that there was a scarcity of research concerning the 
forms of social relations within each institution and between the institution and 
the government. Nevertheless, although the information was not abundant, I 
gathered data from various sources, including previous research on a number 
of related themes, such as the history of the university, the development of its 
organisational structure. From the web sites of each institution I sought 
regulations concerning hiring, promotion and staff evaluation procedures. I also 
referred to staff news letters. 
In order to determine the particular configuration of relations amongst staff in 
the university and the impact of the reform programme, I needed to gather 
information from the academic staff themselves, and here the sensitivity of the 
information was a key issue. Taking this into account, it was clear that the in-
depth interview format was a more appropriate form than a questionnaire to 
approach the problem of attempting to research socially and politically sensitive 
information, as it would provide a greater opportunity of attempting to establish 
trust. Nevertheless, the in-depth interview method raises several of its own 
questions. 
As Clive Seale (Seale, 1998) points out, a 'depth' and 'unstructured' approach 
to the type of interaction in interviews , while redressing some of the 
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'exploitative' aspects of standardised questionnaire format (Seale, 1998, p. 
205), still assumes the epistemological basis of that approach. Both the 
classical and depth approaches assume the notion that "The social world is 
assumed to have an existence that is independent of the language used to 
describe it" (Seale, 1998, p. 202) They differ in their approach to how accuracy 
is obtained. The 'classical' approach is to achieve accuracy by eliminating as 
far as possible personal bias through a standardized format. A 'depth' 
approach, instead of accuracy seeks 'authenticity' through 'trust' and 'intimacy' 
where 'private material' may be divulged. As Seale makes clear, both 
approaches continue to use the interview as a resource rather than a topic. 
(Seale, 1998) 
To treat the interview as a topic is to take into account factors which 
irremediably reduce the 'accuracy' or 'authenticity' of the interview relation, such 
as micro-politics of the interview setting, issues of 'moral reputations and self-
identity' (Seale, 1998, p. 213) and the 'linguistic repertoire' which refers to the 
"resources upon which people draw in constructing accounts". Nevertheless, 
as Seale points out, these are not mutually exclusive approaches and that by 
adopting both its is possible to avoid simplistic assumptions of interviews 
providing 'windows on reality', and at the same time consider which of the 
different constructions of reality are most plausible. As Seale concludes: 
"Examining how different versions of reality are deployed by interviewees 
should not blind us to the fact that only certain versions are likely to be 
plausible". (Seale, 1998, pp. 215-216) 
I used the depth interview approach both to establish trust and intimacy so that 
private material might be divulged, but I also had to pre-establish certain 
relations of trust by using academic networks to establish each interview. (See 
section below on criteria for selection of sample) Nevertheless, in considering 
the interview as a topic, I had to be aware of the micro-politics of each interview 
situation, (discussed further in interview style below) for despite the 'personal 
recommendations' I had received to undertake the interviews, some of those 
interviewed still felt potentially compromised by the information they were giving 
me, and on occasions sought the repetition of my initial confirmation that I 
would protect their identity in my analysis of the interview data. At times, those 
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interviewed did give guarded replies, but did not sustain this attitude throughout 
the interview, partly because confidence was established as the interview went 
on, and partly because the desire to comment on the situation balanced the 
feeling of the need to be careful not to compromise them. This required me to 
compare the information given in different parts of the interview. 56 
In fact, the impression I acquired was that those interviewed were often glad to 
be able to talk about the issues I raised in the interviews; it was as if the 
interview gave them the opportunity to air their views, which they did not often 
have the opportunity to air. For example, the majority interviewed did not use 
the type of phrase "As I have said before in relation to this issue", except one 
person who has written on these issues extensively. With regard to most of the 
other academics interviewed I had the impression that bit by bit, as the interview 
progressed, the questions touched themes which they felt passionately about. 
In only a few cases a certain level of inarticulateness in their response 
suggested that they had not thought through the issues involved, whilst in other 
cases the articulations of the responses suggested that they had thought 
through the issues but they gave no hint of having discussed the issues widely, 
there were no phrases such as "as I have remarked to my colleagues", or 
anything similar. I perceived this when undertaking the interviews, but on 
reflection it is surprising and it would have been useful to have included a 
question concerning the extent to which such issues were discussed amongst 
faculty members. 
6 An example of triangulation is included in appendix 2. 
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The interview 'sample'. 
The most important criteria in the selection of the 'sample' of academics to 
interview, concerned, then, levels of confidence and trust that could be 
established with those interviewed (see a more detailed explanation of this 
below in the section on implementation). . In this sense I used a form of 
purposive, not random or statistically representative, sampling, considering that 
it increased "the scope or range of data exposed and is more adaptable". 
(Robson, 1993, p. 61) I did not consider that my personal identity affected in 
any way my interviews of academics in Mexico City, events in the provinces go 
largely unperceived in Mexico City and when they are perceived they are given 
little relative importance. For example, the fact that power has been devolved 
to the provinces even when some State governors continued to consider 
themselves above the rule of the law, and where no independent judicial system 
exists, and relevant legislation has not been written, let alone passed, is a fact 
that appears to be overlooked by Federal government, although it is quite 
apparent to not only those living in the provinces but also to the evaluating team 
of the GECD (OECD, 1997) (see chapter three). 
I did however; consider that my personal identity could affect the interviews in 
my own university, so I took steps to limit any possible impact. Nearly six years 
had passed since the autonomy of the university was physically violated. Since 
that time my husband had not been permitted to work in the university, and for 
the last three years had been on research assignments in Mexico City. 
Nevertheless, I clearly had to take into account that I continued to be identified 
as the partner of an ex-Rector. Some staff sought to avoid contact with me, 
considering any association would be politically unfavourable for them, whilst 
other surreptitiously greeted me and almost in a whisper asked after my 
husband. Consequently, I sought to interview academics that had been born, 
had lived, or had studied outside Campeche, who had either joined the 
university after these events or had a wider perspective on the issues involved 
and were thus less personally intimidated by any association to them. 
Furthermore, in the invitation to the interview, I made clear the theme of 
discussion which had no apparently direct connection with the events in which 
my husband had been involved. 
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A second important decision was to decide to undertake the interviews in the 
area of social sciences within the three universities. To undertake the study in 
the different knowledge areas of natural sciences, medical sciences and 
engineering would have made the study too large with regard to the time frame 
within which this research needed to be undertaken. 7 I consequently decided to 
opt for the strategy of the extreme case scenario. As explained in the OECD 
distinction between the use of either codified or tacit knowledge in different 
disciplinary environments (see chapter six), it is not unreasonable to suppose 
that the method of quantitative performance evaluation used in the incentives 
programmes is a procedure with which academics from the natural sciences, 
engineering, and perhaps also the medical sciences, would be more at home, 
whereas those in the social sciences might be expected to experience the most 
problems with this method of evaluation. 
What's more, I considered that interviewing people from the social sciences 
would procure a sample of academics that due to their own formation might 
have, to some extent, reflected upon these issues and could consequently 
share with me their own opinions on these issues, and not limit themselves to 
answer only the questions I put to them. When those interviewed made 
evaluations concerning the university in general, this data was compared to the 
data researched concerning the background to the case study (previous 
research, official data, regulations, etc.) in order to decide upon the credibility of 
the data. 
7 the PROMEP grant I received to undertake this research originally specified a three year grant 
with one year to write up, which at the end of the third year was extended to a 3 year grant, a 
four year limit with one year writing up, to respect the original agreement between PROMEP 
and the Institute of Education. 
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Nevertheless, as Naidoo and Jameson point out, it can be expected that the 
impact of the market pressures, and in this case performance management 
incentives, might have a distinct impact in different disciplines. In this sense, 
using interviews in the social sciences field as an extreme case example, 
serves only to the extent that this research is considered as exploratory in 
nature, seeking to develop an initial heuristic framework which can be applied 
and developed further in subsequent research. 
My principal criterion for the selection of interviewees was based on that of the 
establishment of those interviews either personally or through contacts. I 
considered that, on this basis, I would be able to count on approximately 6 
persons from the social sciences in the UNAM, and considered it possible to 
arrange through contacts personal introductions to a similar number of persons 
in the UAM. The reduced number of those interviewed would be balanced by 
the quality of the data collected in in-depth interview undertaken on the basis of 
initial relations of trust. 
The interview design 
Yet even though I had decided that to gather information concerning the impact 
of the performance management strategies of the reform programme in different 
universities, by interviewing the staff themselves, I still had to decide what type 
of questions to ask in order to obtain the required data. 
Yin considers that an essential part of constructing validity in case study 
research, depends firstly upon the source of evidence and secondly on the 
measure of that source. (Yin, 2003) The example Yin gives is that 
neighbourhood change can be measured by, amongst other things, the 
increase in crime. In its turn, the increase in crime may be measured by FBI 
crime reports, but the latter may not be considered a valid measure "given that 
large proportions of crimes are not reported to the police" (Yin, 2003, p. 35) 
In this sense, whilst the question I sought to answer was the impact of the 
reform programme on the objective relations between agents within the social 
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space of the university field, and the structure of relation of capital which 
determined that field, nevertheless, I still had to decide how to outline those 
objective relations in the university and how to measure the impact of the 
performance management strategies on those relations. In Bourdieu's terms, I 
had to distinguish the distinct forms of capital at play in the field and decide 
upon the relative value of each form of capital. I was also aware that these 
forms of capital may be embedded in both formal procedures and tacit practices 
in the university. The design of the interview needed to take all this into 
account. 
The interview consisted of three sections. The first section of the interview was, 
following the model Bourdieu uses in 'Homo Academicus', designed to 
determine the demographic, economic, social, cultural, university power, 
scientific power and prestige and intellectual celebrity, of the interview sample. 
(See appendix 1 for details of this adoption and the interview question 
guideline). This information also provided information concerning the forms of 
capital in the different universities, particularly the existence of intellectual 
celebrity as a form of capital in the university. 
The second section of the interview sought to determine the structure of 
relations between the different capitals. To determine how these relations were 
reproduced by formal procedures, it followed Bourdieu's model in seeking 
information concerning hiring and promotion systems in the university. 
Nevertheless, this section departed from Bourdieu's model by not only taking 
into account who undertakes the job interviews, but also in considering those 
procedures in terms of their levels of formal transparency. This section also 
sought information concerning less formal and tacit forms of relations between 
academics. 
The third part of the interview sought to determine the impact of the incentives 
programmes on the objective relations between agents in the university field. It 
sought information about the impact of the performance management incentives 
schemes on research, institutional, academic, and individual practices. 
Information was also sought concerning the effect of the combination of 
46 
performance management strategies promoting or, one the one hand, 
competitive or, on the other hand, collaborative relations between academics. 
The implementation of the research procedure 
I interviewed academics from the two largest public universities in Mexico City, 
and one provincial university in the south-east of Mexico. On average, the 
interviews lasted about two hours and the interviewees expressed their opinions 
at length about the issues involved. 
Characteristics of the interviewees: 
16 academics, 
6 people from UNAM, 3 from Faculty of Political Science and 3 from Institute of 
Social Sciences, 
5 persons from UAM, 2 from Xochimilco and 3 from Iztapalapa. 
5 persons from UAC. 
The number of persons interviewed was one less in the UAM and in 
Campeche than my theoretical sample, due to the fact that the sixth person in 
each case did not respond to my efforts to contact them, despite personal 
recommendations, and for this reason I decided it would not be ethical to insist 
unduly as their reluctance may indicate an uneasiness with the theme of the 
interview which I explained in my initial communication using electronic mail, 
and if there was mistrust concerning the theme of the interview, it would be 
difficult to establish trust in the interview and gather the data I sought. 
Given the sensitive nature of the content of the interview, and that anonymity 
was a given as a guarantee to those that participated in the interview, I shall 
only refer in general terms in this section to the profiles of those interviewed. Of 
the 6 persons from the UNAM, two had previously held high positions of 
university power, the other four had in the past acquired medium levels of 
university power; in the UAM one person currently held a high position of power, 
and two had previously held high positions of power, in the UAC only one 
person had held intermediary levels of power, reflecting the fact that in the 
provincial university intellectual capital was not associated with academic 
capital. Only one person had parents with high levels of cultural capital, in all 
47 
three universities the rest of those interviewed were the first generation 
university graduates in their family, reflecting the high level of social mobility 
following the revolution at the beginning of the 20th century in Mexico. 
Intellectual celebrity was a form of capital consistently present amongst the 
interview sample in Mexico City, but not in the UAC, given the fact that the 
UNAM and the IPN (National Polytechnic Institution) have their own television 
and radio stations which are popular in Mexico City but do not broadcast 
beyond that geographical locality. 
Interview style and establishing communication 
The style of the interview was adapted according to the personality of the 
person interviewed. Some of those interviewed showed a preference to 
establish a monologue style of communication in the interview, and these were 
often the interviews which only loosely followed the interview guideline. In 
some interviews encouraging noises and facial expressions from the interviewer 
seemed sufficient to establish a positive interview situation. Others, on the 
contrary, seemed to expect a comment from the interviewer on what they said, 
preferring a conversation style to be established in the interview. Sometimes, 
the interview progressed through all these styles as a relation of confidence 
developed during the interview. 
The fact that the interviewer spoke Spanish as a second language possibly had 
some effect at the beginning of the interviews which required a more 
conversational style, but given that those interviewed were academics, the 
question of a foreign accent did not appear to present a communication barrier. 
Methods of data analysis 
The data was codified using Atlas ti software. The latter software was chosen 
on the basis of the type of conceptual networking it supports as well as its 
support for the coding of voice files. (Silverman, 2000, p. 170) I decided to use 
the coding of voice files as it would enable me to more quickly code the ideas 
expressed in each interview than it would be to attempt to transcribe the 
complete interview. Voice files were indexed as primary documents according 
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to the interview session. These voice files were then broken up into quotations. 
As the interview was only semi-guided by the questions in the interview 
questionnaire, and many interviewees digressed substantially from this format, 
the initial coding was only partially pre-established in relation to the questions 
included in the questionnaire. 
Each of the four sections of the interview was given a coding, for example: 
section 2, capital in tacit coordination structures was coded as TN for tacit 
networks. This was preceded by the letter corresponding to the university, 
either N for national, M for metropolitan or C for Campeche. To this initial part of 
the code, 'in-vivo' coding was added, derived from a theme or concept 
developed by the interviewee, generally in answer to the question in the 
interview format. For example, an answer to a question about academic 
relations in the UAM was coded in terms of "MTN interest groups around 
financial resources", where the first letter indicated the university, the second 
two letters indicated the section of the interview and the final part the in-vivo 
code of the idea expressed by the person interviewed. 
Secondly, following the codification of all the interviews, the coding list was 
reviewed. The in vivo codes were analysed to determine core categories whilst 
keeping in mind both the in-vivo codes and the theoretical framework of the 
research. In this way the core categories were constructed as bridges between 
the interview format based on the theoretical framework and the ideas of those 
interviewed. 
For example, as mentioned above, the first section of the interview was based 
on ascertaining the procedures for hiring, promotion and evaluation of 
academics within each institution. The replies to these questions, in those 
interviewed in the UAM and the UNAM, were generally in terms of the degree of 
transparency that was considered to exist in these procedures, and the possible 
areas of manipulation of the process which still existed. In the provincial 
university the replies were in terms of the arbitrariness of the procedures, the 
extent to which they followed no regulations, but depended on political and 
personal favours of the rector. Consequently a core category was determined 
in terms of the degree of transparency or the arbitrariness of hiring and 
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promotion procedures. Other core categories determined in a similar way, were 
the quantitative or qualitative nature of the evaluation of academic performance, 
the discretional or bureaucratic nature of evaluation procedures, the collegial or 
clientalist nature of academic networks, the effectiveness of the culture of 
evaluation in each university. The data from each university was analysed 
using these core categories and provided the basis of a description of the 
situation in each university according to the questions applied at the level of the 
analysis of the individual cases (See section on presentation of results below). 
A third level of analysis concerned a first attempt to distinguish the distinct 
forms of capital at play in the field and the relative value of each form of capital, 
as well as the impact of the reform programme on those values. 
This analysis was developed at a fourth level which involved comparing the 
results between the three institutions. During the interviews a dichotomy was 
repeatedly expressed between either increased transparency based on 
quantitative evaluation or qualitative but discretional evaluation. This dichotomy 
was considered by those interviewed in one university as the inevitable result 
of formal evaluation procedures, but upon analysis I found that a matrix 
emerged between an arbitrary-transparency axis and a qualitative quantitative 
axis, and as the interviews proceeded I began to 'place evidence' within each 
category (Yin, 2003, p. 111) in order to determine the site on this matrix of each 
university. Both the coding and additional hand written notes were used to 
undertake this level of analysis. 
The matrix expressed the dichotomy of either the transparency of quantitative 
evaluation, or discretional qualitative evaluation, yet, as the interviews 
progressed, one factor, that of the prestige of the discretional committees, 
emerged as central phenomenon (Creswell, 1998, p. 151). Nevertheless, this 
concept could not be expressed in the matrix thus far constructed. This 
problem was resolved with reference to the theoretical discussion Bourdieu's 
approach to forms of capital in social fields, which suggested the possible 
changing value of this factor from one context to another. 
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Establishing the trustworthiness of the data 
enquiry 
The inductive, explorative approach of this research, which moves from the 
particular to the general by adopting a case study approach to the gathering of 
empirical data, uses from the outset a combination of data sources. 
Nevertheless, to rely upon a notion of the coherency of the in-depth analysis 
based on the degree and coherency of the inter-connections which can be 
drawn between the different categories arising from the data analysis of the 
case study, as well as the socio-historical background material, could mean to 
fall prey to "the 'holistic bias' - where everything seems to fit into the picture; 
achieved by ignoring, or giving little weight to, the things that donT" (Robson, 
1993,p403). In short, the degree of overall coherency of the interpretive 
account could depend upon including only data that fits the account that seems 
most coherent to the researcher. For this reason it is important to follow 
methods which safeguard against such a bias. 
Robson suggests the use of Lincoln and Guba's four criteria of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability to corroborate that the data 
analysis has been systematic (Robson, 1993, p.405). The latter two depend on 
a process of 'enquiry audit' undertaken by a third party. The first two, on the 
other hand, depend upon the enquirer addressing the related issues during the 
process of analysis. In what follows I explain how the data analysis was subject 
to a 'credibility' check by means of two distinct triangulation processes, and to 
'transferability' on the basis of three different checks regarding support for the 
theoretical framework. 
Credibility: 
(a) The triangulation of data within the interviewee reply 
As mentioned above, the selection of the sample was made on the basis of the 
need to establish trust, yet some of those interviewed were a little guarded in 
their replies at the beginning of the interview, with trust being established as the 
interview progressed (see section on interview style above). The interview was 
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limited to a particular length of time, and as noted above, often extended 
beyond two hours, allowing trust to be established. At the same time the 
interview was structured in such a way as to make possible the triangulation of 
the answers in sections two and three. So for example, answers to the question 
about the transparency of hiring and promotion procedures at the beginning of 
section two could be triangulated in relation to answers in the second half of 
section two, concerning academic networks in the university and the presence, 
or not, of interest groups and if so how they operated. As in general more trust 
had been established by section three of the interview, (although not all 
interviews followed the interview format, as explained above), when answers 
were not entirely congruent with those to section two, it was possible to go back 
and check previous responses. (See an example of this type of triangulation in 
appendix 2). 
(b) Triangulation of data between the interviewee replies 
Triangulation between the interviewee replies was a useful way to check 
information. For example, almost all interviewee's in the two universities in the 
Mexico City mentioned the question of the 'spoken portrait' in relation to hiring 
procedures, where job descriptions are written in accordance with the profile of 
the preferred candidate. Nevertheless, there was also opposing opinions 
concerning what constituted a 'transparent' and 'just' system of evaluation. Yet 
further analysis showed that the differences between accounts occurred 
between institutions not within, and that this distinction required reference back 
to the theoretical framework. This point was thus dealt with under the concept 
of transferability, (see below). 
(c) Triangulation with alternative sources of data 
As mentioned above, the case study was constructed using multiple sources of 
data, and the data from the interview was cross checked, where possible, with 
the background information to the case. For example, the formal rules for the 
procedures of hiring and promotion were checked, in the cases of the two 
universities in Mexico City, against the regulations posted on the universities' 
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Web pages, although this information was not available in the case of the 
provincial universityB. 
Transferability: Developing the theoretical framework 
(a) as a result of the data analysis 
The data was analysed with regard to the relevance of the heuristic framework, 
to determine whether the data could be interpreted within and by developing 
that framework, or whether it required going beyond that same framework. On 
the basis of the comparative case study analysis, it was possible to determine 
the extent to which the heuristic framework could be developed in way which 
could explain both the differences and the similarities between the distinct case 
studies. 
Although the intention of the interview was to relate capital and structures of 
university power in the university to the impact of the reform programme, as 
mentioned above, a number of the interviewees, mainly in the UAM, and in the 
UNAM, referred to the impact of the incentives programmes in terms of the 
problems of the transparency or discretional nature of the evaluation process of 
the incentives programme, and related this to a academic argument about the 
benefits or quantitative or qualitative evaluation. (See section on data analysis 
above and related appendix) It seemed at first, that this data involved the 
introduction of a new proposition in the data analysis, distinct from issues 
concerning values of capital in the tertiary education field, yet upon reflection in 
relation to the heuristic theoretical framework, this difference in fact supported 
the relevance of a relational approach to the analysis of social capital over that 
8 New national regulations were introduced at the end of 2006 determining what type of 
information public universities were required to display on their Web pages. 
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of a structural approach, as only the former provided a coherent theoretical 
framework to explain the differing value of discretional evaluation in each field. 
(b) on the basis of particular data 
Certain data which arose from the interviews directly supported particular data 
from the contextual analysis which had been used to develop the theoretical 
focus of the research. For example, the observation arising from the analysis of 
international policy models, that the logic of the reform model follows that of 
New Public Management which combines centralised control combined with a 
periphery of quasi market environments, was supported by an interviewee from 
the UAM. S/he expressed an impression of the reform model which showed a 
clear perception of this logic when s/he observed that the model of the reform 
programme appeared to be one of a 'central planning model of neoliberalism', 
just as the communist countries implemented a 'central planning model of 
socialism'. This person also commented that the implementation of this model 
in Mexico, showed little reflection on the context of Mexico, indeed s/he 
described it as "a simplistic perspective ... with poor cultural vision". The 
observations of this person supported the comparison of the reform programme 
to the New Public Management model. It also supported the initial heuristic 
approach concerning the importance of examining the question of the impact of 
the reform programme in a way that avoids a simplistic perspective, and 
attempts to improve the cultural vision involved in education policy, by taking 
into account the social historical and political history of Mexico, as well as the 
particular conditions in each university. 
The presentation of the research findings 
In order to preserve the anonymity of those interviewed, I cite them according to 
the following codes: individuals M1-M5 are from the UAM, C1-C5 from the UAC, 
and NF1-NF3 from the UNAM Faculty of Political Science, and N11-N13 to the 
UNAM Institute of Social Research. 
With regard to the decision concerning which compositional style to adopt in 
presenting the case study report, I decided to use a 'theory-building' style in 
presenting the individual case studies. I started with a general description of 
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macro organizational structures of each institution and then compared this to 
the micro relations existing amongst academics, and analysed the relation 
between the two sets of data, and the relation of this information to the impact 
of the reform programme. 
To develop the comparative analysis, I sought to explain the data whose 
meaning apparently varied from one case study to another by developing the 
initial heuristic framework. This involved determining whether distinct forms of 
capital, or other factors, were involved or whether what were in question were 
the relative values of capital in the field, and whether this situation was able to 
explain apparently distinct outcomes. 
Concluding remarks on methods of data 
collection and data analysis 
In conclusion, it can be argued that the comparative case study method 
combined with a grounded theory approach, is a research strategy which most 
congruently attends to the concerns considered above of comparative 
educationalists, for it is an approach which gives priority to: 
1. The investigation of contemporary phenomenon within real-life contexts, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident 
2. The importance of taking into account the wider social political and 
economic context in which the research takes place to avoid making 
incongruent comparisons 
3. The need to be sensitive to distinct cultural frameworks in which 
observed practices are undertaken 
4. The need to be clear about the initial theoretical framework which guides 
the research design 
5. The need to consider this as a loose 'heuristic' framework so as to be 
able to take points 1 and 2 into account during the research process 
6. The consideration in the data analysis given to emerging in vivo data 
categories 
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7. The importance of analysing these categories against the original 
theoretical framework and abandon, adjust or develop that framework as 
necessary. 
8. The use of comparative analysis to maintain sensitivity both to distinct 
contextual conditions which distinguish each case and, at the same time, 
possible common characteristics between the cases. 
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Chapter 3. The field of tertiary education 
in Mexico 
This thesis is concerned to explain why the outcomes of a tertiary education 
reform programme in Mexico differed from its objectives, and why certain 
strategies to reach those objectives were incongruent. In this chapter I will 
analyse more closely the reform programme within the context of tertiary 
education policy in the 20th century, with the objective of identifying possible 
factors which need to be included in any explanation of the incongruent 
strategies and the unexpected outcomes of the reform programme. 
A first possible factor can be identified in the nature of the policy transition. It 
has been described as a transition from that of a "benevolent administration" 
model to a "evaluative state" model (Mendoza, 2002), from a policy where 
resources are nominally assigned with regard to the needs of each institution, to 
a policy where resources are assigned on the basis of the performance of each 
institution. The definition of each of these concepts is examined more fully 
below, but suffice to observe at this pOint that this transition would appear, from 
an initial perspective, to involve a radical change in policy in the 1980's, 
replacing a culture of patronage with a culture of evaluation. 
Nevertheless, from a more considered perspective, it appears that a trend can 
be identified in terms of central government continuing to mediate its relation to 
individual institutions on the basis of budget allocations. From this second 
perspective, rather than a radical policy change, it might be suggested that 
there was instead a strategy change with regard to the criteria of the distribution 
of resources, whilst the underlying relation between government and institutions 
based on the negotiation of resources was left undisturbed. Such a 
perspective questions the idea of a radical change introduced by the reform 
programme, and suggests that situation was more complex. In this chapter I 
will consider the development of tertiary education policy in Mexico in the 
twentieth century, in order to determine how significant this apparent trend was, 
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and whether it is a factor which contributes to the explanation of the unexpected 
impact of the reform programme. 
1930 -1970: The compromise on autonomy 
During the colonial period, the University of Mexico (1547) and the University of 
Guadalajara (1791) were created, as well as various colleges, and in 1910, two 
months before revolution broke out, the re-inauguration of the University of 
Mexico as the National University of Mexico marked the creation of the first 
secular institution of higher education. 
Following the revolution, the way in which the debate concerning the autonomy 
of the National University was resolved, was indicative of the political path the 
country was to follow during the 20th century. The government of Venustiano 
Carranza (1915 -1917) proposed that the National University be made 
autonomous, yet this was not accepted by the rector at that time, Jose 
Natividad Macias, who argued that "the decision represented a grave danger for 
the political life of the nation" (Robles, 1977, p. 127) This, explains Ramirez, 
was because the liberalist humanist form of education offered at the university 
was considered a potential site of resistance by the liberal professions to state 
control (Leonardo Ramirez, 1998, p. 138). 
The autonomy finally granted to the National University in 1929 was a 
compromise. It conceded the university responsibility for determining the 
contents of its academic programmes, its teaching methods and the application 
of funds and resources, yet because no permanent criteria for calculating the 
university subsidy were determined, the central government retained ultimate 
control through the annual budget negotiations. As Robles notes, since its 
autonomy was granted in 1929 the U.N.A.M. "was subjected to a system of 
financing that was always inadequate" which undermined the nominal autonomy 
it had been officially granted, and consequently sustained a tense relation 
between the University and the Government. (Robles, 1977, p. 137) This tense 
relation was fertile ground for the manifestation of social unrest later in the 
century when the goals of the revolution failed to be met. 
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According to the National Census of 1930 the population of Mexico was 
16,553,000 and in 1928 Mexico had, in addition to the National University, five 
state universities: the University of Puebla, the Autonomous University of the 
State of Michoacan, the National University of the Southeast, the University of 
Guadalajara, and the Scientific and Literary Institute of San Luis Potosi. Rapid 
growth in the population followed the revolution, with the consequence that in 
40 years the population almost doubled, from 15 million in 1910 to 25.8 million 
in 1950. Income distribution also improved following the revolution with 49% 
receiving 52% of the total national income in 1950, with annual demographic 
growth at 6%. 
Lazaro Cardenas was the first President (1934-1940) to complete a six year 
period and he made the most of that time to apply the mandate of the 1917 
revolutionary constitution. He created the organization of workers (CTM) and 
the organization of rural workers, (CNC). He recuperated land which was 
owned by foreigners and distributed it among the rural farmers. He also 
permitted the entry of thousands of political exiles from the civil war in Spain, 
who founded the university which is today known as 'EI Colegio de Mexico'. In 
1938 he nationalized the oil industry in Mexico. The following President Avila 
Camacho (1940-1946) built upon this basis by overseeing the transition to an 
industrial society, and a 100% increase in export revenues between 1939 and 
1945. He also created the National Institute of Social Security, providing 
medical attention, and later pensions to those incorporated into the formal 
employment sector. The following President Miguel Aleman (1946-1952) 
continued to promote the modernisation of agricultural and industrial production 
as well as tourism, but given the rate of increase of the population, the task of 
construction in the housing, health and education sectors was onerous. In 1950 
there were 24 institutions of higher education (Robles, 1977, p. 205) and 29,892 
students (OECD, 1997) which represented an absorption rate of 1.5% (Diaz, 
2002, p. 167). During the 50's and 60's there was a close cooperation between 
government, private sector and higher education in the development project 
centred on economic growth and industrialization (Diaz, 2002). 
Nevertheless, in less than 20 years this situation was put in reverse: in 1968 the 
population was nearly 48 million with annual growth at 3.7%, yet only 10% of 
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the population received 52% of the total income. During the presidency of 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958) the first post-revolutionary devaluation of the 
currency took place. Although Ruiz Cortines managed to put in place a 
stabilization pact which lead to the "Mexican miracle" of sustained national 
growth, based on low inflation, this involved the maintenance of low wages 
amongst the majority of Mexicans, at the same time that a new class of 
industrial entrepreneurs emerged. The university population had more than 
doubled by 1960 to 76, 269 and more than tripled by 1970 to 271, 275. Robles 
considers the reversal of what had been substantial advances towards a more 
equitable national income distribution, and the fact that financial restrictions had 
meant that the university had remained subject to the political control of the 
state, (Robles, 1977, pp. 205-207) as a partial explanation as to why, in 1968 
students, workers and ethnic groups combined to confront the federal 
government (Robles, 1977, p. 207). This confrontation between the student 
movement and the government, in which an unknown number of students either 
died or disappeared, undermined the relation of cooperation between the state 
and the university that had prevailed in the previous decade. 
1970 - 1982: Petro-dollars distract from the 
issue of autonomy 
Diaz Barriga explains that by means of the expansion and diversification of 
tertiary education, the government sought to re-establish a consensus. The 
reform programme tends to refer to this period of expansion wholly in terms of a 
series of mistakes which gave rise to the problems which had to be resolved by 
the current reform programme (Pallan, 1994). Alternative analyses, on the 
other hand, consider the expansion at the same time "an achievement and a 
problem" (Hanel del Valle & Taborga Torrica, 1993, p. 20; Mendoza, 2002, p. 
71). There is a general consensus that there was a lack of planning during the 
expansion, with each institution setting its own objectives and negotiating its 
budget accordingly. 
This situation was facilitated by the abundance of financial capital or "petro-
dollars" on the international markets. Banks were unable to offload this financial 
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capital due to the recession in Europe and the United States and so were keen 
to make loans to developing countries which were oil producers. In the 70's 
large oil reserves had been discovered in Mexico. The 1976 balance of 
payments crisis in Mexico thus was quickly overcome, if not resolved by a rapid 
expansion of the economy based on borrowing (Marina, 2003). The Mexican 
loans constituted 50% of the capital of nine principal banks of the United States 
(Valle, 2003, p. 117). 
This temporary financial liquidity permitted the state to respond to the demands 
put forward in the 1968 uprising, particularly that the state comply with the 
promises of the revolution by providing social mobility through education. The 
state expanded and diversified the tertiary education system from 215,864 
students in 1970 to 1,123,744 students in 1985, (a 520% increase). The 
absorption of the population between 20 and 24 years rose during this period 
from 5.8 to 12.6 per cent. (Mendoza, 2002, p. 72) The number of institutions 
rose from 118 in 1970 to 279 in 1984, whilst the number of academics rose out 
of proportion with the increase in students, as shown in the following table: 
Table 2: academic personal at undergraduate level, by category 1979 -1985 
1979 1985 Increase 
--------------- -------------- -------------
Category Professors % Professors % % 
Full time 10,752 18.5 19,998 20.9 85.9 
Part-time 5,480 9.4 7,927 8.3 44.7 
Hourly emplmnt. 45,059 72.1 67,864 70.8 61.4 
Total 58,291 100.0 95,778 100.0 64.3 
Student pop. 698,139 961,468 37.7 
Source: ANUIES, calculated on the basis of statistics 1979- 1985. Taken from the Integral 
Programme for the development of higher education (the data for the student population of 
1985 is revised) (Mendoza, 2002, p. 73) 
Given the increase in the number of teachers in relation to that of students, the 
conditions existed, at least in this respect, for an increase in the quality of 
education. Nevertheless, the quality of the education system during this period 
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was considered to have diminished partly due to the fact that during this rapid 
expansion of the teaching body, the selection process did not follow strict 
evaluation procedures. Teachers were employed before obtaining their 
graduate title, "the academic body was improvised, with the consequences of 
inadequate formation and a lack of criteria for the development and evaluation 
of academic work" (Mendoza, 2002, p. 76) 
Mendoza observes that there was also an increase in bureaucracy and with this 
the concentration of 'power groups' within the universities which had an 
important impact in their functioning and in the incongruency between operation 
costs and salary costs, and it also strengthened the inertia and conservatism at 
the centre of the universities. (Mendoza, 2002, pp. 73 - 76) 
If institutional autonomy coupled with abundant resources had a less than 
positive effect in the hiring process, it also had a negative effect in terms of the 
concentration of the student population in a few regions and states: the 
metropolitan area concentrated a quarter of the population, the UNAM 
accounted for 29 per cent of the student population in 1970 and 75 per cent in 
1985. Approximately three quarter of students were registered in two areas: 
43.81 % in social sciences and administration and 28.13% in engineering and 
technology. (Mendoza, 2002, p. 75) There was an unequal growth between 
institutions of higher education: six institutions had more than 50,000 students 
and the other 241 less that 5,000 of a total of 279 reported in 1985. 
Although the abundance of petro-dollars had resulted in the relative autonomy 
of the universities during the period of expansion in the 1970's, this had been 
coupled with a lack of a framework for planning or accountability. 
Consequently, towards the end of the seventies, as the incongruencies in 
tertiary education became more evident, there was an increasing call for 
planning. In 1978 new legislation provided a legal base for the creation of a 
National System of Permanent Planning of Higher Education (SiNaPPES) 
(Martinez Romo, 1992; Mendoza, 2002, p. 51), yet the implementation of 
proposals was interrupted by the economic crisis in Mexico. 
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1982 - 1988: The lack of autonomy is exposed 
by the economic crisis 
When petrol prices fell in 1981 the balance of payments problems in the 
Mexican economy could no longer be ignored, and a severe economic crisis 
dominated the 1980's. Inflation rose from 40 to 100% and the public sector 
deficit rose above 15% of the PIB (Mendoza, 2002, p. 167). The devaluation of 
the national currency in 1983 resulted in the drastic reduction in the value of 
teacher's salaries, a reduction in grants for students, problems in maintenance 
of equipment, and the deterioration of library services etc. Furthermore, 
despite the continuing expansion of the student population there was a fall in 
the percentage of PIS of the resources destined for this sector. In 1977 0.74% 
of PIS was destined to education and 0.57% in 1984 (Mendoza, 2002, p. 82). 
As a result, the call for an emphasis on planning in the 70's was replaced by a 
return to the emphasis on the criteria for budget allocations. Mendoza notes 
that as a result of the financial restrictions, the issue of the transparency and 
clarity of the criteria of the assignation of resources returned to first place in the 
agenda of the National Association of Universities (ANUIES). Not only was the 
fact that the budget negotiations for each university had become limited to a 
question of how to further reduce the size of the budget, more importantly, it 
was noted that the amount of the federal and state subsidy did not correspond 
to the university costs and programmes. Indeed these apparently "played no 
part in the process of determining the amount of the subsidy, whilst the criteria 
and policies which were employed to determine the amount each year was 
unknown" (ANUIES, 1983; Mendoza, 2002, p. 181). Thus, the financial crisis 
pointed to the fact that an objective mechanism of establishing the resources to 
finance the objectives of this education level had still not been determined. 
The state universities had to negotiate not only at a federal level but also with 
the local governor. The Autonomous University of Sinaloa (UAS) in June 1983 
financed a full page announcement in a daily national newspaper calling for a 
"just and opportune budget": 
Year after year the academic and political calendar of the UAS includes as a 
recurring theme the struggle for the subsidy. This, which should be an 
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administrative procedure, a technical discussion and agreement between the 
federal power, the state and the university, as a result of delays, indefinition and 
indifference of the official mediators, is a chapter which consumes effort, 
resources and time which could be applied to academic activities. (Mendoza, 
2002, p. 182) 
Hence, whilst the abundance of petro-dollars which fuelled the expansion of 
tertiary education in the 70's exposed the lack of a national system of planning, 
the financial crisis of the eighties exposed the continuing lack of any agreed 
rational for the distribution of resources and hence the lack of real autonomy of 
the universities. 
1982 - 1988: The transition to the state as 
evaluator 
In the event, the reform programme introduced during the 1980's linked funding 
criteria to evaluation of the implementation of central planning. Given that 
funding procedures continued to be exercise by central government, the move 
towards more objective criteria for the distribution of resources was coupled 
with a strengthening of centralised control. Nevertheless, the justification of the 
reforms was not made in terms of a move towards introducing objective criteria 
of funding; instead they justified strong central planning and the evaluation of 
results. 
Justifying reform: from chaos to management 
The justification for the creation of central planning and evaluation bodies was 
made in terms of the problems created by the expansion and, hence, the urgent 
need for control. Carlos Pallan, Secretary General of ANUIES from 1993 to 
1997 supported the idea of the need for central planning by describing the 
general problem facing higher education as that of a "giddy and uncoordinated 
growth" from the 1970s onward, which was a result of high demand (Pallan, 
1994, p. 263). He considered that this "giddy and uncoordinated growth" was 
the cause of "high diversity, heterogeneity, synchronism, atomization, unequal 
development, multiple unnecessary repetitions of organizational structures, 
degrees, programmes and projects". Growth had resulted in "a lack of inter-
institutional communication and communication with the general context" 
(Pallan, 1994) : 263). 
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Pallan backs up this description by statistics showing high growth from the 
1970s to the 1990s of the student population in higher education, as well as the 
number of universities and the teaching staff: 
Table 3: Institutions of higher education: 
1970 100 approximately (sic) 
1993 419 
Undergraduate registration: 





Teachers at undergraduate level 
1980 69,214 
1994 120,183 
Source: Pallan (1994, p. 264). 
Against this background of 'chaos', Pall an justified the introduction of order 
through "structural changes". In terms of central planning he referred to the 
creation of a National System for Education Planning (SINAPPES) to re-order 
and rationalize the system of higher education, the improvement of institutional 
normativity and administrative reorganization, the development of an 
information system based on "specific indicators" and the introduction of 
institutional evaluation. In terms of the market he referred to strategies of 
regionalization and decentralization, systematic relations with the private sector 
and flexible academic programs which can adapt to rapid changes in science 
and technology. 
The important point to note about Pall an's discourse is that he does not analyse 
the challenge of dismantling existing procedures of the 'benevolent state', 
together with the hierarchical structure of clientalist relations through which 
resources were managed. Instead, he concentrates on the issue of the rapid 
expansion of the system and uses statistics to suggest that expansion had been 
"giddy", had got out of control, that the situation from the 70's to the 90's can 
thus be described as one of 'chaos', and hence the need to introduce 
organisation through a mixture of central planning and decentralised 
administration, the latter closely controlled by national indicators. 
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Morley has referred to this discursive strategy of new managerialism as one of 
'regulating the chaos'. Not only can effective management 'regulate the chaos', 
but one model with standardised indicators will best do the job: "Instead of 
recognizing diversity and pluralism, there is an assumption that there is one 
best was of doing things and that this will work for all organizations, 
communities and individuals". (Morley & Rassool, 2000, p. 173) Standard 
indicators allow centralised control and the de-centralised management of the 
peripheries through a system of centralised evaluative regulation, but at the 
expense of diversity and pluralism. Hence it can be seen that the centralised 
bureaucracy was substituted by centralised planning coupled with decentralised 
administration. 
Mendoza argues that the transition to a model of the state as evaluator involves 
the combination of a market regulated model of the United States, with the 
European model of political administration. In this model the processes and the 
results of the institutions and their programmes are evaluated (Mendoza, 2002, 
pp. 22 - 30). Neaves describes the main aspects of this model in terms of 
decentralisation and quality control: there is 
a rationalization and a general redistribution of functions between the centre 
and the periphery, in such a way that the centre conserved the strategic global 
control, through political relations, to a reduced degree, and more precise, 
constituted by the assignment of missions, the definition of objectives of the 
system of operations in relation to the quality of the product" (Neave, 1990, p. 8) 
cited in (Mendoza, 2002, p. 29) 
The state as evaluator model establishes a new relation of the centre to the 
peripheries, with decentralization allowing local government and institutions to 
respond to their local market needs. The system thus allows local variations in 
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terms of options employed, but the indicators to evaluate options are centrally 
defined. 9 
Confusing effective governance with accountability 
Yet, not only has this centrally controlled system limited possible responses to 
diversity, it has also included an implicit assumption that it would resolve all 
previous problems. By reducing the problems of tertiary education to one of a 
previous period of chaotic expansion, it is supposed the introduction of strong 
management will resolve the problems which consequently arose. Jose J. 
Brunner's defined the previous model as one in which the State "finances 
higher education through a formula which is at the same time paternal and 
benevolent, whose principal means is the increasing assignation of resources 
with no relation to any consideration of quality, equity or efficiency" (Brunner, 
1993, p. 60) quoted in (Mendoza, 2002, p. 27) Mendoza considers that this 
type of relation between the State and the university characterized the systems 
in Latin America up to the eighties. Funds were nominally assigned on the 
basis of the student population, but as Mendoza Rojas observes, in Mexico 
political clientalism was the rationality which sustained this model: 
The functioning of the model rests on the political relations between the 
government and the academic hierarchy and the corporative autonomy of the 
universities, with in a web of political ciientalist networks which operate in the 
distinct levels of the system, from the institutional to the national. (Mendoza, 
2002, p. 27) 
9 This has resulted in the difficulty of the system responding to diversity in an integral manner. 
At the beginning of the new millennium, the controversial creation of the Intercultural Public 
University Subsystem, which inaugurated four new indigenous universities to attend the needs 
of ethnic groups (SEP, 2006, pp. 2.2.6, 70), showed that diversity is still responded to by 
special, segregated programmes. 
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Yet, although tertiary education scholars in Mexico were aware of the power 
relations inherent in the 'benevolent administration' model of education policy, 
they apparently nevertheless assume that it was the model itself which fostered 
such relations, and hence a change of model would erase them. Rollin Kent's 
evaluation was that "the government limited itself to use the cheque book, 
subjecting itself to the demands of the public institutions on the government, 
without effectively governing (Kent Serna, 1995, pp. 14 -15) cited in (Mendoza, 
2002, p. 28) The insinuation is, hence, that by controlling the check book, 
'government' will consequently be established. 
Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse 'government' with 'accountability', 
for whilst there may have been a lack of evidence of the latter, to suggest that 
there was a lack of the former would be to fail to recognise the nature of 
clientalist systems. The distribution of resources is one of the key factors of 
control in clientalist systems (see following chapter) and hence the 'check book' 
is a key factor in this model of governance, not a sign of the lack of governance. 
It should not be ignored that it is a system of governance which sustained a 
single political party, the PRI, in power for more than 70 years. Consequently, 
the distinction needs to be maintained between, on the one hand, the negative 
effects of this type of system such as the lack of motivation for innovation, the 
lack of mechanisms for evaluating quality, the lack of social responsibility of the 
institutions, (Mendoza, 2002) and, on the other hand, the political effectiveness 
of the system, are important. 
1988 - 2000: Linking evaluation to funding 
Mendoza Rojas observes that policies of planning and evaluation did not begin 
to show advances until the 1988-1994 evaluation results to access to public 
funds by the Salinas administration. The distribution of the basic university 
subsidy continued to depend upon the payroll, whilst all additional resources 
were to be paid via special projects. The Salinas government implemented the 
Plan for the Modernization of Education (PME) 1989-1994 at the same time that 
it pushed through neoliberal reforms for the transition to a export based 
economy, the signing of The North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
the privatisation of the banks and other state owned industries. 
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From 1984 to 1990 additional funds were channelled through a number of 
'special' programmes, yet these had no necessary relation one to another. It is 
particularly relevant to this research that the first strategic measures linking 
funding to performance and evaluation had been directed at the academic 
personnel through the introduction of incentive pay. The National System of 
Researchers (SNI) had been set up in 1984 following the devaluation of the 
currency. The objective was to stop the 'brain drain' by awarding financial 
incentives to the most productive researchers at a national level. The Salinas 
administration extended this model of funding. In 1990 the National Programme 
of Incentives for Academic Performance (el Programa Nacional de Estimulos al 
Desempeno Academico) was initiated. Only those academics who were 
evaluated as having achieved the highest level of performance would receive a 
financial compensation. About 30 per cent of full time academics participated 
receiving amounts which ranged from two and a half to nine minimum salaries. 
It was supplemented in 1992 by the Teaching Career programme for Academic 
Personal in each institution of higher education, with the intention of rewarding 
those who dedicated their time mainly to teaching. From 1993 an amount was 
assigned annually directly by the treasury to institutions to cover these rewards. 
(Mendoza,2002,p.245) 
Perhaps the significance of this programme is missed unless one takes into 
account the fact that these rewards can count for over 50% of academics 
salary. As Estela Bensimon notes in her study of this programme, "only those 
academics who produce the most prized goods, e.g. publications in 
international journals and earn extra supplements receive a salary that is 
representative of a middle class standard of living" (Bensimon, 2004, p. 2) 
Teachers paid by the hour were not included in these programmes, although it 
needs to be added that in some provincial universities agreements were made 
with the local state government to destine part of the state contribution to the 
university to the inclusion of teachers in hourly pay schemes, and teachers in 
the sixth form colleges annexed to the universities in this programme. Eduardo 
Ibarra Colado, in an extensive study of the reform programme in the 
Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM), shows that whilst the income of the 
lowest post of a fulltime academic, was constituted 100% by their salary, a 
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middle grade post would be 48% salary and 52% incentive payments, and the 
highest grade would be 32% salary and 68% incentives. (Ibarra Colado, 1993, 
p.325) 
The second type of special performance fund introduced was aimed at the 
transparency of the administration of resources. PRONAD is an accounting 
system directed towards clearly determining inputs and outputs, the distribution 
of resources, and cost per student, but only recently has been backed up by a 
national auditing system. The special funds projects, on the other hand, were 
subject to accountability and auditing practices from their outset. 
A third type of fund concerned the modernization of infrastructure. In 1991 a 
special fund was set up called the Fund for the Modernization of Higher 
Education (FOMES) which canalized resources to particular projects. Although 
these projects were required to address the needs defined in the auto-
evaluation of each institution, and were evaluated by Secretary of Education 
(SEP), in reality, the quality of the auto-evaluation varied greatly from one 
institution to the next. FOMES was the major source of extra finance for the 
Universities beyond that of the basic subsidy to cover salaries, but it was a 
competitive resource, the amount available each year was defined prior to the 
evaluation process and the universities competed for the largest proportions of 
this fund. FOMES signified the difference between subsistence and 
modernization for universities, and finances were forthcoming to the extent in 
which the modernization proposals agreed with the blue print for modernisation 
set out by the government. The use of funds had to be accounted for within the 
times stipulated by the Sub-secretary of Education (SESIC). 
The fourth type of special programmes was funds for research from the National 
Council for Science and Technology (CONACyT). CONACyT also set up a 
National Registry of Excellence (Padron de excelencia) to evaluate post 
graduate programmes. Since the incorporation of CONACYT within the SES, 
this has become the National Registry of Graduate Programmes (Padron 
Nacional de Posgrado: PNP). Programmes in the league are full-time study 
programmes, and students of those programmes have access to grants for 
living expenses, but not fees. The problem is that to enter the league, a 
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programme has, amongst other things, to prove its efficiency in terms of 
graduation rates for two generations of students. This means that the university 
has to find the funds to subsidise the programme for four or more years to meet 
the quality indicators. 
Most of the additional funds available for universities were channelled through 
these 'special' programmes, on the basis of the state evaluator model: projects 
were selected on the basis of prior evaluation by central committees, with 
funding flowing from the centre to the peripheries and evaluation of results 
flowing back to the centre, and in relation to which future funding was 
determined. This model did not encourage comprehensive planning at the 
peripheries, but rather planning only at the project level in response to 
programme strategies centrally determined each year. This situation changed 
with Mexico's membership of the DECO following the signing of NAFT A. 
The inclusion of an alternative model of reform 
Criticisms of the reform programme in Mexico in terms of its relation to the 
neoliberal economic project, (Gonzalez Casanova, 2001; Olmedo, 2001) tend to 
ignore the differences between the OECD and World Bank influences on the 
programme. Nevertheless, the difference between the objectives of these two 
models leads to the incongruencies of the reform programme which this 
research set out to explore. 
Prior to the membership of Mexico in the DECO in 1995, the reform programme 
had followed the general model of tertiary education reform recommended by 
the World Bank (World_Bank, 1994). This was centred on performance 
management strategies which rewarded individual productivity through financial 
incentives programmes. Following the elaboration in 1996 of the DECO report 
on the situation of education in Mexico (DECO, 1997), the PRDMEP 
programme was introduced. This was the first programme which attempted to 
break with the vertical structure of funding and power. The introduction of this 
programme attempted to put the academic as researcher/teacher at the centre 
of the modernization programme. "There was then an awareness that the future 
of the system depended on the academics" (De Vries, 2000, p. 22) 
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The programme involved the evaluation in each institution of the academic 
base, a strategic plan for the development of that base, and the consolidation of 
the same. (ANUIES, 1998) The development of teaching programmes was to 
be congruent with the profiles of academic staff. It funded grants for teachers to 
undertake postgraduate studies, funds for creating and equipping office spaces 
for full time academics, and financial assistance for academics to attend 
national and international conferences. In contrast to the individualistic focus of 
the SNI and Teaching Career programme for Academic Personal, the PROMEP 
initiative encouraged the formation of 'academic bodies' and funds were made 
available to those bodies based on the evidence of their combined academic 
profile and their internal and external collaborative performance based on the 
formation and consolidation of academic networks. 
For the researcher this programme offered both benefits and restrictions. The 
evaluation of this system continued to be based on indicators which were 
centrally controlled. For a full-time academic to receive the PROMEP profile, he 
or she would have to have achieved a masters level or preferably a doctoral 
level degree, performed the stipulated number of teaching hours per week, be 
included in the student tutorial programme, be a member of a registered 
'research body', have published or diffused the results of research. 
(httpll:sep.gob.promep.mx) Researchers are required to maintain an up to 
date version of their curriculum vitae in the PROMEP web page, which is linked 
to the research group profile which the research group leader maintains up to 
date, and on the basis of which the researcher is evaluated. 
Nevertheless, the PROMEP programme also offered the researcher a certain 
level of autonomy at an institutional level. By achieving the PROMEP profile an 
academic could later achieve tenure, funding for research, equipment and office 
infrastructure. In this sense, the individual academic could, for the first time 'by-
pass' clientalist power structures in his/her local university, in which tenure 
options and resources had previously been embedded. PROMEP thus 
indirectly challenged the clientalist system by assigning funds directly to the 
individual academic, and local universities were supposedly obliged in the terms 
of the contract signed with PROMEP to provide support for the academic 
objectives of the individual. If the individual academic was able and willing to 
72 
achieve the evaluation indicators, he or she could achieve a certain degree of 
professional autonomy, independently of whether the particular institution was 
indeed prepared to consider their academic base as the point of departure of 
strategic institutional planning. 
Nevertheless, the PROMEP programme was not readily accepted by all. The 
formation of research groups presented a problem, because within the 
clientalist interpretive scheme, the formation of a group obeyed political 
interests. Furthermore, faculty directors often considered the independence 
gained by individuals and the group as an affront to their power relations with 
the teaching-research staff. Initially, the local administrations attempted to 
intervene in the formation of research groups, imposing their own groups. The 
fact that these often had no congruent research base meant that they were 
rejected in the PROMEP evaluation process, due to the lack of congruence in 
the research profiles and projects of the integrants. In the year 2000, the 
director of PROMEP toured the provincial universities explaining to the 
researchers the basis of the programme and assuring them that they were 'free' 
to form academic groups according to their research interests. In this sense 
PROMEP not only indirectly but also directly challenged clientalist practices, 
and offered a lifeline to researchers in the provinces. 
Nevertheless, PROMEP only funded scholarships for internationally recognised 
masters and doctoral programmes, applying strict time limits for completion. 
Many full-time academic staff could often not find the programme they wished to 
study in this international and national league table, or found the time 
restrictions too onerous, or were unable to consider studying away from their 
home towns for the required period, although some distance tutorial schemes 
were included. For this reason funds which were available in each university for 
grants often remained unused, especially during the first years of the 
programme. Universities were required to approve the applicants study 
request, which was a possible source of conflict of interest. 
Funds originally available to all research groups became restricted to 
'consolidated' research groups, or those 'in the process of consolidation'. 
Attendance to national and international congresses, often the only possibility of 
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those in the provinces to establish and maintain contacts in their research area, 
was subsequently cut. Only those research groups which from the outset were 
constituted by researchers at a Doctoral level could hope to reach the 
'consolidated' level by 2004. The programme was initially designed to end in 
the year 2006, and its future hangs in the balance although its continuation has 
been recommended in the most recent OECD report (Brunner, Santiago, Garcia 
Guadilla, Gerlach, & Velho, 2006: item 344) 
The unclear direction of the reform programme 
The reforms introduced during the 1990's clearly related additional resources to 
the acceptance of evaluation. Mendoza argues that there was a general 
agreement that the financial strategy of linking funding to reform achieved the 
introduction of changes in higher education (Mendoza, 2002, p. 242), but that 
also changes were as a consequence pushed through with little consultation 
(Mendoza, 2002, p. 238) (Diaz, 2002) with the result that the learning element 
was minimum (De Vries, 2000) (Bensimon & Bauman). The justification for the 
lack of consultation was that there was not enough time for consultation: "The 
logic of 'Mexico is in a hurry to make profound changes' continued to be 
imposed, and for this reason, the suggestions to proceed gradually, to analyse 
the implication of different measures, go beyond the short term vision, were 
interpreted as attitudes which strengthened immobility" (Mendoza, 2002, p. 
238). 
There was, in the 1990's no clear policy objective which related one programme 
to another. At the end of the 1990's in the UNESCO-IESALC report, De Vries 
observes that the situation is still that "no single coordinating body for evaluation 
policies exists" (De Vries, 2000, p. 20), instead different policies had been 
introduced by different government departments: the treasury controlled the 
performance incentives schemes for academic personal, FOMES and PROMEP 
were controlled by SESIC, institutional evaluation was channelled to the latter 
through CONAEVA, (National Commission of Evaluation) the peer evaluation 
committees depended on CON PES (National Planning Commission), another 
system of academic grants SUPERA was administered by ANUIES (National 
Association of Institutions of Higher Education), the CENEVAL (National 
Evaluation Centre) was responsible for the national examination system, and 
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postgraduate policies were controlled by CONACyT (National Council for 
Science and Technology) whilst the control of the Technological Universities 
was devolved to the states with Technological Institutes remaining nationally 
controlled. 
De Vries also points to the fact that although the Institutions were rewarded 
financially if they achieved the different goals set them by the various evaluating 
bodies, nevertheless, they could continue functioning on their basic government 
subsidy, even if they did not. Similarly, the academic staff could participate in 
PROMEP, but if they chose not to they could still count on their basic wage, 
which meant that those that found it preferable to have a second job rather than 
undertake a postgraduate programme and produce research results, could do 
so. 10 The participation of the private tertiary education sector was also 
voluntary, and not linked to funding. 
Although the different policy models of the World Bank and the OECD will 
explored in chapter six, it can be observed at this point that the combination of 
these two models in the Mexican reform programme gives rise to an apparent 
incongruency in the performance management objectives of that programme. 
The individualistic tendencies of the national programme of the SNI and the 
university academic incentives programmes exist alongside the collegial focus 
of the PROMEP programme where funding promotes the formation of academic 
bodies around common research areas. Ball suggests that such incongruities 
are not unusual outcomes of the process of recontextualisation of theoretical 
models in local policy: 
10 (The normal working and education day is split in most of Mexico into two shifts: 7a.m. to 
3p.m. and 3 p.m. to 9 p.m. and it is common for Mexicans to supplement low wages by having 
two 'full-time' jobs). 
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National policy making is inevitably a process of bricolage: a matter of 
borrowing and copying bits and pieces of ideas from elsewhere, drawing upon 
and amending locally tried and tested approaches, cannabalising theories 
research, trends and fashions and not infrequently flailing around for anything at 
all that looks as though it might work. Most policies are reams hackle, 
compromise, hit and miss affairs that are reworked, tinkered with, nuanced and 
inflected through complex processes of influence, text production, 
dissemination and ultimatley, re.creation in contexts of practice. (8all, 1998a, p. 
126) 
This research is concerned to explore the effects of the incongruous pollicies 
arising from the recontextualisation of two distinct policy models, in particular 
the effects of the incongruity between the 'faculty individualism' encouraged by, 
on the one hand, the academic incentives programmes on which a large 
percentage of an academics income is based, and, on the other, the collegial 
practices encouraged by the PROMEP programme. 
Further problems arising from the reform programme 
The incongruency of the objectives of these two distinct programmes aimed at 
academic performance was perhaps not apparent due to the sheer number of 
programmes for complementary funding. Instead, what was clear in a context 
of financial restrictions was the need to participate in all possible programmes to 
increase the chances of obtaining additional resources. Consequently, the 
reforms did not always succeed in introducing a culture of planning and 
evaluation. De Vries has criticised this construction of a relation between 
evaluation and financial resources, arguing that "these rewards created a 
climate of evaluation characterized by simulation and highly bureaucratic 
exercises, based on formats, 'verification', and less on learning or accountability 
to third parties" (De Vries, 2000, p. 22) 
This argument is backed up by the findings of a research project on 
organizational learning, particularly regarding the results of the evaluation 
procedures put in place during the 1990's, which shows that learning was not 
an evident result: 
The responses from the participants provided very little indication that the 
research productivity reports are valuable to decision-makers. There were 
almost no instances in which the participants mentioned having leamed 
something new or important about the state of research within their units. 
Overall the prevailing sentiment seemed to be that the research productivity 
reports exist for the sole purpose of determining the supplementary 
compensation of researchers. Moreover, our own review of the reports that 
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directors and their associates publish annually revealed that they are heavy on 
numbers and light on analysis. (Bensimon & Bauman, 2004, p. 11) 
The absence of learning was also evident in the fact that although the amount 
of state funds channelled into each university was no longer determined by the 
student population, but by the number and value of academic contracts, 
nevertheless, the application of this policy continued to be undermined by the 
old system of political clientalist practices. Whilst the basic budget of each 
university was based on the number and value of academic contracts, 
additional funds for research, infrastructure, etc. were negotiated between the 
Rector and the SEP. De Vries observed that "in fact, the amounts for each 
university appear to obey particular histories of political negotiations" (De Vries, 
2000, p.5) 
There have also been strong criticisms of the effects of the programmes which 
reward academic performance. Mendoza speaks of negative effects of these 
programmes in the academic context in that they encouraged "individual labour, 
the principal of differentiating work and its results, as against equal treatment" 
(Mendoza, 2002, p. 246) Bauman is somewhat stronger in her criticism, 
suggesting that these programmes convert the universities into "academic 
maqui/adores" (the Mexican term for 'sweat shops'), by focusing academics' 
attention on what products to produce to maximise their points in the reward 
system. It also can represent wasted labour as short term projects are 
preferred over long term projects and "the production of knowledge that is 
unresponsive to the most urgent educational, social, and economic needs of the 
people of Mexico" (Bensimon, 2004, p. 20). Such programmes also undermine 
collegiality and favours "confrontations between academics. It also increases 
faculty individualism", as well as unleashing "academic simulation, corruption 
and credentialsim", (Bensimon, p. 23) a distinction between academic "Have's 
and Have Not's", (Bensimon, p. 23), and "Bottom line Scholarship" (Bensimon, 
:24). In the case of the social sciences this means focusing on "publications 
that are not labour intensive and that do not require extended periods of data 
gathering" (Bensimon, p. 24). Indeed the programmes for academic rewards 
are the most criticised aspect of the reform programme. 
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2000 - 2006: Tightening up central control of the 
reform programme 
With the change of President in the year 2000 the Executive Secretary of 
ANUIES became the new Sub Secretary of Higher Education (SESIC), and 
pushed forward the consolidation of the reform programme. Not only was 
evaluation to continue to be linked to funding but now also more closely to 
planning. The various 'special' programmes for obtaining additional funds, 
were combined under one, carefully designed, national programme: 'PIFI', 
(Programme for Institutional Strength) which has continued to be developed 
with the objective of ensuring that the various programmes were tightly 
coordinated to achieve the modernization objectives of each institution. 
The PIFI has consequently strengthened the OECD model in the fact that 
institutional planning must take into account the academic base, with previous 
funding for infrastructure in the FOMES programme now being linked to the 
development of that base, as is funding for research programmes, and funding 
to support programmes to be accredited or enter in the national postgraduate 
league table (PNP). CONACyT was incorporated into a closer relation with 
SESIC to support this policy focus, as well as the technological system, with 
SESIC being renamed as SES (Sub-Secretary of higher education). The 
additional funds made available through the PIFI thus currently clearly aim to 
reinforce a coherent institutional planning process. Each year, public 
universities present their Institutional Programme for a centralised evaluation 
process designed to detect the coherency of their proposals. The process 
determines whether the institution is indeed soliciting funds for a coherent plan 
of institutional development, starting from the actualization of the academic 
profiles and the development of research lines, which in turn support academic 
programmes, student development, graduation efficiency, the meeting of local 
demands, constructing business partnerships, and so on. The Rector of each 
university is invited to the evaluation process to explain the PIFI presented by 
his or her institution. 
Research funding has also been linked more closely to national and local 
needs. CONACyT changed its basis for research funding from research 
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funding for university based research projects, to two new forms of research 
awards. These are called 'mixed funds' awards and 'sectorial' funds. The 
objective of the first is for state and municipal governments to agree with 
universities and local businesses on the joint selection and funding of research 
to resolve local needs. The sector funds are made available by CONACyT and 
different federal government departments, to fund research to resolve national 
problems in areas such as agriculture, water, the environment, the fishing 
industry, etc. The 'mixed funds' projects, have so far had most success, all the 
states except three have participated; between 2002 and 2005 a total of 101 
awards schemes were published, 3,508 projects were evaluated and 1,302 
were approved. 991 million pesos (aprox. 99 million dollars) were solicited and 
799 million pesos were approved. A total of 81 % of the projects were in the area 
of applied science, 1 % in basic science and 18% in technology development. 
(http://www.conacyt.mxlfondos/fmixtos.html) Overall, information on the 
results of joint CONACyT/sector research projects is not as yet available, but 14 
sectors have announced awards schemes since 2002. 
There is a clear objective for research to address local and sector problems, on 
the basis of a combined participation of the state, universities and local 
business and NGO's. This research strategy is akin to the OECD approach in 
focusing not only on formal research and its production of codified knowledge, 
but also on experience based knowledge production. It is an approach 
supported by the Mode 2 knowledge concept which argues that the transition to 
a knowledge society involves the emergence of bottom-up research patterns. 
(Gibbons, 1994; Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001) The influence of this 
approach in the reform programme in Mexico can be seen in the fact that 
national and state legislation has been designed to meet this new modality for 
inter sector research funding. 
Outstanding issues with regard to the impact of 
the reform programme 
Whilst statistics indicate that the PIFI model apparently works efficiently in some 
institutions, thus suggesting that they have developed a planning culture from 
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the academic base upwards, encouraged by an organizational structure and 
leadership which recognises the need for coherent planning and evaluation, the 
same statistics indicate that this is still not the case for many institutions. 
Evidence of the uneven impact of the reform programme can be seen in the 
results of the Consejo para la Accreditation de la Educaci6n Superior 
(COAPES) (Council for the Accreditation of Higher Education). Results 
published in the national newspaper 'Reforma' in May 2006 show the majority of 
accredited undergraduate programmes to be in the northern frontier States, in 
the Central States of Jalisco, Puebla and the State of Mexico. These 8 States 
each have between 40 and 60 programmes accredited. On the other hand 
there are 12 States with between 1 and 10 programmes accredited. 
The amounts awarded annually under the PIFI programme to each public 
university from 2001 to 2005 are displayed in the Web page of the SES: 
(http://ses4.sep.gob.mxiif/financiamientolfinan05/PIFI%20UPESb.htm). From 
this statistical information it can be deduced that 11 of a total of 53 participant 
universities stopped receiving funds in the 2004 and 2005 annual reviews of 
their presentation of their PIFI proposals, although there is no indication as to 
why this was so. The amounts awarded also vary greatly, yet there is no 
indication of the ratio of the amount awarded relative to the size of the 
institution. Nevertheless, this information can be compared to another SES web 
page which gives details of the federal and state subsidies from 2001 to 2005 to 
45 public institutions of higher education. This page does not indicate the 
relation of the budget to either the student ratio or the number of research 
centres in the university. Nevertheless, if one compares the 13 universities 
which in 2003 had a budget over 500,000,000 Mexican pesos, (approximately 
50,000,000 U.S. dollars), with the amounts awarded as a result of the PIFI 
review, the universities of Coahuila, Sinaloa and Tamaulipas stand out as 
universities with a high federal and state subsidy, yet comparatively low PIFI 
results, whilst the Autonomous University of Zacatecas did not receive any 
funds in the 2005 evaluation. 
This information may explain to a certain extent why, in the 2006 Pacific Circle 
Consortium Conference, an academic from Zacatecas asked why federal funds 
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for the Programme of Incentives for Teacher's Development, were awarded by 
the Rector of Zacatecas according to his personal discretion and not according 
to the objective indicators of teachers performance as established in the PIFI. 
The reply from Dr Zetina, Director of Planning and Evaluation of the SES, was 
that whilst the SES maintained a general guideline concerning the use of such 
funds, their aSSignation remained under the jurisdiction of the Rector of each 
institution. He offered to receive details of the complaint, yet the academic had 
already indicated that complaints had already been presented to SES, and 
there had been no reply.11 
As a result of comparing data from these different sources, it can be deduced 
that the efforts to introduce an objective system of university funding linked to 
evaluation continues to run parallel to other, more 'traditional', forms of 
controlling access to federal resources. Purportedly the annual subsidy 
continues to depend on the pay-roll of the university, with new full-time 
contracts requiring approval by SES according to the PROMEP profile of the 
candidate, (all new contracts require minimum masters, and preferably doctoral 
degrees). Similarly, relatively strict evaluation procedures are followed with 
regard to the PIFI evaluation, yet the rewards for teacher productivity are still 
left to the discretion of individual rectors. Nevertheless, those universities which 
distribute those rewards in flagrant abuse of the PIFI objectives can probably 
11 The local context of the University of Zacatecas is one of inequality and low levels of 
administrative efficiency. In an article on statistics recently released by the National Council for 
Population, (Conapo) concerning the distribution of wealth, the states of Oaxaca; Chiapas, 
Guerrero y Zacatecas had in 1995 the highest in levels of inequality, and in recent statistics 
Queretero replace Zacatecas amongst the 4 states with the highest level of inequality. 
(Martinez, 2006). A recent article on the negative results of the decentralization of basic 
education, argued that only in those states where the consolidation of an education system had 
already begun, did decentralisation bring advantages, but in other states it just transferred 
problems without the means to resolve them, as can be seen in states such as Oaxaca, 
Chiapas, Guerrero, Michoacan y Zacatecas. (Poy Solano, 2006) 
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expect a less than favourable result in the PIFI evaluation, because such 
policies will most probably be negatively reflected in the overall level of 
productivity of academics in such institutions, as well as other related indicators. 
The fact that the resources for academic productivity are not under direct 
government control would suggest that the SES does not count upon 
government support to close the flow of this type of discretional resources which 
continue to support clientalist practices. The fact that the President did not 
count on a PAN majority in congress during his administration would have made 
such an objective difficult to achieve. Indeed, the fact that political negotiation 
has continued to affect the system can be seen in the congress decision to 
increase university budgets above the subsidy agreed by the current 
administration (2000 - 2006). The policies of the SES was thus undermined 
given the fact that institutions could appeal directly to congress to increase their 
budgets, and the Supreme Court has not yet passed verdict on the legality of 
this process. (Munoz Garcia, 2006, p. 8) 
Not only has the response of the provincial States varied with regard to 
adopting the more integrated management strategy of the PIFI, but also this 
attempt to integrate all aspects of the programme, may actually aggravate the 
problem of simulation. Given that the different indicators are all related to each 
other, there is more pressure to simulate one result in order to protect other 
related indicators. Sergio Guzman writing in the daily newspaper La Jornada in 
July 2006 questioned this policy approach with regard to the efficiency of 
postgraduate programmes. Efficiency indicators stipulate that graduation in 
masters programmes has to be within two years and in Doctoral programmes 3 
years to meet the efficiency criteria of the PNP so that a programme can 
remain within the league table and hence have access to the resources that 
membership includes. Guzman argues that this policy has resulted in the 
formation of human resources which are not highly qualified, because all too 
often to achieve the indicators of graduation efficiency, the academic bodies are 
obliged "to sign off thesis as finished and publish articles which scarcely meet 
high standards of scientific quality". The result is, in the opinion of Guzman, 
that: 
The system has been deformed and practices of little ethical value are 
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occurring where researchers pursue high productivity at whatever cost, 
because if they do not have students, theses and published articles they forfeit 
subsidies, economic rewards, and face the loss of prestige within the 
community in which they are immersed. (Guzman del Proo, 2006) 
So despite the fact that the PIFI exhorts a more congruent and integrated 
planning by universities, it still faces three principal problems: as a transition 
towards a more objective system of financing it is undermined by the continued 
existence of discretional systems of financing; there continues to be a wide 
variance in the success of institutions in achieving the required indicators; the 
integration of all factors of the development of the university under one coherent 
model, puts pressure on academics to simUlate some results in order to "save" 
others - either a particular programme, or the overall result - thus encouraging 
a culture of simulation alongside one of evaluation. 
Another outstanding problem is that a more just basis for academic salaries has 
yet to be established and this is complicated by the lack of a stable system for 
financing pensions. Many institutions have found they are paying more in 
pensions to retired academic personnel than the pensions fund receives in 
contributions from the current academic base. Humberto Munoz describes this 
situation as the "black hole" for public finances, which without a change in the 
current labour model can only get worse (Munoz Garcia, 2006, p. 9) 
Consequently, base salaries continue to be effectively frozen in order not to 
aggravate this problem. This short term response has the further knock on 
effect that many teachers cannot afford to retire because not only do they fear 
that the pension fund may go bankrupt, but also they cannot afford to do so as 
they would retire on only half of their present income. The SES has created a 
programme for the reform of the pensions system, and those universities which 
have together with the unions, applied the SES model of pension reform, have 
access to special funds to replenish their pension funds. The details of this fund 
can be found on the SES website: http://ses4.sep.gob.mx. The question 
remains whether the resolution of the pension issue will be followed by a 
resolution of the salaries issue. Meanwhile, the academic base gets older and 
younger researchers and teachers are not incorporated. 
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Concluding remarks 
The reform programme which includes international models of performance 
management based on standard or 'objective' indicators has not achieved 
uniform levels of introduction, it has lead to increasing levels of simulation and 
vested interests continue to function within the system. 
One explanation which is offered for this disjuncture between the objectives and 
the results of the reform programme, concerns the fact that there is no apparent 
plan for what happens in those cases which do not achieve the required 
performance indicators beyond that of the hope that the lack of access to 
additional funds will 'teach them' the need for resolving 'the breaches of quality' 
in their organization (Porter, 2004). Meanwhile these public institutions, and all 
private institutions that are not evaluated, can continue to function. It is a policy 
of the carrot without the stick, that is, without secondary options (De Vries, 
2000). 
Another reason offered concerns the formation of the actors involved. The 
OECD in their report on the National Education Policies in Mexico, solicited by 
the government in 1995 as Mexico entered the OECD, cautioned against the 
wholesale application of neoliberal policies. They criticised the decentralization 
process, observing that "not all the states are equally prepared and often lack 
human resources to be competent interlocutors of the institutions of higher 
education" (OECD, 1997, p. 222). 12 Here the OECD was recognising that the 
12 The criticism of the model of decentralization implemented in 1992 was reiterated by the 
Citizens Observatory on Education in their communication 7 in La Jornada 24/04/99 and also by 
the Governor the State of Zacatecas in September of 2006 who 'returned' the responsibility of 
education to the Federal Government, arguing that "in a supposedly federal model, in reality 
what was decentralized has been above all the responsibilities, but not the suficient resources 
or the faculties" (La Jornada, 04/09/06). Luis Hernandez Navarro, writing in La Jornada 
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conditions in the provincial universities vary greatly, as do the level of autonomy 
those institutions enjoy in relation to local governments. In those states where 
the PRI is still in power, the university is considered as just another state 
dependency whilst the positions of rector, faculty directors, coordinators, etc., 
are often still considered as a post which the governor can assign to repay 
political favours, simulating a show of following the organic legislation of the 
university. The resulting rector is not, in the opinion of the DECO, necessarily 
the best candidate to lead the institution, yet, in many parts of Mexico it is still 
considered that a rector requires a political not an academic profile, to 
successfully manage the incessant intrigues between rival factions. 
An alternative approach which has been explored in this chapter to explain the 
apparent disjuncture between the objectives of the reform programme and its 
results is to consider the way in which the reform programme apparently 
introduces changes at one level whilst reinforcing traditional structures at 
another. This is partly due to the fact that it was assumed that it was the 
'benevolent state' model which encouraged clientalist practices in the university 
12/09/06 argues that decentralization has created a deficit calculated at 20 thousand million 
pesos, (2 thousand million dollars). 
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and a disregard for quality. Consequently, it was expected that an 'evaluative 
state' model would undermine the basis for cliental ism and replace it with a 
culture of evaluation. Because, policy design did not take into account the 
extent to which clientalist practices in universities were embedded in a historical 
trend based on social control through the distribution of resources, this change 
of management strategy failed to address, and even possibly aggravated, the 
historical tension concerning university autonomy and government control in 
Mexico. Meanwhile, the positive effects of an alternative policy approach 
pursued in the PROMEP programme in undermining clientalist structures were 
not followed through as resources for this programme have been reduced. 
Finally, the more integrated model of the PIFI policy has been undermined by its 
centralised conception, as clearly, one model does not fit all cases, whilst the 
flexibility in the model is limited. Consequently, this model encourages both an 
evaluation culture in some contexts and simulation in others, and often a 
mixture of the two. The replacement of traditional academic values by market 
values in the education system did not help in these circumstances. The 
situation was further weakened by the continuing existence of a parallel system 
of the discretional allocation of resources. 
In short the 'objectivity' of the indicators for the allocation of resources is, in 
practice, compromised, whilst the underlying tension between institutional 
autonomy and government control through the allocation of resources remains 
intact. Hence, the conditions for the practice of simulation are present at both 
levels: those that attempt to compete in the objective model find themselves 
pressured to simulate in some aspects to safeguard their overall achievements, 
whilst others continue to regard the process as just another strategy of 
governmental control, and hence view simulation as an efficient means to 
obtain resources. 
Before exploring on the basis of empirical case studies the extent to which the 
impact of the reform programme varied between different universities, it is 
important to consider the wider social and political context of Mexican society, 
to determine whether the clientalist practices in the tertiary education system 
which the reform programme has confronted with only partial success, were 
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also embedded in the social structures of Mexican society at the end of the 20th 
century, and thus to begin to assess the potential magnitude of the challenge to 
introduce a system of objective indicators for university finanCing. 
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Chapter 4: The national context of the 
reform programme 
In the previous chapter, the assumption that it was the 'benevolent state' model 
which gave rise to clientalist practices and that by linking funding to evaluation 
these practices would be replaced by a culture of evaluation, was criticised. It 
was observed that such policies aggravated a historical tension concerning the 
mediation of university autonomy through the process of annual budget 
negotiations. The fact that the evaluation procedure tends to promote 
simulation rather than a transition to a culture of evaluation, can be partially 
explained in terms of the continuity in this underlying practice of political control. 
In this chapter, the objective is to determine the extent to which the use of this 
practice was confined to the tertiary education system, or embedded in wider 
structures of social and political practice. The purpose is to gauge whether the 
change to a culture of evaluation involves changes confined to the tertiary 
education system or wider social structures are involved. 
Firstly, I will consider a historical account of the emergence of Mexican social 
structures, followed by an anthropological account regarding of the structures of 
Mexican Society toward the end of the 20th century. Secondly I will consider 
the introduction of neoliberal policy in Mexico and the impact on the social 
structure of Mexican Society. 
The history of clientalism in Mexico 
The Concept of Clientalism 
In the year 2000 the right of centre 'Party of National Action' (PAN) won the 
Presidential elections, after 70 years of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI). To consider the possible significance of this transition in Mexico to 
democratically elected government, the magazine Letras Libres dedicated their 
December issue of the year 2000 to the question whether the new government 
would maintain a system of "caciques y caudillos", the political operators of 
clientalism in Mexico, or achieve the transition to a system based on the law 
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and freely elected representatives. The magazine editorial defines the cacique 
in the following way: "Rural, labour union, urban, impresario, academic, cultural, 
the cacique is our two faced Jano: community leader, provider, ultimate law, 
kindly oppressor, disposed to negotiation if his/her right to the last word is not 
discussed, and faithful instrument of the superior central presidential power" 
(Editorial-Letras-Libres, 2000). 
In his contribution to this debate the British historian Alan Knight (Knight, 2000) 
considers caciques as the representatives of the clientalist system whilst 
caudillos operate at the cupola of the political system, and "On the top is the 
President" (Knight, 2000, p. 17). The caciques are intermediaries, recognised 
and rewarded by those above them in the structure to the extent that they 
exercise control over a local social group, passing some of those rewards on to 
those below in return for loyalty. The level of aggression used in these 
transactions varies, some caciques assuming the role of kindly oppressor of the 
social group under his/her control, yet that of aggressive assassin in relation to 
rival political groups. This issue also depends on the level of the cacique in the 
hierarchy. At the lower levels the caciques occupy positions which themselves 
confer authority: "they can be political administrators, judges, police officers, 
teachers (the teacher-cacique is a common phenomenon) or, 'the elder' in 
indigenous communities. Indeed, the parish priests can function as local 
caciques" (Knight, 2000, p. 19) Another strategy used by the caciques to 
maintain control is 'divide and rule', the cacique exercises power by provoking 
and mediating between conflicts: "Factionalism, the organization of political and 
social conflicts around clientalist networks of certain longevity - is also an old 
practice and occurs at many levels .. but the caciques also mediate between the 
factions" (Knight, 2000, p. 20). 
The Mexican political historian, Lorenzo Meyer (Meyer, 2000), considers 
cliental ism as of a tool of social control and considers the history of Mexico in 
terms of how the use of this particular tool became embedded in the national 
culture. Its origin can be located at the time of the Spanish colonisers and their 
response to the problem of the control of an indigenous population. In 
subsequent power vacuums, different political administrations fell back on the 
system put in place by the Spanish colonizers. In what follows I shall consider 
89 
the consolidation of a clientalist culture in social development from the pre-
colonial period to the Mexican Revolution. 
Historical view of clientalism in Mexican society 
1500 a.c. marks the beginning of the pre-classic period in the history of 
Mesoamerica with the population of the first villages by nomads thought to have 
crossed over to the American continent through the Bering Straights, arriving as 
far as Mesoamerica by 33,000 b.c. By the time the Spanish Colonisers arrived 
to Mexico at the beginning of the 15th century, Mesoamerican culture had 
developed during 3,000 years. It was a hierarchical and educated culture, 
headed by its priests and nobles. It was a culture which through its astrological 
studies had divided the solar year in 365 days, had arrived at the concept of 
zero and had developed various forms of writing. The education system 
reproduced the social structure. Children of both sexes were educated from an 
early age by their family, and children of nobles and priests went on to study at 
the Ca/mecac reading, writing, astrology and history, to form writers, doctors 
and engineers. The rest of the children went to a form of technical college 
called Tepo/challi, where they were taught religion, military techniques and 
other social posts. (Abud & Ramayo, 1990, p. 18; Kobayashi, 2002, p. 54; 
Zoreida Vazquez, Tanck de Estrada, Arce Gurza, & Staples, 1981) 
Hernan Cortes arrived to Mexico in 1519, and in 1529 the Catholic Missionaries 
founded the first school for the indigenous population. The authority of the 
hereditary leaders of the indigenous populations in Mexico was recognised by 
the Spanish once they submitted to Spanish rule. The origin of the word 
cacique, as Lorenzo Meyer, points out is a "corruption of the word kassequa, an 
arahuaco word which denominated the indigenous leaders which Colon 
encountered in New Spain in 1492" (Meyer, 2000, p. 36). 
The caciques were assigned the role of intermediaries between the indigenous 
population and the government of the viceroy. This status of intermediary was 
consolidated by the distinct education given to the indigenous leaders. Through 
the different Catholic orders such as the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the 
Augustinians and the Jesuits the children of the indigenous population were 
inculcated in the Christian and Western system of values. Schools were 
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annexed to the monasteries in each town, yet the indigenous distinction of two 
systems of schooling for the children of nobles and for the rest of the children 
was maintained. The latter were taught the Christian doctrine and basic 
mathematical calculations of addition and subtraction, and certain professions. 
The children of indigenous leaders lived in the convents in a strict existence 
similar to the Calmecac, often disciplined with whips, and learnt reading, writing 
and song, (Zoreida Vazquez et aI., 1981, pp. 18, 20) 
In 1536 the first institution of higher education was founded in New Spain, the 
College of Santa Cruz in Tlatelolco. A project to send the sons of the 
indigenous leaders to the college for formal preparation was short-lived given 
the heated debate concerning the teaching of the 'sacred scriptures' to the 
indigenous population. Whilst this debate rumbled on, the offspring of 
colonisers and the indigenous population created a new ethnic group called 
mestizos (offspring of Spanish and Mexicans) (Robles, 1977, p. 15). 
Meanwhile, the leaders or caciques of indigenous communities continued to be 
expected to govern their own communities according to the Christian values 
they had been taught. 
This system of caciques survived for over a century and could have been a 
successful method of government if the indigenous leaders had continued to be 
considered legitimate by the population they controlled and if the colonial power 
had continued to respect the status of the indigenous nobles within the colonial 
power structure. Nevertheless, in reality the system was marked by the abuse 
of power both on behalf of the indigenous leaders towards their people, and the 
Spanish leaders towards the indigenous leaders. Thus a functional system 
based on legitimate intermediaries was transformed through corrupt practices 
into a system of control through coercion. 
Nevertheless, Meyer argues that the fact that this system was almost non-
existent by the time of the War of Independence (1810 -1821) was not due to 
the corruption of the system, but instead to two other reasons: the death of the 
majority of the indigenous population (from disease and exploitation) and the 
suppression of the system of special education for the indigenous nobles, the 
91 
nobles were no longer considered, in many cases, of noble status either by the 
Spanish or by their communities. 
In 1547 the University of Mexico was created according to the constitution of the 
University of Salamanca, for the education of Europeans and the sons of the 
Spanish colonizers born in Mexico, a group known as criollos. Students 
received an education which was renowned in Europe as vanguard in scientific, 
philosophical, literary, medical and linguistic areas(Robles, 1977, p. 16). The 
distinction between the colonisers and the colonised was gradually replaced by, 
on the one hand, the representatives of the Spanish crown, on the other, the 
criollos and the mestizos. The need for indigenous caciques to control the 
indigenous population was replaced by the need to control this new social 
division. 
The fact that the clientalist system re-emerged was, according to Meyer, due to 
the virtual disappearance of the state following the War of Independence as the 
political elite was occupied by various struggles: "monarquists against 
republicans, masons against clerics, federalists against centralists, liberals 
against conservatives, etcetera". (Meyer, 2000, p. 38) In the space of this 
power vacuum certain indigenous caciques re-emerged, as well as a new type 
of cacique whose power was not hereditary but rather was based on personal 
capacity: "The leaders of local insurgents, the leaders of local criminal bands, 
the heads of the national army, etc. became the new wave of caciques, many of 
them mestizos and some criollos" (Meyer, 2000, p. 38). 
Finally, following the successful expulsion of the French imposed emperor 
Maximilliano (1864 to 1866), the liberals achieved the introduction of a liberal 
constitution in 1857 which included the right of free and non-religious education 
for all. The liberal government also confiscated the extensive amounts of 
church land which was sold to the middle and upper classes, and raised a tax 
on their remaining properties. Given this confrontation with the church, the 
liberals did not attempt to confront the new class of caciques which had 
emerged during almost 50 years of a weak or not existent state. The result was 
that the liberal paradigm of a direct relation between citizen and authority was in 
practice constructed on the basis of intermediaries in the form of the caciques. 
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Indeed, the return to a period of conservative administration under Porfirio Diaz 
meant that the liberal education project was not fully implemented until the 
Constitution of 1917 following the revolution. During his presidency which 
extended over three decades (1877-1911 with a four year break 1880-1884) 
Porfirio Diaz managed to control both the liberal and church/conservative 
factions by giving back to the church some of their properties, relaxing the 
taxes, giving governmental positions to the liberals and exploiting the cacique 
system of political organization. He established a pyramid of power with the 
President at the pinnacle, followed by the state governors, then the muniCipal 
preSidents, and finally to the local level made up of hacienda owners, business 
persons, money lenders, factory or mine owners and the remaining few 
indigenous leaders. Meyer claims that the cacique during this period exercised 
"almost total political, economical and social control, over a geographic area. It 
was for this reason that the cries for revolution in 1910 not only included those 
of "Land and liberty" and "Mexico for the Mexicans" but also "Death to the 
caciques" (Meyer, 2000, p. 39). 
On the anniversary of 100 years of independence in September 1910, Porfirio 
Diaz surprised the country by permitting his Minister of Education, Justo Sierra, 
to officially found the National University based on liberal rational and non-
religious educational values. The progress of this project was interrupted, 
however, 2 months later when in November 1910 the revolution began on the 
basis of liberal demands for freedom of elections (FranciSCO Madero). As the 
revolution progressed, other demands, particularly in relation to land, emerged 
(Emiliano Zapata). A new class of caciques emerged during the years of a non-
existent or weakened state. These were from the lower strata of the social 
structure and included "criminal bands, teachers, miners, farmers, small traders, 
students, dependents and some marginal large property owners".(Meyer, 2000, 
p.39) 
The fact that the PRI controlled political power in Mexico for over 70 years was 
largely a result of the way they appropriated cliental ism as a political strategy to 
meet the challenge of constructing a post revolutionary political consensus. 
With the armed stage of the revolution officially ended following the successful 
93 
accession to power of General Obregon in 1920, the institutional phase of the 
revolution began. That stage involved winning the recognition of foreign 
countries, particularly the U.S.A., the creation of institutions such as the Ministry 
of Education, integrating the multiplicity of small political parties in the hands of 
regional war lords, and weakening the power of the church. To achieve this, the 
main political party was constructed as a hierarchical structure, at the top of 
which the regional war lords could negotiate political power without resource to 
armed struggle, becoming appointed governors and municipal presidents, 
senators and deputies. At the same time, workers, peasants and the military 
were represented through the different sections of the party and could win 
political positions through elections. Nevertheless, those who were to run for 
elections were appointed by the local political elite, the previous war lords who 
were now state governors. Political stability was thus achieved at the price of 
maintaining clientalist structures, and at the expense of political and social 
modernization. The liberal education project was reconfigured as a nation 
building project and at the same time it was integrated as another level in this 
traditional clientalist social and political structure. 
The second generation of post-revolutionary caciques had less power and was 
more subject to the power of those above them in the hierarchy, than were their 
predecessors. Their role was to secure the votes of their 'clients' to maintain 
the political control of the PRI and making sure that the opposition could not get 
a foothold. The rural model of caciquismo was applied to urban industrialism, 
with syndicate leaders becoming the most 'famous' modern caciques, whilst 
colonial leaders and leaders of market sellers, mainly women, began to operate 
effiCiently in this aggressive 'masculine' world (Monsivais, 2000). Although the 
head of the oil union was jailed by President Salinas in 1988, the current leader 
of the teachers union survived and is currently one of the strongest syndicated 
leaders and women caciques at the beginning of the 21 51 century, (Loyo, 1997; 
Rangel & Thorpe, 2004). In the 2006 presidential elections she split from the 
PRI and set up her own political party, allied to the rightwing PAN party. 
Indeed, given that the PAN candidate won the election by just over 1 % of the 
vote, the support of her party for the PAN presidential candidate was a crucial 
factor in the election result, and her power is expected to be consolidated in the 
forthcoming government. 
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This party political system was also used as a means of social mobility, to work 
one's way up through the social and political structure. In the South-eastern 
State of Campeche, for example, Abelardo Carrillo Zavala worked himself up 
from a canteen singer through the Confederation of workers of Mexico (CTM), 
to be Federal Deputy of Congress and finally Governor of the State from 1985 -
91. Although his successor claimed he would rid the State of the influence of 
ex-governors who continued to control power as caciques, nevertheless Carrillo 
Zavala achieved the election of his protege as the following governor. He had 
helped this person work his way up through the PRI party structure, yet he was 
considered an authoritarian and despotic governor, and by securing the placing 
of family members in the current administration, currently wields more influence 
than his mentor. 
During the seven decades which the PRI maintained control of the electoral 
system in Mexico, clientalist practices permeated all aspects of the social 
structure with the consequence that virtually any social group could be 
organised around this model of power relations. Nevertheless, as Meyer 
observes, at the end of the 20th century, this clientalist system had lost some of 
its control over the political system, maintaining extensive control over the 
syndicate system and the social system in rural areas. De la Pena explains that 
the reason for this decline in control was partly due to the increasing limitations 
of the PRI to redistribute economic benefits in rural areas through land reforms, 
and in urban areas as a result of the impact of the financial crisis in the eighties 
(De la Pena, 1992). 
Jon Schefner from the University of Tennessee, links the decline of the patronal 
power of the PRI with the neoliberal reduction of the size of the state sector 
(Shefner, 2001). Nevertheless, his study of 'Coalitions and cliental ism in 
Mexico' sustains Gay's (Gay, 1998) argument "that clientalism is an extremely 
flexible mode of political control, varying by time, locale, and political 
environment" (Shefner, 2001, p. 619). Schefner's study adds a subsequent 
chapter to Lorenzo Meyer's historical account of the changing forms of 
clientalism in Mexico. He notes that "The 1970's and 1980's were periods of 
exploding urbanization but decreasing urban service delivery ... as austerity 
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politics or other pressures. diminished (the) patronage pool (Shefner, 2001, p. 
601). The combination of the increasing local deception with lack of PRI 
delivery on its promises, and the conscious raising work of the Jesuit liberation 
theology movement in the area, led to a coalition between groups of urban poor 
which resisted clientalist co-option by local government officials. The coalition 
achieved the significant success of not only revealing the corruption of local 
officials of the federal Solidarity programme for building infrastructure in poor 
communities, but of finally achieving state compensation for the victims. 
This coalition joined forces with a coalition of Mexican NGO's to form RAMAS 
(Red de Apoyo Mutuo para la Accion Social Network of Mutual Support of 
Social Action). This widening of the established coalition was the result of three 
particular events: the filtration of petrol from a local refinery into the sewer 
system of Guadalajara, and its explosion in 1992; the assassination of Cardinal 
Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo and several others at the Guadalajara airport in 
1993; and the Chiapas uprising in 1994. 
Despite an initially strong coalition, individual members of RAMAS did not resist 
political co-option for two related reasons. On the one hand, President Salinas' 
success in promoting Mexico as a nation entering the first world open-market 
economy, resulted in the cutting off of international funds to Mexican NGO's. 
On the other hand, SEDESOL (Secretaria de Desarollo Social Secretariat for 
Social Development), initiated the Fund for Social Co-Investment, which 
directed much needed funding to NGO's in return for support for the 
programme. The NGO's were partners in the sense that they had seats on the 
council, but they were unable to negotiate from a position of strength. Hence, it 
was considered that "SEDESOL continues deciding ... who has the money. 
They decide the people who participate, they selected who will be part of this 
committee, through all the manoeuvres they're used to" (Shefner, 2001, p. 617) 
In this way, the neoliberal governments of Salinas and Zedillo introduced 
programmes which co-opted and silenced coalition movements working in 
favour of civil rights and against cliental ism. The key to co-option continued to 
be the control of resources: impeding alternative sources and channelling state 
resources through one centrally controlled programme. Schefner's account of 
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these events suggests that clientalist structures were re-born at the end of the 
20th in the form of what Fox has described as "political entrepreneurs (which) 
can replace rigid, antiquated controls with new, more sophisticated clientelistic 
arrangements without necessarily moving towards democratic pluralism" (Fox, 
1994; quoted in Shefner, 2001, p. 620) 
The neoliberal version of clientalism is thus impersonalised, the cacique is 
replaced by the faceless political entrepreneur who designs policy to co-opt and 
control. Nevertheless, the mechanism of control remains the same: the 
distribution of resources. Hence the question historians posed in Letras Libres -
whether the fact that the existence of a President from the opposition party 
would result in the further dismantling of the cacique system of political and 
social control - ignored the fact that clientalism had already been re-invented 
according to the neoliberal political economy. 
The complex structures of social relations in 
Mexico 
The way in which hierarchical and clientalist structures in Mexico are embedded 
in a complex web of social relations has been documented by a Chilean 
anthropologist, Larissa Adler Lominitz, during the seventies and eighties in 
Mexico. Adler studied poor migrant urban communities, the relations that held 
together elite business families, the type of relations in the national university, 
the sector structure of Mexican society, and the ideological justification of the 
social system in the nationalism of the PRI. 
Adler identified a combination of vertical and horizontal relations as typifying the 
structure of urban relations in Mexico City, and the structure of Mexican society 
in general. Various authors have described the vertical segmentation of the 
Mexican society between the public and the private sector, whilst Adler Lominitz 
refers to four sectors: the public or state sector; the private sector; the labour 
sector; and the informal sector. She describes these sectors as "four large 
pyramids", referring to the vertical power relations which permeate all of these 
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sectors, although less so in the informal sector. Adler Lominitz outlines four 
variables in the flow of resources between these 4 sectors: 
The type of resources (capital, power, work, informal, political loyalty) 
The level or quantity of the same 
The mode of articulation (formal or informal) 
The direction of the interchange of resources (that is, whether it is horizontal or 
vertical) (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 253) 
The largest trade unions are to be found in the labour sector, they are still 
officially affiliated to the PRI and form part of the political and governmental 
structure. 13 The workers in the private sector organise themselves in general in 
what are called the "white" trade unions, which are controlled by the 
industrialists. Adler notes that trade union leaders who resist integrating into 
either one of these two systems have faced severe pressure, being "destituted, 
imprisoned or assassinated" with the movements dissolved or co-opted by new 
leaders (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 239).14 
The informal sector includes under-employed, informally employed, 
autonomous occasional workers lacking social security15, a minimum salary, 
power of negotiation and organization at the national level (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, 
13 This affiliation to the PRI has begun to be questioned following the fact the PRI dropped to 
being the third largest party following the July 2006 presidential elections. New trade union 
~roups have recently emerged allied to the PAN administration. 
4 It is not uncommon to observe a smear campaign against a union leader in terms of the 
misuse of union funds, yet, it is difficult to know whether the accusations are based on facts or 
Burely politically motivated. 
5 In Mexico, it is not the individual but the employer which registers a citizen in the social 
security system, and pays his or her contributions, the employee, above a certain income level, 
paying a percentage of the total amount. The total contribution is approximately 33% of an 
individuals salary and includes medical attention, pension, sickness and housing benefits, but 
not unemployment benefits, and upon loosing employment the right to medical attention is 
withdrawn. Consequently, all those unemployed or informally employed have no access to 
these benefits. 
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p. 227). The importance of this sector is not only its size,16 but also its 
marginality with regard to the other three sectors which are formally integrated 
into the state system and power structure: 
Regarding the objectives of a sector categorization, the stability of employment 
(or security of economic roles in general) is more important than the nature of 
the work that the individuals undertake in the economic structure (Adler 
Lomnitz, 1994, p. 250). 17 
Nevertheless, the more 'able' individuals in this sector construct their own 
clientalist structures by operating as intermediaries between formal employment 
structures and workers, forming "a sort of bourgeois of the "barrio" (ghetto) : a 
social level of transition between the formal and informal sectors" (Adler 
Lomnitz, 1994, p. 251) What is interchanged here is not only jobs, but also 
social benefits, in exchange for political support. Adler Lominitz refers to the 
case study of labour hirer in the construction industry, named the "devil" who 
had constructed a complex structure of lieutenants, sergeants and masters, 
without the existence of a single formal document, either between them, or 
between the "devil" and the construction company. In a particular construction, 
the "devil" eamed more money than the engineer under whose orders he 
worked, with the difference that on concluding the construction, the engineer 
continued to receive a salary and the "devil" returned to his informal ghetto. 
(Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 250) 
Another type of intermediary are the 'Iideres coloniales' (housing estate 
leaders), usually women, who construct a group under their control through 
gaining the recognition from the PRI as a community leader. As leaders they 
control of the canalization of state benefits such as 'dispensas' (basic food 
16 Adler notes that in 1979 the informal labour sector was 40% of the urban workforce, in 2005 it 
was reported by INEGI to constitute 28.7% 
17 For this reason the practice of 'inheriting' one's 'plaza' (tenure) is a workers right in many 
unions, including the teachers union, and the health workers union, but is considered by parents 
as the most important inheritance they can pass on to their children when they retire, as it 
guarantees a life's income and health and pension benefits, amongst others. New graduates 
who do not have parents in the profession they trained for, have to save sufficient resources to 
'buy' a tenure from the union. Nevertheless, some young professionals are beginning to reject 
co-option by the system involved in receiving such tenure. 
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parcels), basic housing construction materials (often roofing sheets), education 
grants for children for primary and secondary levels, and other benefits. In 
times of elections the beneficiaries of these resources are expected to 
accompany the 'leader' to political meetings and to the voting booth on voting 
day. At other times they may be required to participate as protest groups, or 
show their support in various different ways. Schefner's article on 'Coalitions 
and Clientalism in Mexico describes a community attempt's to question the 
relation between the satisfaction of infrastructure requirements and loyalty to 
the PRI (Shefner, 2001 ). 
Yet whilst Schefner concentrates on the clientalist relation between poor urban 
communities and the government, Adler notes that the inhabitants of the 
informal ghettos obtain a "minimum of security of survival" through the 
horizontal networks based on family members and neighbours". She thus 
rejects the traditional equation drawn between 'urbanization' and 
'disorganization' by showing that amongst these groups "The extended family of 
the Mexican peasant, as well as the ritual links of compadrazc0 18 were 
reinforced and extended" (De la Pena, 2001, p. 11). 
Similar forms of reciprocal interchange also take place at all levels in the formal 
sectors. Indeed the strong relations uniting urban migrants are mirrored in 
family business elites, with the difference that the relations within the family are 
based on a hierarchical corporate structure, whilst horizontal reciprocal relations 
are employed via the extended family to secure preferential treatment for the 
family, whether it be in central government, local government, education, etc. 
18 Compadrazo is based on the catholic term where god-fathers of a child become 'com padres' 
of the family, but is generally used as a term used to refer to relations of mutual help 
established between friends (De la Pena, 2001, p. 9) 
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where members of the extended family are employed or have contacts. Maria 
Alba Pastor traces this corporate structure of family relations back to the period 
between 1590 and 1630 in New Spain in which productive auto sufficiency in 
the colonies allowed a powerful oligarchy to "weave a solid and closed red of 
parental relations" (Pastor, 2000, p. 87) across the public, ecclesiastic and civil 
professions, manufacturing, commerce and transport. 
Nevertheless, this form of horizontal reciprocal relations are social forms which 
have developed at all levels of society and "increase social mobility and the 
circulation of resources between equals" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 252) Unlike 
the vertical interchange of resources based on formal groups, horizontal 
interchange takes place between "informal groups, without frontiers which are 
permanent or clearly defined" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 255) These horizontal 
networks extend across sector divisions, so that, not only is it common practice 
for business persons to use family connections to resolve bureaucratic 
requirements or legal issues, but also public sector officials obtain benefits in 
the purchase of goods in the private sector on the basis of their position in the 
government and the services they can exchange. 
Adler argues that both the private and public sector have interests in 
maintaining these horizontal networks, and this can be shown by the 
proliferation of these networks. As De la Perla observes, Adler confirmed the 
well known thesis of Eric Wolf (Wolf, 1966), that when formal political and 
economical relations are not capable of guaranteeing the security and wellbeing 
of the members of society, then they turn to networks of friendship, family and 
patronage to solve their problems. Yet in addition, she argued that "the same 
formality of society is that which produces informality ... the greater the rigidity of 
the norms, the greater the necessity to seek a solution to the problems outside 
the system" (De la Perla, 2001, p. 15) What's more, she argues, they are 
necessary in that they allow the system to work by introducing flexibility into the 
system "they lighten the pressure of hierarchical relations and provide flexibility" 
(Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 264) In this sense, they also avoid the system 
transforming itself into a "cast society in perpetual rivalry. The flexibility and 
fluidity of the networks or reciprocal exchange, precisely by crossing the 
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hierarchical frontiers within sectors and between sectors, has a real importance 
for the system" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 257).19 
For this reason, it is important to not confuse these relations with corruption. 
Adler suggests that although this is difficult, the factor of social distance can be 
taken into account, as horizontal reciprocity takes place between socially 
equals: 
Occasionally it is difficult to determine where the reciprocal interchange of 
favours ends and corruption begins. To the extent that the social distance is 
augmented between the participants of an interchange, we see the reciprocity 
tends to be converted into a market interchange and the solidarity becomes 
complicity" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 259). 
The introduction of anti-corruption campaigns as part of a government policy to 
introduce for transparency (http://www.transparenciamexicana.or.mxlENCBG/). 
have had a limited impact due to this extensive practice of reciprocity, including 
at top government levels. 
19 This is clear in any working environment in Mexico. A recent clear example can be found in a 
personal experience of organising a postgraduate research seminar in may 2006. To arrange a 
room for the seminar required 2 verbal and 4 written requests. Given that on the day prior to the 
event, the person organising the postgraduate seminar rooms had still not received the written 
request, I asked the office administrator to phone her to arrange a meeting. A walk to the other 
side of campus, a few mutual laments about the absurd levels of bureaucracy in the university, 
resulted in the arrangements for the room being verbally confirmed, with the understanding that 
the official request would arrive within the next week or so. Nevertheless,this way of 'getting 
things done' was put in jeopardy by the new office coordinator, a PRI activist, "imposed" on the 
university, (in the sense that the position was a recompense from the Governor for not receiving 
a political nomination in the party). In order to assert himself in his new position over those 
'below' him, and be seen well in the eyes of those 'above' him, he insisted on observing vertical 
reporting structures. The result was the rate at which 'things got done', rapidly diminished, and 
the frequency of student complaints increased. In not understanding the particular way in which 
horizontal and vertical structures worked in the university, this person undermined the 
functionality of the office. 
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The reproduction of social structures in Mexico 
The reciprocal interchange of resources is considered a norm in Mexican family 
culture and between friends; hence the refusal to use one's position to help 
family or friends to obtain jobs, commercial contracts, university entrance, etc. is 
a violation of a social norm. In this sense, the question of 'loyalty to family and 
friends' legitimates the norm concerning the reciprocal exchange of resources. 
What's more, if one does not use one's position in government to advance 
oneself financially through reciprocal favours, and politically through the 
clientalist pyramid, one is not considered very 'clever' (Iisto). 'Usto' is a term in 
Mexico ascribed to persons who know how to use their position to their 
advantage to scale the pyramid of the sector in which they find themselves. It is 
an interpretive scheme that allows individuals to lament corruption as a drain on 
the Mexican economy whilst admiring 'those who know how to get on in life by 
'using their connections'. 
The structure of Mexican society is thus reproduced not only through the 
vertical system of hierarchical patron-client relations, but also through the norms 
of reciprocal relations. Yet, whilst such relations permit the reproduction of the 
system, the domination of the system by certain groups was avoided, it was a 
presidential and fragmented, not a monolithic, system. Power was fragmented 
throughout the pyramid, and the fact that presidential elections take place every 
six years, (re-election is not legally permitted), means that horizontal relations 
were not consolidated into power groups, nor were alternative power groups 
formed. 20 
20 Nevertheless, the formation of interest groups at the pyramid of the political structure is an 
accusation which has been repeated many times during and following the presidential elections 
in July 2006. The presidential candidate was supported openly (and illegally according to 
current electoral law) by the current President, as well as by the copula of the business sector 
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In fact, each new president designates a new group in power. For this reason, 
the groups left out or discontented, do not form coalitions but prefer to wait their 
turn for power in a future sexenial change. (Adler Lomnitz, 1994) 
So, on one extreme of the social spectrum, the change in President contributed 
to ensuring the reproduction, and not the domination of the system. At the other 
extreme, the socialisation processes required that the individual learned to a 
greater or lesser extent how to survive within the system: 
Now, if the individual must manage the three types of interchange (market, 
redistribution and reciprocity), that implies that they participate simultaneously 
in three kinds of social relations: a relation of class, a hierarchy and one of 
confidence. In this way the economical, the political and the socio-cultural are 
three domains that are intertwined in the life of the individual, and their path 
constitutes the macro-social reality. Each type of interchange has its rules, that 
the individual learns to manage and (when they are contradictory) to conciliate 
in each particular situation. This process is rich in symbolic language; and 
consequently, the ability to manage symbols in its turn constitutes a resource 
(Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 263). 
The symbols of the nation are given an important place in social ceremonies in 
Mexico, and from the first day of school children swear allegiance to the flag, 
who financed a publicity campaign against the opposition candidate, was one of the factors the 
opposition cited in presenting its argument to the electoral authorities for the annulment of the 
election results. 
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and repeat the ceremony every Monday morning.21 The President is the 
maximum figure of authority of the nation, and the family, religion and health its 
principle values. (Anguas Plata, 2005; Salinas Amescua, Garduno Estrada, & 
Barrienteos Lavin, 2005). This symbolic scheme legitimises the norms of the 
vertical power structure in Mexico. The combination of vertical and horizontal 
relations as well as the six year presidential cycle facilitates the fluidity of the 
system and its flexibility. 
The other factor which Adler documented as key to the functioning of this 
complex system was the ideological aspect, "in abstract terms, this ideology 
was nationalist, in concrete terms, it is found in the legitimacy of the PRI, 
dominant in Mexico since it was created in 1929" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 275). 
Schefner argues that this legitimacy of the PRI as the official party of the 
Mexican revolution also meant that clientalist institutions and practices enjoyed 
a certain legitimacy (Shefner, 2001, p. 595). This legitimacy is confirmed every 
six years in the Presidential election campaign. Adler was concerned to 
answer the question why, if the decision concerning who will be the next 
president was made known in the same act in which the PRI candidate for 
president was named, did the PRI spend so much money and energy on the 
presidential campaign for its candidate. Adler found the answer by 
understanding the symbolism of the campaign: "the campaign is a ritual, where 
the national myths of social revolution, mestizaje and unity are recreated" (De la 
Pena, 2001, p. 17) 
21 This ceremony of allegiance to the 'patriotic symbols of the nation' is a ceremony which 
involves the formation and training of the 'escolta': a group of children which each year will 
enact the ceremony of presenting the flag to child charged with this responsibility. Primary and 
secondary schools are encouraged to train these groups to practice their marching routines and 
enter in the section, municipal, state and national competitions for this activity. Parents are keen 
that their children are selected for this activity which is considered as an honour. 
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Parallel social structures 
Although the 1857 constitution was a liberal constitution, the liberal government 
in practice made use of the national network of caciques to achieve the 
recognition of the liberal government. Adler considers that although different 
studies have shown, following the revolution, the replacement of patron 
relations in agriculture in the 'haciendas', with capitalist industrial structures, 
and although some communities have become more heterogonous, this has not 
resulted in the hegemony of a capitalist system, but instead the parallel 
existence of two systems: a pre-capitalist, symbolic structure based on "the old 
principles of trust, loyalty, friendship, family relations, etc.", and a market system 
based on 'objective' market values of supply and demand. 
On the one hand we have, then, an individualist democratic ideology, which has 
not ceased to dominate the Mexican political ideals since the 19th century, and 
which has is allied with the capitalist production of free competition (promoted in 
different moments in Mexico by different sectors in different moments). The 
tragedy of the democratic individualist system is that it has never been able to 
totally dominate. On the other hand, we have a system of social relations which 
undermine the free competition of the markets, equality before the law and 
democracy. The tragedy of this (second) system of social relations in Mexico is 
that only rarely has it found a political figure which gives it a legitimate place in 
the regime (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 299). 
Adler found that the same parallel existence of different systems characterised 
the situation in the National University. Side by side with the scientific academic 
organisation of the university in faculties, research institutions, and 
administrative structures, a system of vertical relations existed between 
academics, and between researchers and students, with a notable lack of 
horizontal relations in the university. Hence it was a "university structure, 
apparently intelligible in terms of a formal rationality" yet it was accompanied by 
"a parallel rationality: that of clientalist groups and vertical political intervention" 
(De la Pena, 2001, p. 12). 
The director is the intermediate between the higher authorities and the 
members of the institute he/she directs, and is responsible for acquiring the 
necessary resources from the authorities and deciding the form in which to 
distribute them, in such a way that on the basis of the results, the next year 
more resources can be obtained" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 179). Indeed, the 
highest acknowledgement given to a successful academic is an administrative 
106 
post as director of a faculty or institute: "As a consequence the researcher, up 
to then, dedicated and productive, finds him/herself, converted into the most 
powerful person in the institute, generally not possessing the experience of 
qualities needed for administration" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 178). There is very 
little participation by the other researchers in this decision making process. The 
role of the Director as intermediary repeats, then, the role of the cacique as 
socio-political intermediary, and his or her power is invested in the resources 
she or he controls. 
In addition to the scientific and the vertical power structure, Adler described the 
social and political functions of the national university. Socially, the university 
was considered to playa key part in forming "the nationality and the conscience 
of Mexicans" based on values and symbols of Mexican identity. The university 
also played a political and social role as an "institution of opposition" and refuge 
for dissidents, as well as a vehicle of social mobility. Within this context, Adler 
identified four types of students: the academic, the professional, the political 
ideologues, and the political pragmatists. The third group are students which 
use the university as a political training ground to eventually enter in the 
government, whilst the fourth group form pressure groups (grupos de choque), 
"which can be used by diverse political groups both within and outside the 
university. Eventually, some are absorbed into the other groups whilst others 
gravitate towards occupations related to the world of crime (delito) (Adler 
Lomnitz, 1994, pp. 169-170). 
It can be seen from this brief review of Alders work, that not only did she identify 
the corporate structure of clientalist structures in Mexican society both within the 
state system and the business family structure, but also that she identified the 
horizontal relations of reciprocity which sustained the functioning of this system 
at all levels. Furthermore, she identified that this complex, if traditional, system 
existed, within the university, side by side the rational structure of the university 
organization, and similarly, in society, parallel to the liberal individualist 
constitution of the state and the purportedly rational logic of the market. Finally, 
Adler identified the way in which the nationalist ideology of the PRI and its 
ritualistic practices had 'papered over' the inherent contradictions of this system. 
A very complex system thus emerges, in relation to which I shall consider, in the 
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following section, the impact of the transition to neoliberal government policies 
in Mexico. 
From authoritarian liberalism to neoliberal 
clientalism 
Middlebrook and Zepeda consider that the political background explains the 
broad scope and rapidity in which neoliberal economic reforms were 
implemented in Mexico, in addition to some of the inconsistencies in the way 
they were introduced. They argue that the first reason for the rapidity of their 
introduction, needs to be traced back to the formulation of the post-revolutionary 
constitution in 1916-1917 which "placed pre-eminent authority in the presidency 
and limited the powers of the legislative and judicial branches of government", 
as a result of the perceived need at the time of a strong executive to put an end 
to the rapid succession of governments and to implement the revolution's social 
agenda. 
With the formation in 1929 of an "official" political party there was a further 
acceleration of "the trend toward the centralization of political power", and "The 
post revolutionary elites' control over the state apparatus guaranteed to the 
"official" party the establishment of its electoral hegemony and the party's 
assured electoral triumphs constituted an important basis for both political 
legitimacy and reliable legislative majorities". (Middlebrook & Zepeda, 2003, p. 
11) The PRI established a network of state-society alliances "underpinning 
Mexico's distinctive form of authoritarian rule" (Middlebrook & Zepeda, 2003, p. 
13), referred to by Lorenzo Meyer as 'authoritarian liberalism' (Meyer, 1995). 
Middlebrook and Zepeda argue that the same authoritarian system accounts for 
the rapid implementation of neoliberal economic reforms as well as "for 
important inconsistencies or omissions in the reform agenda". (Middlebrook & 
Zepeda, 2003, p. 14) The first concerned the fact that the sale of banks to the 
private sector was not combined with financial sector liberalization. The banks 
remained in the hands of Mexican social and economic elite until the turn of the 
century when they were bought by foreign banks keen to make profits at the 
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expense of the FOBAPROA government programme which bought unpaid bank 
loans following the 1994 financial crisis.(Hogenboom, 2004, p. 213) The 
second concerned the deflation of the real value of wages, which although it 
can be considered as "a basis of international comparative advantage" meant 
that "government policy decisively tilted the industrial restructuring process in 
favour of business interests". (Hogenboom, 2004; Middlebrook & Zepeda, 
2003) (Ortiz 2003) 
Middlebrook and Zepeda consider that the favours Salinas handed to the 
private sector were to be expected: "it is of little surprise that the sale of 
financial institutions occurred on terms favourable to Salinas's principal allies in 
the private sector." (Middlebrook & Zepeda, 2003, p. 15) Yet, in fact such a 
practice marked the end of the traditional rivalry between the government and 
private sectors. The argument Salinas employed to justify this lack of central 
government transparency was that economic liberalization should precede 
democratization; openness was required of the economic sector but not of the 
political system, or of the government. 
Hence, the real change introduced by neoliberal reforms in Mexico, was the 
elimination of the status quo which Mexico's 'authoritarian democracy' had 
maintained on the basis of a " permanent confrontation" between the private 
and the public sector over "which sector should decide the economic and 
political affairs of the system" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 236). These two sectors 
were in turn based on two distinct dominant social classes in Mexico: 
Currently, two dominant classes exist in Mexico: in the commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie, and the "new class" 0 the high levels of the state political 
and technological bureaucracy. The relation between both dominant classes is 
a complex mix of collaboration and competition. (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 224) 
Basanez considers that the public sector maintained social hegemony up to the 
eighties (Basanez, 1981, p. 205) Yet, during the 1970's, the education of the 
sons of the political elite in Harvard business schools and the creation of a new 
generation of 'technocrats' who favoured neoliberal policies, meant that the 
'permanent competition was gradually eroded during the last two decades of 
the 20th century. This explains Adler's observation in the 1980's that "the 
private sector is evolving more each time in the direction of a clientalism in 
relation with the public sector" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 236). Hence, the 
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privatization process, was neoliberal in so far as it reduced the size of the state, 
but was not in terms of the market competition, instead it "resulted in state 
monopolies being replaced by corporate monopolies" (Hogenboom, 2004, p. 
209). Indeed, as Shefner argues, clientalist practices were merely being 
adapted to neo-liberal economic strategies. 
The last few months of President Fox's administration in 2006 witnessed a 
growing public criticism of the emergence of a political impresario elite, 
concentrating both power and wealth in the hands of a few. The repudiation of 
this new concentration of power and wealth and the growing polarisation 
between rich and poor in Mexico constitute the main issues of the opposition 
PRO campaign. Meanwhile, citing the World Sank report 'Redistribution of 
income between poor and rich: public transfer in Latin America and the 
Caribbean', Roberto Gonzalez writing in the Jornada 26th July 2006, notes that 
the report indicates that 50% of Mexicans live in poverty, whilst of the 9.8% of 
the PIS destined to social costs, only 3.5 per cent is destined directly to the 
poor. Furthermore, funds in agricultural projects such as "Procampo do not 
benefit the poorest, instead 43% of the resources benefited 20% of the 
population of high income, and only 12% benefited 20% of the population with 
the lowest income.22 
The recent elections have resulted in a critical polarisation of society between 
the leftwing PRO alliance and the PAN, with the former repudiating the slight 
margin in the results in favour of the PAN, making accusations of electoral 
fraud, citing illegal public advertising by business groups and the Catholic 
22 In a recent newspaper article concerning the increasing levels of inequality in Mexico, the 
National Council of Population (Conapo) links this data with increasing current mistrust in 
democratic institutions. (Martinez, 2006) 
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church against the opposition candidate23, and cybernetic fraud in the 
recounting of the votes24 , as well as more traditional electoral fraud strategies 
involving the alteration of results. In response, the PAN has incessantly 
reiterated their call to respect the 'legal' procedures of the electoral institutions 
and has criticised as 'undemocratic' the street demonstrations. As a result, the 
relation between the legal and the just, the legal and the legitimate, has been 
questioned25. 
Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, a disjuncture between policy and practice in tertiary 
education was explained to the extent to which neoliberal policy ignored the 
politically embedded practices around the distribution of resources, and 
proceeded to centralise the control of this distribution despite introducing 
'objective' evaluation indicators. The purpose of this chapter was to determine 
whether the issue of the control of resources was a problem confined to the 
23 The historia Lorenzo Meyer, writing an opinion column in the daily newspaper "Reform a", 
argued that the campaign by the PAN and certain business groups to discredit the PRO 
candidate Lopez Obrador, has meant that the electoral process, instead of extending the same 
electoral power to all and thereby resolving the division in society between the middle classes 
and the "dangerous poor" has instead again linked the poor to a leader who is "a danger for 
Mexico". 
24 The suspicions concerning the possibility of cybernetic fraud continued to increase following 
the presidential elections, with various mathematicians questioning the results in the edition of 
the daily newspaper "Jornada" 26th July 
25 Juan Enrqeuez Cabot argued, the following: "The problem at the bottom of all this does not 
appear to be the electoral fraud of the 2nd of July. The problem is for many, perhaps the 
majority in the country, and especially for the poor, is that to say something is "legal" is a sign 
that you lost (ya te fregaste) ... What is legal is not clearly synonymous with justice ... What 
should be sought is what is legitimate rather than what is legal .. We have in our hands a 
country profoundly divided between the 21 st century and the millions which feel profoundly 
offended by the modern, the legal, the open and the privatized. This is a battle fought daily in 
countries as different as Iran .. France ... Argentina .. and in many the consequence of insisting in 
defending the legal above the legitimate ... is that they country itself fracture, divides, is lost .... 
Monday 24 of July 2006 the Reforma, 
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relation of the university system to the government, or was embedded in other 
forms of social relations and structures. 
A review of research in this field has shown that clientalist relations have been 
used as a strategy of social control since the Spanish colonial period. This 
social structure of the cacique as intermediary was utilised during more than 
500 years of Mexican history by different governments to maintain social control 
and became embedded in social practices at all levels. Horizontal practices of 
reciprocity developed to ameliorate the inflexibility of the hierarchical sectorial 
structures. 
During the 20th century the PRl's adaptation of clientalism to their particular 
model of 'corporative authoritarian liberalism' allowed them to retain political 
control for seven decades. Clientalist systems of control were 'legitimated' by 
the ritual practices of symbolic nationalism and the PRl's appropriation of the 
symbols of the revolution and were considered legitimate in so far as they 
delivered the goals of the revolution in terms of land and wealth distribution. 
This complex symbolic system existed alongside a liberal constitution and an 
import protected market economy. 
The 'legitimacy' of the bureaucratic model of clientalism was undermined during 
the 1960's and 1970's as a result of widespread abuse of the system by party 
officials who consequently failed to deliver on electoral promises, and this 
failure to deliver was further exacerbated during the 1980's as a result of the 
financial crisis. Nevertheless, the vertical corporative state structure was still 
able to facilitate a rapid transition to a neoliberal 'open' market economy and the 
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adaptation of clientalist practices from bureaucratic to neoliberal models of 
decentralization and 'partnership' with civil society. 
This 'new' system can be considered to mirror clientalistpractices in so far as 
the government centralised its control over resources and used that power to 
co-opt the acquiescence of the relevant players in the system, undermining 
sites of 'legitimate' civic opposition. Furthermore, when funding is linked to 
reform in times of economic austerity, a relation of equity is clearly lacking26 . 
The adoption of this strategy of linking funding to reforms to push through the 
tertiary education reform programme's may also be considered as dangerously 
close to this new form of 'neoliberal cliental ism' despite the fact that the reform 
programme was based on an 'objective' system of indicators designed to 
supersede the discretionalism on which cliental ism is based. Furthermore, 
given the embedded nature of clientalist social structures in Mexican society, to 
attempt to overcome this practice using a strategy based on an adaptation of 
the same clientalist practices one seeks to overcome, might explain the 
unexpected outcomes of the reform programme. 
The disjuncture between the aims and the outcomes of the reform programme 
thus involved the incongruency of the combination of local aims and global 
ideologies. On the one hand, the national aim to introduce an 'objective' and 
hence possibly 'democratic' system of indicators to determine university 
funding. On the other hand, the adoption of performance management 
strategies adopted from international policy models which too closely mirrored 
and were adapted to the practices the aim of which it was to replace. 
26 Of course the same argument could be made against the notion of a 'free' market. 
113 
At this point, having analysed the national context of the reform programme, it is 
hence necessary to analyse the international policy models which were so 
unsuccessfully adopted to achieve that programmes aims. Nevertheless, 
before undertaking such an analysis, it is important to outline more fully the 
concept of social capital upon the basis of which those policy models are 
designed, as well as to analyse the extent to which this concept can explain the 
disjuncture's between policy aims and outcomes. 
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Chapter 5: Social Capital 
The following exploration of the concept of social capital is, on the one hand, to 
consider the different interpretations of this term and its usage, and, on the 
other hand, to determine the extent to which it refers to factors crucial to 
understanding the disjuncture between policy aims and outcomes. 
Different approaches to the concept of social 
capital 
Margarita Flores and Fernando Rello (Flores & Rello, 2003) consider the 
problem of defining the concept of social capital as one which depends on 
clarifying the different aspects involved in this term. The term is used to refer 
both to the sources of social capital and the collective action those sources 
permit, as well as the results of those actions. They produce a comparative 
table which I have translated in table 1 below. 
Table 4: Distinguishing different definitions of social capital 
Sources and Infrastructure Collective Action Results 
Coleman, 1990 Aspects of social structure That facilitate certain 
common actions 
within the structure 
Bourdieu, 1985 Permanent networks and Assures to the members 
membership of a group of a group of actual or 
potential resources 
Putnam, 1993 Aspects of social Which permit action For mutual benefit 
organ izations such as and cooperation (development and 
networks, norms and trust democracy) 
Woolcock, Norms and networks Which facilitate And the common benefit 
1998 collective action 
Fukuyama, Moral resources, Which strengthen 
1995 confidence and cultural social groups 
mechanisms 
Neoweberians Links and norms Which link individuals 
within organizations 
World Bank, Institutions, relations, That govern the And facilitate economic 
1998 attitudes and values interaction of people development and 
democracy. 
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Social capital, according to this table, involves both a source and infrastructure, 
which in turn permits collective action and results in the engendering of certain 
benefits or 'pay-offs'. Flores and Rello suggest that the confusion concerning 
the nature of social capital is a consequence of confusing these three aspects 
of social capital. They argue that many define social capital as networks of 
trust, thereby confusing social capital with the infrastructure which makes it 
possible, whilst others, such as Coleman, have a functional definition of social 
capital, defining it in terms of what it does, confusing it with the benefits it makes 
possible. 
Flores and Rello propose that social capital should be considered as a capacity. 
This capacity can be individual, entrepreneurial, communitarian or public. An 
individual or a group (whether mercantile, communitarian or public) which 
possesses social capital has possibilities which an individual or isolated group 
does not have. "In effect, it represents the capacity to obtain benefits on the 
basis of social networks". (Flores & Rello, 2003, p. 206) The issue which they 
do not address is whether they use the term 'capacity' in a rationalist sense, a 
structural sense, or a cultural sense. It is not clear whether they are suggesting 
that certain social infrastructure exists in an objective sense and the individual 
takes a rational decision to use that infrastructure, acting in collaboration, in 
order to obtain social benefits, or whether the social infrastructure acts as a type 
of social norm which governs the actions of agents, and or, the perceptive 
framework in which decisions concerning actions are made. 
Yet the different approaches to the issues of social capital also correspond, to 
some extent, to the different problematic that it is required to answer. These 
problematic include economic concerns regarding how forms of social 
governance may help or hinder economic development, social concerns 
regarding the apparent decline in social governance and policy concerns with 
regard to the effective introduction of development strategies. Within these 
broad categories there are also different approaches. In what follows I will 
outline some examples of these approaches in an attempt to find an approach 
to social capital which can explain disjuncture between the aims and outcomes 
of policy with regard to particular social contexts. 
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The OEeD sociological approach 
The increasing importance with which the OECD regard the issue of social 
capital is reflected in their publication The Well-being of Nations, a publication 
devoted to defining the concept of social capital. In this text they refer to 
different concepts of social capital and determine their own definition of this 
term as "networks together with shared norms, values and understandings that 
facilitate co-operation within or among groups." (OECD, 2001, p. 41) 
Trust is considered to be both a source and an outcome of social capital, and 
three types of trust are distinguished: Inter-personal trust among familiars 
(family, close work colleagues and neighbours); inter-personal trust among 
"strangers"; and trust in public and private institutions. Relations, situations 
and practices which engender social capital are considered to be: i) family; ii) 
schools; iii) local communities, iv) firms; v) civil society; public sector; vii) 
gender; and viii) ethnicity. 
The OECD does recognize a two-way relation between local or national 
institutions of public governance and social capital: 
Public governance based on commitment to public welfare, accountability and 
transparency provides a basis for trust and social inclusion, which in turn can 
strengthen social capital. The political, institutional and legal conditions 
prevailing in a country can underpin networks and norms for social co-
operation. These two categories can complement and reinforce each other in 
promoting well-being. Hence, social capital not only produces better public 
governance and more effective political institutions, but the latter can 
complement rather than replace community-based networks and reinforce trust. 
(OECD, 2001, p. 47) 
Nevertheless, they do not explore in detail the different dynamics of this two 
way relationship, and this is because they only briefly consider the down-sides 
of social capital. Although they examine the negative effects of 'inward-seeking' 
strongly bonded groups and 'exclusive social bridging', they consider this to be 
the exception rather than the rule, and so conclude that "The benefits from most 
types of social bonding and bridging generally greatly outweigh the negative 
consequences". (OECD, 2001, p. 43) The lack of development of the issues of 
the possible negative forms of social capital and the relation between this 
situation and forms of public governance is related to the fact that the focus of 
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the OECD report is on changes in social capital in the U.S.A., Europe, Australia 
and New Zealand. 
Nevertheless, whilst the OECD downplays the occurrence of negative forms of 
social capital, they do provide a useful account of how these negative forms 
may occur. They argue that the failure of bridging with more distant friends may 
result in a strong social capital developing within a group that at the same time 
constructs negative social relations to all those external to that group. This 
situation may be compounded by the failure of linking to other social groups and 
social strata in a situation of hierarchical authoritarian governmental structures. 
So, for example, closely knit family or ethnic groups, may practice bonding, but 
not 'bridging' with more distant friends or 'linking' with different social groups in 
the social strata. 
Furthermore, they do acknowledge that certain forms of social capital may be 
negative, including "highly bonded groups, such as drug cartels, illegal 
immigrant smuggler groups, mafia operations and terrorist groups (which) can 
embody high levels of internal trust and reciprocity"(OECD, 2001, p. 42) 
Similarly, "some forms of exclusive social bridging at the national or regional 
level may have socially destructive consequences" and these forms "include 
extreme or totalitarian ideologies" (OECD, 2001, p. 42). Yet, negative social 
capital is, according to the OECD account, only found in these extreme criminal 
groups; in general, social capital is positive and is characterised by relations 
based on trust. 
Given that the OECD account of social capital considers all negative forms of 
social capital in terms of 'extreme criminal groups' or 'extreme totalitarian 
ideologies', it is an account which provides few elements for understanding the 
social context to policy reform in Mexico, or any country outside the English 
speaking Anglo-Saxon culture. Nevertheless, their concept of social capital 
does help to understand the OECD's approach to tertiary education reform, as 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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A development policy approach 
Bowles and Gintis are concerned with the effective introduction of development 
policy and determine those factors which are key to positive developments of 
social capital. They argue that the notion of social capital refers to certain 
comportment towards other members of one's community, involving trust, 
concern for one's associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one's 
community, and punish those who do not. 
They observe that such practices were considered from Aristotle to Thomas 
Aquinas and Edmund Burke as "essential ingredients of good governance" 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2000, p. 2). However, this emphasis became replaced, since 
the 18th century, by the notion of homo economicus together with a Lockean 
vision of competitive markets, well-defined property rights and efficient, well-
intentioned states. Bowles and Gintis suggests that "good rules of the game 
thus came to displace good citizens as the sine qua non of good government." 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2000, p. 2: 2) 
They argue that the current return to an interest in the notion of social capital is 
a recognition of the importance of community governance resulting from the 
failures during the 20th century of either the market or the state to govern the 
economic process. They thus describe the return to an interest in 'good 
citizens' as a result of a failure of the faith placed by the West in theories of 
social organization based on the state or the market. It is clearly a concept 
which has not arisen out of the failure of the authoritarian corporate state in 
Latin America, where neither the state nor the market have been considered as 
occupying any degree of autonomous development. 
Bowles and Gintis consider that although social capital is a good idea it is not a 
good term because in their view the term 'capital' refers to things that can be 
owned whereas 'social capital' describes relations among people; they prefer 
the use of the term community. They consider that the community is an 
essential complement of the state and the market in solving problems, but that 
the way communities act in solving problems cannot be accounted for by self 
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interest. They prefer the notion of strong reciprocity where an individuals input 
is not dependent upon her/his expected personal benefit. 
However, Bowles and Gintis also consider "community failures", such as the 
fact that groups tend to be homogenous, "thereby depriving people of valued 
forms of diversity" (Bowles & Gintis, 2000, p. 14) , and the possibility of treating 
badly those that do not belong to the group. What's more, they consider that 
this is the rule not the exception: "The problem is endemic. Communities work 
because they are good at enforcing norms, and whether this is a good thing 
depends on what the norms are" (Bowles & Gintis, 2000, p. 14). 
Bowles and Gintis' view suggests that the downsides of social capital are 
inherent in the nature of this form of capital. Inward looking tightly knit social 
groups are not only the result of the failure of bridging to more distant friends 
and linking to other social groups and social strata, but also the fact that groups 
tend to depend on a degree of homogeneity, reinforced by norms. 
Whether the outcome is negative or positive depends both upon the norms that 
are reinforced, together with contextual factors. These include the need for "a 
legal and governmental environment favourable to their functioning" and a 
certain amount of social equality. Bowles and Gintis cite a paper by Bardhan 
and Johnson comparing irrigation organizations in India and Mexico which 
concludes that "farmer members of irrigation organizations .... Are more likely to 
cooperate in making efficient use (of the) water if status and class inequalities 
among them are limited." (Bowles & Gintis, 2000, p. 20) 
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In short, Bowles and Gintis delimit three general factors which have an impact 
on the positive development of social capital: the nature of the norms of the 
community; whether a legal and governmental environment exists which is 
favourable to their functioning and whether hierarchical division and economic 
inequality among community members is reduced to a minimumY They 
suggest that all three factors are important in considering the possible 
effectiveness of community governance in Mexico. They also call attention to 
the risks of importing policies which depend on the management of social 
capital which include certain assumptions about the nature of the social capital 
to be managed. 
Their account is congruent with the analysis of the complexity of Mexican 
society in the previous chapter. The issue of the norms of society is an 
important factor if the tacit as well as objective social practices are to be taken 
into account. The governmental and legal environment sustains those norms 
as seen in the example in the previous chapter of the "devil". Hierarchical social 
structures also sustain such forms of clientalism. Nevertheless, whilst Bowles 
and Gintis' account thus highlights crucial factors in determining social capital, 
unlike the DECO's reliance on the measure of trust, the relation between those 
factors is not developed in their account. 
27 The problem of marked social inequality is a factor which is not confined to developing 
economies. In his study of the negative impact of social inequality on public health,Richard 
Wilkinson considers it a social pollutant which occurs in both societies with high and low GOP's. 
(Wilkinson, 2005) Polly Tonybee noted that the UN development report of the first week of 
September 2005, shows that "extreme inequality within nations does great damage whatever a 
country's overall wealth" (Toynbee, 2005, p. 13). She draws the link between this observation 
and Sen's capabilities approach which emphaSises the need to measure a nation's wealth not 
in terms of GOP but in terms of the distribution of wealth in a nation. 
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A structural account of social capital in 
development policy 
Woolcock takes a structuralist approach in attempting to define four factors of 
social organization and the relation between which can be guaranteed to secure 
a positive outcome for social development. The absence of anyone of these 
factors will result in a negative outcome. The four factors are "embedded" and 
"autonomous" social ties at both the "micro" and "macro" social levels 
(Woolcock, 1998, p. 164). 
The task of the developmentalist is to identify the actual relation which exists 
between those four factors in any particular context and adjust the introduction 
of new policy accordingly. 
It is impossible to understand the prospects of development policies and 
projects without knowing the characteristics of social relations at both the micro 
and macro level, whether and how these levels articulate with one another, and 
how this degree of articulation has emerged historically ..... Rather than trying to 
prove or refute assertions that social relations are always and everywhere the 
construction of "rational "agents, or instead the result of primordial norms or 
"culture", a more fruitful approach invokes a social-structural explanation of 
economic life and seeks to identify the types and combinations of social 
relations involved, the institutional environments shaping them, and their 
historical emergence and continuity. The four ideal-typical forms of social 
relations identified in this article are a useful starting point for synthesizing such 
an analysis. (Woolcock, 1998, pp. 183,185) 
The relation between embedded and autonomous relations at the macro and 
the micro level give rise to particular social forms. As can be seen in figure 2 
below, at the micro level, embeddedness in the form of social integration results 
in strong social ties, but these need to be combined with linkage to other social 
groups for a certain level of autonomy in relation to those ties to be maintained. 
Yet this combination of embeddedness and autonomy at the micro level needs 
to be supported at the macro level by a combination of autonomy in the form of 
government integrity, combined with government or organizational 


















Figure 2 Woolcock's model of top-down and bottom up development and the 
forms of social capital 
At both the macro level and the micro level there exists, as a consequence, four 
possible ideal types of social capital according to the particular combination of 
autonomy and embeddedness that exists. At the micro level, a low level of both 
these aspects results in amoral individualism, a sort of Hobbesian world which 
Margaret Mead evokes in her description of the Ik tribe in Uganda. On the other 
hand, amoral familism describes a context where intra-community ties are 
strong, but at the expense of extra-community networks, due to an "excess of 
community" built on "fierce ethnic loyalties and familial attachments (Woolcock, 
1998, p. 171). Economic development cannot move beyond the level of the 
family, or the ethnic group. Woolcock cites studies on Russia which question, in 
this respect, the viability of neo-liberal economic policies based on privatisation, 
"since efforts to sell off collectively owned goods under these conditions may 
not only intensify existing social problems but actually create new ones" 
(Woolcock, 1998, p. 172). Similar comments were made about the sell off of 
state assets in Mexico when President Salinas introduced neo-liberal policies, 
and privatization was seen to benefit a chosen few. 
Anomie is the situation Durkheim identified as the "hallmarks of modernization" 
(Woolcock, 1998, p. 173) where people in new urban settings may have the 
freedom of linkage but lack a community base to provide social norms and 
hence stability. Social opportunity describes a context where high levels of 
community integration and extra-community networks can be found. Woolcock 
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suggests that such a situation has been achieved in development programmes 
of rotating savings and credit association. 
Social opportunity in this example, involves a social mechanism which 
Granovetter calls "coupling and decoupling" where members initially are 
supported by their immediate community but are later encouraged to establish 
ties with other communities to expand their enterprise. Nevertheless, it can be 
seen that this example in fact takes Woolcock's analysis beyond the micro-
level, in the sense that it is the development programmes which later encourage 
members to establish ties with other communities, and which promote this as an 
acceptable norm within the community. This example thus supports the 
argument of Bowles and Gintis, that it requires an appropriate governmental or 
institutional framework to establish social opportunity at the micro level. 
Woolcock describes a similar set of equally interdependent relations at the 
macro-level, whether governmental or organizational. The level of coherent 
internal relationships within an organization characterises its organizational 
integrity, whilst the level of relationships between the organization and its 
members, or the State and its citizens is referred to as synergy. Low levels in 
both these aspects produces a state of anarchy, characteristic of a collapsed 
state, Woolcock gives the example of Somalia in 1998. On the other hand, a 
rogue state is one which lacks autonomy in terms of organizational integrity and 
is characterised by corruption, yet maintains a form of synergy as government 
officials use connections with industry to secure personal goods and the state 
monopoly of violence to crush dissent. African states such as Nigeria and 
Sudan are current examples of rogue states. Weak states, on the other hand, 
are high in integrity but low in synergy and tend to be characterised by good 
intentions which get lost in bureaucracy and inefficiency, resulting in 
ineffectiveness. Woolcock considers ex-communist and socialist states as 
examples of weak states. Developmental states are those which have high 
levels of organizational integrity as well as good state-society relations. 
Woolcock cites Japan, South Korea and Singapore as prime examples. 
The four possible combinations at the macro level and four at the micro level, 
result in a total of 16 theoretical combinations. The best possible option is a 
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combination of strong social capital at the micro level and supportive public 
governance, that is, conditions where there is intra and extra community links, 
good state-society relations and strong corporate cohesion, which allow for the 
emergence of a situation of beneficent autonomy. The contrary position, where 
none of these factors is present, is anarchic individualism. 
Clearly, Woolcock describes ideal types; a nation is a context which is generally 
too large to be homogenous. Japan, for example, may be a developmental 
state, but also has problems with organised crime, even though the Japanese 
mafias tend to play by the rules, indeed they even elect their leaders. Indeed 
Woolcock observes that "groups within societies also vary considerably" 
(Woolcock, 1998, p. 167). As mentioned at the beginning, Woolcock's interest 
in social capital is a result of his interest in determining the conditions for 
assuring positive results of policy interventions. His model thus shows that 
policy needs to work at both the macro and micro levels encouraging 
embeddedness and autonomy at both levels, to best ensure the beneficent 
outcome of policy for society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, Woolcock's model does not account for the possibility of 
resistance to the implementation of development policy. It assumes that policy 
failures can be accounted for purely in terms of the consequence of an 
imbalance in policy strategies as a result of not taking both macro and micro 
levels, and autonomous and embeddedness factors into account. In short, it 
avoids all reference to power relations in social structures, and the manner in 
which these may be embedded in social practices and symbolic structures. Yet, 
in chapter two, it was seen that the linking in Mexico of funding to reform, 
reproduced traditional clientalist power structures. Woolcock's model does not 
anticipate how such power relations are embedded in existing social structures 
or practices, constituting a resistance to change, adapting new policy strategies 
to traditional objectives of social control. 
This is because Woolcock considers the infrastructure of social capital in terms 
of objective structures; he does not consider a possible normative aspect to 
social capital. Thus, Woolcock assumes that if policy attends to the 
infrastructure of social capital in the four areas which he defines, then the 
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rational individual will consequently choose to change his or her previous way of 
acting and begin to act in a way that will produce benefits for society as a 
whole. Hence, Woolcock's explanation of the unexpected outcome of policy 
remains restricted to an account of the complexity of the social infrastructure 
required to secure beneficial results for development policy. 
Robert Putnam, on the other hand, in his study of the north and south of Italy 
was aware that the same social infrastructure and policies had different results 
in each region in Italy, and consequently attempted to take into account an 
aspect of cultural resistance to policy innovation, a notion which he refers to in 
terms of 'path dependence'. 
A social governance approach: Putnam's notion 
of 'path dependence' 
Putnam is perhaps best known for his theory relating the decline in social 
governance in the United States of America to the decline in social capital. 
Nevertheless, for the purposed of this thesis, his research on social capital in 
Italy is more relevant, for not only did he attempt to explain a form of 'cultural 
resistance' to policy innovation, but also he was concerned, like Bowles and 
Gintis, with the negative impact of hierarchical relations. He argues that vertical 
relations not only inhibit flows of information because "the subordinate 
husbands information as a hedge against exploitation" (Putnam, 1993, p. 174), 
but they also undermine the norms of the group because "sanctions that 
support norms of reciprocity against the threat of opportunism are less likely to 
be imposed upwards and less likely to be accede to, if imposed", (Putnam, 
1993, p. 174). 
Putnam considers that the hierarchically ordered organizations in southern Italy 
"like the Mafia or the institutional Catholic Church should be negatively 
associated with good government" (Putnam, 1993, p. 175). He also suggests 
that patron-client relations and strong kinship ties also undermine good 
government. The former are reciprocal yet vertical and unequal relations which 
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"undermine the horizontal group organisation and solidarity of clients and 
patrons alike - but especially of the clients." (Putnam, 1993, pp. 174-175). 
Whilst, Putnam recognises that such hierarchical structures do serve a purpose 
in the early stages of society by establishing stability, he suggests that if not 
superseded they also limit social development. Putnam notes that as a 
consequence "civic equilibrium has shown remarkable stability ... although its 
effects have been disrupted from time to time by exogenous forces like 
pestilence, war, and world trade shifts. The contrasting Hobbesian equilibrium 
in the South has been even more stable, though less fruitful." (Putnam, 1993, p. 
181). Similarly kinship ties are important in the early stages of commercial 
revolution, but in later social development, such 'strong ties' are less important 
than weak ties which "encompass broad segments of society and thus 
undergrid collaboration at the community level", (Putnam, 1993, p. 175). 
Thus Putnam shows that "Social context and history profoundly condition the 
effectiveness of institutions." (Putnam, 1993, p. 182) (authors italics). 
Secondly, Putnam draws attention to the similarities in the north-south contrast 
of the social and historical contexts in Italy, with the relation between North and 
South America: 
After independence, both the United States and the Latin republics shared 
constitutional forms, abundant resources, and similar international 
opportunities; but North Americans benefited from their decentralized, 
parliamentary English patrimony, whereas Latin Americans were cursed with 
centralized authoritarianism familism and clientalism that they inherited from 
late medieval Spain. In our language, the North Americans inherited civic 
traditions, whereas the Latin Americans were bequeathed traditions of vertical 
dependence and exploitation. The point is not that the preferences or 
predilections of individual North and South Americans differed, but that 
historically derived social contexts presented them with a different set of 
opportunities and incentives. The parallel between this North-South contrast 
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and our Italian case is striking. (Putnam, 1993, p. 179)28 
Putnam refers to the prevalence of 'tradition', in southern Italy and in Latin 
America, in terms of 'path dependence', which not only includes the idea of 
cultural resistance to the introduction of external policy initiative, but also their 
transformation: "informal norms and culture change more slowly than formal 
rules, and tend to remould those formal rules, so that the external imposition of 
a common set of formal rules will lead to widely divergent outcomes." (Putnam, 
1993, p. 180) 
Putnam's reference to the possibility that the informal norms of culture might 
'remould' the formal rules of policy sounds strikingly similar to with the way in 
which the attempt to introduce objective criteria for the assignation of funds to 
universities in Mexico based on evaluation results, was in many cases, 
'remoulded' to a traditional exercise of obtaining resources, in which simulation 
is considered an expedient strategy. Nevertheless, Putnam does not attempt to 
explain why "informal norms and culture change more slowly than formal rules", 
in fact the notion of 'path dependence' almost sounds like an excuse why 
nothing can be done in contexts such as southern Italy and Latin America. For 
this reason, it is important to seek an account of social capital which takes 
informal norms into account. 
28 Not only is there a parallel between Putnam's study of north and south Italy and the United 
States and Latin America, but also there is an emerging distinction in Mexico between the north 
and the south of the country, accelerated by the signing of NAFTA, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada, in 1994. 
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A relational sociological approach 
Bourdieu's account of social capital involves the identification of both the 
structure of social capital of a given context, and also the way in which that 
structure is reproduced. He achieves this by distinguishing three notions: that of 
habitus, capital, and field. The former is the structure of tacit practices and 
norms, whilst the dominance of these 'implicit rules of the game' endows an 
individual with capital to use in different social fields. The field is a relational 
site in which different forms of capital compete for different positions in the 
power hierarchy of the field, so that the field is defined by the relation between 
forms of capital. Both the habitus and the field can be compared to a game, the 
capital possessed by an individual as a result of dominating the rules of a 
particular habitus provide him or her with 'trump cards to play in the economy of 
the field. According to the field in which the individual plays, his or her 'trump 
card' has a different weight or value. The social universe is made up of different 
fields, " i.e. ,spaces of objective relations that are the site of a logic and a 
necessity that are specific and irreducible to those that regulate other fields 
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). 
It is perhaps this lack of specificity which makes Bourdieu's notion of social 
capital difficult at first to understand, yet the fact that it is a relational concept 
where the field is defined by the relations between capital in a particular context 
is that which makes Bourdieu's account particularly useful in context's where 
social relations do not conform to more traditional accounts. In this way 
Bourdieu's account of different forms of capital can be defended against Ben 
Fine's rejection of the concept of social capital. 
The main argument of Fine against social capital is that the aspects of social 
engagement referred to are not questions of capital. As a consequence Fine 
concludes "If social capital seeks to bring the social back in to enrich the 
understanding of capitalism, it does so only because it has impoverished the 
understanding of capital by taking it out of its social and historical context" (Fine, 
1999, p. 39). Fine argues that we can only talk about capital because for more 
than 200 years we have lived in a capitalist society. The post-Washington 
consensus uses the notion of social capital as the non-market counterpart to 
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market imperfections and thus as variables to be calculated in the complex 
statistical analysis of market predictions when imperfections are taken into 
account. Fine considers that the growing popularity of such analysis has the 
"potential to swallow up development studies, and to marginalise alternatives 
genuinely based on class analysis and political economy" (Fine, 2001, p. 138) 
Nevertheless, as Adler argues, it is not clear that a class analysis and an 
account of political economy are suitable to the analysis of the development 
context of Mexican society. In her analysis of social structures in Mexico, Adler 
argues that the emergence of an authoritarian State in Latin-American societies 
has tended "to superimpose a sectorial structure of power on top of the class 
structure based on relations of production" (Adler Lomnitz, 1994, p. 223) 
Bourdieu's account of social capital does not depend upon a class analysis. 
The differential power relations of the field can obey different economies of 
power. Indeed, Bourdieu argues that classes are but one form of the principle 
of differentiation of social spaces, and these forms vary from one historical 
moment to another and one culture to another: 
Social science should construct not classes, but rather the social spaces in 
which classes can be demarcated, but which only exist on paper. In each case 
it should construct and discover. .. the principle of differentiation which permits 
one to re-engender theoretically the empirically observed social space .... But 
with the exception of the least differentiated societies (which still present 
differences in symbolic capital, which are more difficult to measure), all 
societies appear as social spaces, that is, as structures of differences that can 
only be understood by constructing the generative principle which objectively 
grounds those differences. This principle is none other than the structure of the 
distribution of the forms of power or the kinds of capital which are effective in 
the social universe under consideration and which vary according to the specific 
place and moment at hand. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 32) 
Bourdieu differentiates what he calls "three fundamental species" of capital, 
each with its own subtypes, "namely, economic capital, cultural capital, and 
social capital", whilst symbolic capital "is the form that one or another of these 
species takes when it is grasped through categories of perceptions that 
recognize its speCific logic, or if your prefer, misrecognize the arbitrariness of its 
possession and accumulation." (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119) 
Subtypes of capital include university capital (power over the reproduction of 
capital in the university field), intellectual capital (intellectual renown), scientific 
capital (generated by league tables, research societies, etc.), political 
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capital,(arising from forms of governance), (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, pp. 
76, 96). Social capital is the result of the objective regularities of relationships 
of an individual in a habitus, which involve mutual acquaintance and 
recognition. Social capital may take different forms and assume distinct 
dynamics in different societies. In differentiated societies it may be 
'patrimonialized' by political capital, such as in Mexico in the 20th century, in the 
form of peasant, teachers, workers unions which all have a particular role in the 
one (dominant) party system. (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 119) 
In this sense the different capitals acquire value according to the economies in 
which they are situated. Bourdieu describes his intention as one of 
a desire to wrest from economism (Marxist or Neomarginalist) precapitalist 
economies and entire sectors of so-called capitalist economies which do not 
function according to the law of interest seen as the search for the maximization 
of (monetary) profit. The economic universe is made up of several economic 
worlds endowed with specific "rationalities," at the same time assuming and 
demanding "reasonable" (more than rational) dispositions adjusted to the 
regularities inscribed in each of them, to the "practical reason" which 
characterizes them. (Bourdieu, 1998, p.98). 
Bourdieu's approach to the question of social capital is, then, one which 
attempts to reach beyond a Eurocentric or Marxist account of social 
organization. 
Afield determined by an economy of symbolic exchange 
An example of the way in which a field is defined by a particular economy of 
relations of capital is to be found in Bourdieu's study of the Kabyle economy. 
This study enabled him to distinguish the principles of differentiation of a pre-
capitalist economy and the extent to which that was based upon a domestic 
economy. In his essay 'The economy of symbolic goods' (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 
92) Bourdieu considers how in the transition from a pre-capitalist economy to a 
capitalist economy two systems can co-exist, such that the market economy 
only very gradually replaces the symbolic economy, and pockets of the former 
will nevertheless remain (e.g. artistic capital). 
The symbolic economy Bourdieu describes is remarkably similar to the social 
structures and practices Adler distinguishes in Mexican society, particularly the 
observation that these practices exist alongside a market rationality. 
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Nevertheless, it would also appear that in Mexico the introduction of neoliberal 
policies, far from accelerating a transition to a market economy has resulted in a 
market economy being adapted to clientalist structures, at the expense of both 
a liberal market and a symbolic economy. For this reason it is important to 
consider carefully Bourdieu's description of a symbolic economy. 
The first important point is that Bourdieu finds, in what appears a to be a 
reciprocal exchange of gifts, an aggressive act which puts the receiver in a 
position of obligation to the giver, "it creates obligations, it is a way to possess, 
by creating people obliged to reciprocate. But this structural truth is collectively 
repressed." (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 94) Individual self-deception concerning the 
acts of domination and aggression that are present in an exchange of gifts are 
sustained in a "veritable collective misrecognition inscribed in objective 
structures (the logic of honour which governs all exchanges - of words, of 
women, of murders etc.) and in mental structures, excluding the possibility of 
thinking or acting otherwise." (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 95) 
The impossibility of thinking or acting otherwise depends on various factors. 
One factor is the logic of honour; another is the social taboo of making things 
explicit (a taboo which still exists in market economies where it is considered 
bad taste to leave a price tag on a present). The important point Bourdieu 
makes is that these are not conscious decisions but depend upon "acquired 
dispositions" of the habitus in which an individual is 'educated'. A successful 
exchange of gifts requires both parties to "have identical categories of 
perception and appreciation" which are in turn "sustained by the entire social 
structure". They can be sustained in different ways "there must be rewards, 
symbolic profits, often convertible into material profit, people must be able to 
have an interest in disinterestedness, a man who treats his servant well should 
be rewarded, with people saying of him: "He is an honest man, an honourable 
man!" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 101) All members of a group thus enjoy the symbolic 
capital of that group and "all the profits of the market of symbolic goods". They 
also partake of the symbolic violence, given that the relations of submission 
involved in the symbolic exchange are not recognised as such. 
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The complex and extensive way in which this symbolic economy is sustained in 
the social structure means that the emergence of a market economy in which 
social agents can "tear themselves away from collective misrecognition" and 
admit to themselves and others that they intend to make and accumulate a 
profit on the basis of exploitation, is a very slow process. But it does not only 
involve recognition of the misrecognition but also the transformation of the 
objective social structures in which that misrecognition was embedded. 
Bourdieu's account of an economy of symbolic goods has many similarities with 
the situation Adler describes in the vertical and horizontal relations of exchange 
in Mexican societies. The figure of the caudillo was based primarily on honour, 
and that element of honour still exists in the general perception of clientalist 
relations. The symbolic relation of honour obscures the relation of domination of 
the patron with the client, the former offering jobs, university entrance, the 
solution of a legal case, or general protection, in return for personal loyalty to 
the patron, or political party, or family business structure. It also means that to 
question that relationship in any way is considered an insult to the honour of the 
patron. The more recent neoliberal version of clientalism has replaced this 
disguise of patron client relations under questions of honour, for the disguise of 
quasi-market competition, with the intention to undermining the economy of 
symbolism, and replace a personalised form of social control with a more 
systematic form of social management controlled by central government. 
The horizontal reciprocal relations which Adler describes in Mexican society are 
less disguised in gestures of honour given that the situation of domination is 
reduced, yet such exchanges still involve the sense of a debt to be paid, even if 
the form of repayment depends more on the future possibilities of the person 
133 
and less on a formal present obligation. They are forms of exchange 
embedded in the symbolic economy of society, in the family, in the church, in 
the vertical power structure, headed by the symbolic figure of the President, 
guardian of the national prestige.29 
The importance for this research is Bourdieu's observation that because the 
economy of symbolic goods is based on belief, and involves a constant 
adjustment between mental and objective structures, it is a stable economy 
which is not easily replaced: 
The rupture cannot result from a simple awakening of consciousness; the 
transformation of dispositions cannot occur without a prior or concomitant 
transformation of the objective structures of which they are the production and 
which they can survive. (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 122) 
In Bourdieu's economy of symbolic goods, each element only makes sense in 
relation to another element. Similarly, in the Mexican social structure, the 
relations of reciprocity are a consequence of, and at the same time sustain, the 
vertical structures which are in turn sustained by the symbolism of the nation, 
and the teachings of submission and obedience in a religious population. In a 
symbolic economy the dominant capital within the economy is symbolic and the 
principal habitus where this capital is formed is the family. Bourdieu's concept 
of social capital thus explains the stability of the informal norms which Putnam 
refers to as 'path dependence'. It also makes explicit the degree of 
embeddedness of c1ientalist relations in Mexican society. Not only are they 
'embedded' due to their historical trajectory and their insertion in a complex 
structure of Mexican social relations which Adler describes, but also, according 
to Bourdieu, due to their reproduction in the different habitus of Mexican society, 
29 The way in which the symbols of the Catholic Church and those of the State are mutually 
appropriated is the subject of a paper (Rocher, 2006) for a forthcoming conference on identity 
and culture organised by the UNAM. 
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in the symbolic economy which sustains the clientalist system and the relative 
value of clientalist capital in the different fields of the Mexican social space. The 
fact that neoliberal forms of clientalism seek to substitute a quasi market 
economy for a symbolic economy may have an impact on the relative value of 
clientalist capital in different fields. 
Bourdieu's description of an economy or field evokes something similar to the 
concept of an eco-system, where each element participates in maintaining the 
balance of that structure. It is distinct from Woolcock's model of four distinct 
factors which have to be maintained in a functional balance. This account of 
the dynamic of social relations is one which also explains that which Putnam 
referred to in terms of 'path dependence' and Woolcock as the 'unexpected 
results of policy strategies'. Given that at both the level of the habitus and the 
level of the field a tacit knowledge of the rules of the game are required, and the 
capital in the field is relational, policies have an impact on a relational structure 
and not on a 'rational' agent: 
First, the external determinations that bear on agents situated in a given field 
(intellectuals, artists, politicians, or construction companies) never apply to them 
directly, but affect them only through specific mediation of the specific forms 
and forces of the field ... (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 105) 
Another concept which Bourdieu's account of capital explains is one which the 
OECD refers to as 'linking' or bridging, and Woolcock as linking at the micro 
level and 'synergy' at the macro level. These concepts Bourdieu explains in 
terms of both the personal skills in dominating the tacit rules of the game of a 
particular habitus, and a mixture of personal skills and relational power 
operating at the level of the field. To use a more concrete example, if one 
considers Adler's example of the labour contractor known as the "devil", it can 
be seen that she refers to an individual who excels in the rules of the game at 
the level of the habitus of his local community of urban migrants, using the 
community networks to form and control a team of workers. Yet this control is 
also dependent upon his ability to find work for that team in the construction 
economy which combines formal and informal work forces. 
This individual is the modern cacique or 'intermediary' in Mexican society, using 
his capital in one economy of reciprocal relations of migrant workers 
community, and playing it in the construction economy. His trajectory of 
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success in moving between these two different economies means that his 
position in each is reinforced by his success in the other: his ability to control 
informal teams of workers raises the value of his capital in the construction 
economy, whilst his ability to procure employment raises his capital in the 
migrant workers community. 
Yet, his success not only depends on his personal skills in 'playing the game', 
but also certain 'external determinations' such as government policy concerning 
both employment legislation and also its enforcement. Whilst that enforcement 
is lax in the construction field, the 'devil's' capital is high, although neoliberal 
reforms are aimed at the regularisation of the informal labour market (Cross, 
1997). In this sense, Bourdieu's account of a relational economy of capital also 
explains the relative importance of that which Bowles and Gintis refer to as legal 
and governmental frameworks. Government legislation and its application can 
intervene in a field to transform the relational value of capital in that field. 
Relative values of capital, school cultures and ethos 
The impact of government legislation is described by Grimmett and Crehan 
(Grimmett & Crehan, 1992) in their evaluation of the impact of current education 
policy in school cultures in England. In determining the concept of 'school 
cultures' they refer to a number of factors which they suggest are participant in 
the construction of school cultures: "School culture can be said to be influenced 
by teacher sub-cultures, framed by personal biographies, ontological 
perspectives, and career experiences and by the occupational culture of 
teaching which represents attributes of the teaching profession as a whole." 
(Grimmett & Crehan, 1992, p. 59) They suggest that cultures evolve over time 
and the "culture building is essentially the infusion of value into the regular 
enterprise" so that "the organization is changed from an expendable tool into a 
valued source of personal satisfaction". (Grimmett & Crehan, 1992: ) 
They consider this multifaceted nature of school cultures in relation to the 
performance management strategy of 'forced collegiality'. They observe that 
"The last decade has witnessed a Significant trend towards the centralization of 
bureaucratic control" which is the response to crises of "legitimation, belief, 
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motivation and purpose", and "One consequence of this state of affairs is the 
'peculiar paradox that teachers are apparently being urged to collaborate more, 
just at the time where there is less for them to collaborate about "(Hargreaves 
and Oawe, 1989:3, emphasis in original), (Grimmett & Crehan, 1992). They use 
the term 'contrived collegiality' to refer to situations when collegial practices are 
'grafted onto' existing school practices "without nurturing the underlying beliefs, 
values and norms that make up the sustaining culture." They suggest that 
'administratively imposed' collegiality will remain contrived, whilst 
'organizationally induced' collegiality involves the "careful manipulation, not of 
teachers' practices and behaviours, but of the environment within which 
teachers live and work and have their professional being". (Grimmett & Crehan, 
1992, p. 70) These conclusions of Grimmett and Crehan clearly have a direct 
bearing on the application of centrally designed performance management 
strategies across different institutional environments. Their findings suggest 
that instead of directing policy to individual's behaviour and practices, it would 
be more effectively directed to the environment in which teachers practice. 
The notion of the environment within which teachers live and work and have 
their professional being having more impact than administratively imposed' 
collegiality, is similar to the importance Bourdieu ascribes to dispositions arising 
from habitus constituted by a web of social practices. Indeed Terence 
McLaughlin describes 'ethos' in terms very similar to those of Bourdieu's 
concept of habitus: 
"At the most general level, an ethos can be regarded as the prevalent or 
characteristic tone, spirit or sentiment informing an identifiable entity involving 
human life and interaction (a 'human environment' in the broadest sense) such 
as a nation, a community, an age, a literature, an institution, an event and so 
forth ... The influence of an ethos is seen in the shaping of human perceptions, 
attitudes, beliefs, disposition and the like in a distinctive way which is implicated 
in that which is (in some sense) established. (McLaughlin, 2005, p. 312) 
That which Grimmit and Crehan, or McLaughlin, refer to as the 'ethos' of an 
institution, Bourdieu describes in terms of habitus, which is something which 
influences 'schemes of perception'. (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53) This is not a set of 
objective rules an individual consciously follows, but instead 'regularities' which 
can be found in practices and upon which frameworks of perception are 
founded. These 'regularities' form the basis of the perceptual frameworks within 
which an agent acts and finds his or her acts meaningful. Such 'regularities' 
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constitute both the possibility of, as well as restrictions to, human agency, and 
in this sense they are objective. Lingard suggests that as a result of applying 
Bourdieu's approach of 'socioanalysis' individuals may be helped to become 
"reflexively aware of the structural determinants of their practice" (Lingard, 
2006, p. 291). 
Capital is derived from particular habitus but it can be deployed in various fields. 
Individuals or policy makers can seek to increase the value of a particular 
capital in the logic of a particular field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 99), for 
example administrative capital over scientific capital in the field of education. 
The distinction between the construction of capital and the relational value of 
capital is important in this thesis due to the issue of policy which seeks to 
transform performance. According to Bourdieu's approach to the concept of 
capital, capital itself arises from the regularities of practice which constitute a 
habitus. It is in this sense that Grimmit and Crehan observe that collegiality is 
constructed over time in an education institution and cannot be imposed by 
policy directives. Nevertheless, policy can undermine the regularities of 
practice upon which a habitus or 'ethos' was constructed. 
On the other hand, policy can intervene to the extent that it works to change the 
relational value of one form of capital in relation to another in the logic of a field. 
As Grimmit and Crehan observe, the centralisation of programme design and 
the standardisation of evaluations has decreased the scientific capital of the 
teachers in schools in England, so that teachers are asked to collaborate more 
when there is less for them to collaborate about. Thus, policy fruitlessly 
attempted to regulate the construction of a habitus of collegiality in schools yet, 
at the same time, it devalued the scientific capital of teachers in the educational 
field. 
The way in which current education policy in England is undermining teachers 
capital in the education field as well as the habitus where that capital is formed, 
can be contrasted to Bourdieu's account of the mechanisms of the preservation 
of capital and habitus in the French university system. Bourdieu's analysis of 
research data in Homo Academicus demonstrates how the reproduction of the 
habitus is also dependent on the power relations which configure the field and 
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how, in turn, the maintenance of those power relations depends upon certain 
procedures which determine the access to that field. Bourdieu argues that in 
the academic field those procedures are embedded in the practices of the 
committees of selection and promotion. The objectively orchestrated 
dispositions are constructed and maintained by the processes of selection, 
evaluation and promotion of both the student and academic community. The 
control of power by a dominant group in a field maintains the habitus 
(disposition) of that group, and its relation to other groups. This explains the 
homologous relation that exists between the discursive stances and the 'space 
of the positions' held by their authors. On the basis of this observation Bourdieu 
arrives at the following conclusion: 
This means that it is not, as is usually thought, political stances which determine 
people's stances on things academic, but their positions in the academic field 
which inform the stances they adopt on political issues in general as well as on 
academic problems. (Bourdieu, 1988) 
The positions taken by academics in relation to political events largely reflected 
their differential position in the academic field. The latter is determined by the 
means of reproduction of the hierarchies of that field, the way in which 'the 
capital of university power' is produced and reproduced through the committees 
of selection and promotion. 
The relation between these terms of field, capital and habitus allows Bourdieu to 
develop his notion of finality, the idea that events occur not as a result of 
conscious decision taking, but due to objectively orchestrated dispositions. 
(Bourdieu, 1988, p. 149) In short, Bourdieu's explains the events of May 1968 
as the result of no particular political decision but as the result of 'qualitative 
leaps where the continuous addition of ordinary events leads to a singular, 
extraordinary instant." (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 161) Thus Bourdieu can explain how 
unexpected outcomes may occur as a result of orchestrated dispositions but not 
conscious intent. For this reason, the distinction between habitus, capital and 




Bourdieu's analysis of habitus and disposition provides a theoretical framework 
for explaining the way in which they are embedded in social practices. 
Symbolic economies co-exist with market economies and symbolic capital 
operates alongside social capital, with cultural capital and intellectual capital. 
Capital is, in this sense, something like the tacit understanding and practical 
dominance of the rules of the game which facilitates the successful participation 
of an individual in the relations of a social group. This practical dominance 
arises from the sharing of habitus which constructs a perceptual framework and 
a disposition. Capital is also something which acquires distinct values 
according to its positional relation in different economies of the 'fields' of the 
social universe. An individual can increase the value of his or her capital in a 
particular field according to the skills with which he or she plays that capital, but 
also the value of that capital can be affected by external structures such as 
governmental and legal frameworks, and changes of the relation of that field to 
others in the social universe. 
Adler argues that the 'rules of the game' are at least four dimensional in Mexico: 
vertical, often clientalist relations, horizontal reciprocal relations, market 
relations and symbolic relations, embedded in a diverse set of social structures 
sustained by social practices. Adler argues that Mexicans need to learn these 
distinct rules of the game whereas Bourdieu would argue that they also need to 
learn the value of the consequent capital in different economies or fields. 
Various scholars have sought to explain different issues by means of the 
concept of social capital. These include the decline in public governance, the 
role of social capital in economic success, the unexpected results of policy 
implementation, the relative importance of governmental and legal structures for 
capital to be successfully employed, the 'path dependence' of certain forms of 
capital, the role of linking between different social fields, and the notion of the 
ethos of an institution. Bourdieu's development of the concepts of habitus, 
capital and field, succeeds in constructing an account which coherently 
integrates all these factors. As such it is an approach which can be employed 
to explain the complex levels of relations which exist in Mexican society, as well 
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as the operation of the intermediary, or cacique, in the complex combination of 
economies which constitute the social universe of the Mexican society. It can 
also be employed to explain the impact of neoliberal policy and the new forms 
of neoliberal cliental ism. 
The above development of an account of Bourdieu's relative approach to forms 
of capital in the social field can be seen as relevant to the explanation of the 
social context of policy reform in Mexico. In the following chapter I will consider 
the extent to which it is relevant to the explanation of international policy models 
in tertiary education. 
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Chapter 6. A global educational policy 
field 
Two distinct accounts of post-industrial society 
In the previous chapter it was seen that Bourdieu's approach which considers 
social spaces relationally, instead of geographically, in terms of the relative 
values of capital within a field, can explain how government policy can alter the 
value of capital in a field, as in the example of the informal contract labourer, the 
"devil". 
Education policy can similarly be considered in terms of its impact on the 
relative values of capital, either directly or indirectly, within the field of tertiary 
education. Bob Lingard argues in a recent article that Bourdieu: 
.. seems to be suggesting the way in which global neo-liberal politics have 
dented somewhat the relative autonomy of the logics of practice of many social 
fields, including I would argue that of the educational policy field, which has 
become more heteronymous as a sub-set of economic policy. (Lingard, 2006, p. 
292) 
Consequently, with the aim of explaining the disjuncture between policy 
objectives outcomes, the reform programme in Mexico can be analysed in 
terms of the precise way in which it proposes to transform, either directly or 
indirectly, the power relations in the field of tertiary education policy. These 
potential areas of impact can then be compared with their actual impact in 
particular contexts. In this chapter I will analyse the potential impact of the 
reform programme and in the chapters seven and eight I will analyse the actual 
impact of the reform programme in three universities in Mexico. 
In chapter three it was observed that the reform programme in Mexico included 
both World Bank and GECD strategies of education reform, and furthermore, 
that the tension between these either competitive or collaborative strategies has 
not been resolved in the most recent tightening up of policy application in 
Mexico. I will firstly argue that the World Bank and the GECD tertiary education 
policies constitute two distinct models which can be distinguished on the basis 
of their distinct accounts of post-industrial society in terms of either a 
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'knowledge economy' or a 'knowledge society'. Secondly, I will consider how 
each account directly or indirectly proposes to transform the relative values of 
capital in the tertiary education field. 
Neoliberalism and the 'knowledge economy' 
As mentioned in the introduction, the 1980's and 1990's were dominated by a 
paradigm of development referred to variously as the 'Washington consensus', 
'market fundamentalism', 'free-market economics' or 'neoliberalism'. The use of 
the latter term predominated in Latin America. (Broad, 2004, p. 129) The 
Salinas Government (1988-1994) oversaw the transition of the Mexican 
economy from one of a protected internal market to a neoliberal open market, 
export lead, economy. 
Nevertheless, in addition to the increasing tendency towards deregulation and 
'open markets' as neoliberal economics came to dominate economic policy at 
international and national levels, there was increased economic competition at 
an international level arising from the globalisation of economic transactions. 
This was intensified by the steadily increasing competition from producers with 
low labour costs, such as south Asia, India and China. Given this intense global 
competition, there was an increased effort to determine strategies which would 
create alternative forms of economic advantage. During the eighties, 
Singapore, unable to compete in size with the 'Asian giants', had invested in 
education to produce a highly skilled work force and successfully attracted high-
tech companies requiring skilled labour. 
The advanced industrialised countries, unable to compete in the 'race to the 
bottom' in labour costs, yet unwilling to abandon completely 'free market' 
economics and support the International Labour Organisation's (www.ilo.org) 
argument for a minimum world wage, opted for the 'Singaporean approach' of 
constructing 'market niches' in high-technology production where they 
considered they would be in a stronger position to compete. The race to the 
bottom is avoided, as is protectionism, by constructing this form of 'market 
niche' and then repositioning education policy in line with this economic 
strategy. They attempted to capitalise their 'advantages' in terms of an 
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educated workforce by considering them as knowledge workers in a knowledge 
economy. Tertiary education thus came to be considered as an integral part of 
economic policy in advanced industrial countries. 
Nevertheless, this model has not been described in official discourses as an 
attempt to carve out a 'market niche', but instead as a need to keep up with a 
'knowledge economy' described as a 'global phenomena'. The knowledge 
economy model has been adopted by the World Bank and the OECD as part of 
their international development models, which all countries, whether they have 
advanced or developing economies are encouraged to adopt. Brown and 
Lauder have pOinted out that the developing economies of China, India and 
Malaysia are doing precisely this, thus undermining the "policy discourse of the 
knowledge economy" which "assumes that the competition for high-skilled 
employment would be fought out between the developed economies as low-
skilled, low-waged work would migrate to less-developed economies" (Brown & 
Lauder, 2006) p323 
There are a number of other related, explanations for this misrepresentation of 
this particular strategy in terms of a 'global phenomena'. One is the growing 
hegemony of a particular world view30; another is the desire of certain global 
30 Peet considers that "the neoliberalism that now informs even conventional thinking about 
globalization has achieved the status of being taken for granted or, more than that, has 
achieved the supreme power of being widely taken as scientific and resulting in an optimal 
world. So resistance to neoliberal globalization is seen as resistance to globalization in general, 
a new kind of Luddite opposition to the technically and economically inevitable." (Peet, 2003, p. 
4) Writing about the role of international policy institutions, he suggests that hegemony requires 
moving "the analysis from the ideological level - the socio political production of what people 
think - to the hegemonic level - the socio-cultural production of the way people think." (Peet, 
2003, p. 16) Once a community of experts agree "more by convention or political persuasion 
than factual backing, to call a certain type of thinking and speaking "rational"", they thereby 
transform a certain set of speech acts through their repetition into the regularities of a 
discursive formation. Alternative discourses with difficulty find openings, for all further 
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institutions to achieve a new model of economic imperialism, obliging other 
countries to play by a set of rules where they already have an established 
advantage; a third explanation is the interest of certain countries in opening up 
a private education market, supported by the World Trade Organisation 
pressing for the inclusion of education services as a sector to be opened up to 
international markets. 
Hence, the seventies and the eighties saw the coincidence of the existence of a 
highly educated population in advanced industrial societies (Drucker, 1992, 
1993), the demand by the financial markets for a reorganisation of production to 
provide a better return on investment (Dumenil & Levy, 2003), developments in 
communication and information technology (Castel Is, 2000, 2001; Clegg, 
Hudson, & Steel, 2003; Heap, 1995; Mackay, 1995; Thomas, 1995), and the 
successful attempt by Singapore to create a niche the commodity market in 
discussion on this topic is regulated by this discursive formation, discussion tends to take place 
within the categories of the discourse and not in relation to the discourse itself: "That is, the 
depth of a hegemony resides in the ability of a discursive formation to specify the parameters of 
the practical, the realistic and the sensible among a group of theoreticians, political practitioners 
and policy-makers. A discourse operates negatively by producing and enforcing silences on 
disapproved topics, terms and approaches." (Peet, 2003, p. 17) 
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high technology production attracting investors with the supply of a highly skilled 
workforce(Bottery, 1992}. 
The combination of these factors, although coincidental, has been used to 
justify the concept of a 'globalised market lead knowledge economy' which has 
emerged as a consequence of the evolution of science and technology in the 
field of communications. Within this hegemonic discourse it is argued that 
education policy has no alternative but to reform to meet the new demands of 
the market. Nevertheless, in this policy discourse, education, has no role in the 
emergence of the knowledge economy, instead its role is to adapt to this new 
reality by supplying private enterprise with highly educated human resources 
and 'new' or 'frontier' knowledge. 
The concept of a 'knowledge society' 
This account of the linear evolution of the knowledge economy from advances 
in communications technology to the globalisation of a knowledge economy has 
been criticised by many. Ducker's genealogical account of the emergence of 
the knowledge economy argues that it was not the capitalist promotion of 
scientific management that was the cause of the emergence of the new 
economy but rather the latter's contribution to the reduction of back breaking 
labour and the extending of the working life of the average worker. As a result 
the average labourer's child has been exposed to extended schooling and has 
now evolved into a knowledge worker. 
By a circuitous and quite unplanned route, we are therefore arriving at the point 
at which Taylor aimed seventy-five years ago: we are beginning to apply 
knowledge to work itself. That the knowledge worker came first and knowledge 
work second - that indeed knowledge work is still largely to come- is a historical 
accident (Drucker, 1992, p. 283). 
Concerning the role of advances in technology Ray Thomas argues that, 
technology is designed and developed according to social factors, for example, 
the binary code can be considered as pure science, but its applications are 
socially determined: 
Binary code can be thought of as a piece of pure science which can be 
considered independently of the human minds which invented it. But the 
information society is an artefact which encompasses a range of applications of 
binary code which reflect the complexity and dominant interests of society 
146 
(Thomas, 1995, p. 12). 
As early as 1979 Lyotard described the consequences for education systems if 
they continued to adopt a management position based on the linear 
development of technology and industry supplied by autonomous education 
systems. He warned this approach included administrative procedures which 
manipulated the aspirations of individuals to mirror those of the system: 
"Administrative procedures should make individual "want" what the system 
needs in order to perform well." (Lyotard, 1984, p. 62) Thus we find the World 
Bank recommending financial incentive schemes to motivate academic 
performance in accordance with strategic objectives, (World_Bank, 1994). 
Lyotard argues that these management approaches are based on the theory of 
thermodynamics and "the notion that the evolution of a system's performance 
can be predicated if all of the variables are known" (Lyotard, 1984, p. 55) He 
reminded us that the limits of this model was made clear by the advent of 
quantum mechanics and atomic physics and argues that the latter paradigm of 
knowledge "which favours a multiplicity of finite meta-arguments" (Lyotard, 
1984, p. 66) can and should be applied to social systems. 
More recently this challenge has been taken up by the application of the 
concept of 'complex systems' to social structures and learning environments. It 
is an approach which considers all systems as interrelated or embedded in the 
complex network of systems which constitute social reality, with the result that a 
change in one sUb-system will invoke changes in other sub-systems. Jan Visser 
(Visser) develops a concept of 'complex systems' based on a notion of an 
ecosystem, where all the sub-systems and their sub-systems are 
interdependent and the system evolves as a whole. Nevertheless, there are 
accounts of complex systems which considers them in terms of an increased 
number of interdependent sub-systems which can, nevertheless, be classified in 
terms of their function, and thus brought under a Single systematic approach 
(Axelrod & Cohen, 1999). 
Visser's notion of the evolution of society in terms of interrelated sub-systems is 
one adopted by Manuel Castells in his account of the emergence of a 
147 
'knowledge society' or 'network society'. Castells argues that the role of 
technological developments in the emergence of the knowledge society was not 
a linear process. He suggests that, in this sense, there are lessons to be learnt 
from the history of the emergence of the Internet. 
Firstly, concerning the argument for the reduction of state intervention he notes 
"all the key technological developments that led to the Internet were built around 
government institutions, major universities, and research centres. The Internet 
did not originate in the business world, It was too daring a technology, too 
expensive a project, and too risky an initiative to be assumed by profit-
orientated organizations." (Castells, 2001, p. 22) 
Secondly, although the research which led to the establishment of the Internet 
was financed by military spending, "The lucky part of the ARPANET story was 
that the Defence Department, in a rare instance of organization intelligence, set 
up ARPA as a funding and guidance research agency with considerable 
autonomy. ARPA went on to become one of the most innovative technology 
policy institutions in the world ... " (Castells, 2001, p. 20) The autonomy of the 
project allowed the creators to realize their dream "to change the world through 
computer communication", designing an open protocol which lead to the self-
evolution of the Internet in ways which nobody had planned. Nevertheless, this 
'dream to change the world' was not fortuitous, but itself the product of a liberal 
university education system and a particular social and political context of 
California in the 1960's and 1970's. 
This theme of the socially embedded character of scientific development is 
taken up by Nowotny et al in their discussion of the emergence of Mode 2 
knowledge. They regret that in their first book in which they developed this 
concept, 'wider social transformations went largely unexplored' which permitted 
the traditional view that "The transformation of society is regarded as 
predominately shaped by scientific and technical change" (Nowotny et aI., 2001, 
p. 3) , and instead they suggest that in understanding the 'knowledge Society' 
"The correspondence between the evolution of social and pOlitical contexts, on 
the one hand, and intellectual cultures on the other are too suggestive to have 
been merely accidental". (Nowotny et aI., 2001, p. 9) 
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They observe that whilst "The search for control and predictability had guided 
the project of modernization from the beginning, the Clock, and later the 
Machine, had become the guiding metaphor and dominant iconography of the 
political order", (Nowotny et aL, 2001, p. 5). Similarly the enthusiastic reception 
of the development of chaos theory in the 1970's was due to the fact that 
society was ready, even waiting for such a theory: "For this wider public, chaos 
theory was a powerful metaphor which vindicated its long-held belief that not 
everything was predictable - either in science or government or in daily life." 
(Nowotny et aL, 2001, p. 5) The receptivity of society for such a theory was, 
according to the authors, due to the changing nature of society: "Contemporary 
society is characterized - irreversibly - by pluralism and diversity and also, we 
argue volatility and transgressivity". (Nowotny et aL, 2001, p. 19) There is in 
this sense, a two way relation between science, technology and society, in the 
growing demand of local people for science to attend their particular concerns.31 
31 An example of a situation in which this type of knowledge is generated was when the 
government in Mexico announced plans to build a nitrogen plant in the South East state of 
Campeche, not far from lagoons protected under environmental law. The local indigenous 
people demanded an inquiry into the impact of such a development in the area, and this 
required oceanologists, ecologists, anthropologists, sociologists, lawyers, local representatives 
and government representatives. The knowledge generated drew from both previous 
knowledge in each discipline and generated new interdisciplinary knowledge around the 
problem attended to in the particular context in which it arose. That new knowledge may be 
codified in the formal report of the resolution of the problem, or it may partly or wholly remain 
uncodified and tacit practical knowledge of those who were involved in the discussions and 
consultations. As Gibbons explains, this new knowledge, is not readily transferable in a 
decontextualised form, but it is transferred through individuals who participated in that project 
and who may draw upon the lessons learned in that experience in resolving other different 
problems. An important characteristic of this type of knowledge is that in addition to being trans-
disciplinary, it is also tacit. (Gibbons, 1994, p. 17) There is also a sense in which people have, 
as a result of media reporting on events worldwide, become more aware and more suspicious of 
the uses to which science and technology are put, at the same time as having become more 
aware of their rights as citizens as well as their power as protest groups. 
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Ron Barnett likewise argues that universities have become more, not less, 
interconnected "in today's "shifting, fragile and uncertain world". And as such 
"Universities are caught in webs. The strands of the webs link universities 
variously to economies, states, other universities, epistemologies and 
professions"(Barnett, 2003, p. 6). Indeed, in such an interconnected world the 
neoliberal ideology which considers tertiary education as an autonomous sub-
system, has little congruence with reality and will with difficulty achieve closure, 
for even in authoritarian states, the 'systems' dependence of the use of ICT's 
will enable the development of spaces external to the system,(Stambach & 
Malekela, 2006) . 
This approach to social evolution is one which is referred to as a 'knowledge 
SOCiety' approach, and clearly considers society to be an integral part of the 
development of knowledge. Whereas in the 'knowledge economy' approach 
SOCiety is a passive beneficiary of developments in science and their application 
in industry, whilst education is considered as an autonomous SUb-system at the 
service of the knowledge economy, supplying specialised human resources, in 
the 'knowledge society' approach tertiary education is one of the sources of 
change and innovation. The 'knowledge society' and 'knowledge economy' can 
thus be seen to present two different models concerning society, the economy, 
and the role of education. 
These two different models of the knowledge economy sustain two distinct 
international models of tertiary education: the World Bank model based on that 
of a 'knowledge economy' and the DECO model, based on that of a 'knowledge 
SOCiety'. 
Transforming the relative value of capital in the 
tertiary education field 
The World Bank model 
In this section I will proceed to analyse the way in which the World Bank policy 
seeks to transform the relative value of capital in the tertiary education field and 
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the concept of social capital which is presupposed. This transformation 
involves redefining 'suppliers' and 'clients' in that field, and who validates the 
production of that field. 
Membership of the field 
In World Bank tertiary education policy, the issue of the membership of the field 
of tertiary education is defined in terms of those institutions which are to be 
legally recognised as suppliers of tertiary education, as well as procedures 
controlling the access of potential 'clients'. 
Current World Bank policy seeks to re-define membership of the field of 'tertiary 
education' by promoting the certification of private institutions. In the 1994 
report, certifying private institutions as tertiary education suppliers was justified 
in terms of providing a means of expanding higher education without increasing 
government spending: "Government can encourage the development of private 
higher education to complement public institutions as a means of managing the 
cost of expanding higher education enrolments, increasing the diversity of 
training programs, and broadening social participation in higher education." 
(World_Bank, 1994, p. 34) This is backed up by the WTO classification of 
education as a "commercially competitive activity" (Bottery, 2000, p. ix) 
The certification of non-university institutions is also encouraged. (World_Bank, 
1994, p. 31) Both the 1994 report and the 2002 report emphasise the 
importance for governments to encourage greater differentiation of institutions, 
which means the "development of non-university institutions and the growth of 
private institutions" in order to "make higher education systems more 
responsive to changing labour market needs." (World_Bank, 1994, p. 28) This 
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claim appears to be based on the argument that private institutions will respond 
more quickly to market demands for education.32 This argument also implies a 
corresponding re-orientation of the demand for tertiary education from 
traditional areas such as law and accountancy to technology and science. It 
presupposes that potential students know which career programmes offer the 
best chance of increasing an individual's employability, and what's more, that 
on the basis of such considerations a potential student will choose his or her 
course of study. 
The fact that higher education is referred to as 'training programmes', that non-
university institutions should be able to offer such programmes and that private 
suppliers should be able to participate already indicates the way in which the 
reconfiguration of the membership of the field also reconfigures the 'product' of 
the field, namely that which is considered to be tertiary education, particularly 
university education.33 
Access policies determine who will benefit from that knowledge and also join 
the "global market for advanced human capital". The World Bank in their 1994 
policy document, mentions as a necessary area of reform the "control of access 
to public higher education on the basis of efficient and equitable selection 
criteria". (World_Bank, 1994, p. 13) The justification for the "improving of 
selection processes" is made on the basis of its role in improving quality. The 
32 Recent research on the pertinence of post-graduate programmes to business development in 
the South-East of Mexico has shown that private institutions only tended to offer programmes 
where student demand was high, and a low infrastructure cost was involved, even when the job 
market was saturated. Data analysis showed that, in general, only the public universities 
offered post graduate programmes in a wide selection of subjects related to areas of local 
economic development. (Rodriguez Montes, 2006 #347; Negrin Munoz, 2006 #346; Castillo 
Leon, 2006 #345] 
33 A discussion of the impact of this reconfiguration can be found in Ronald Barnett's discussion 
of the role of the university in today's complex society. (Barnett, 2000) 
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1994 report suggests that "Governments can help higher education institutions 
strengthen the quality of education in many ways. For example, they can assist 
institutions in selecting students by organizing and improving admission 
examinations." (World_Bank, 1994, p. 61) The selection criteria should be 
based on national, regional or global evaluation systems. Access formulas 
should determine the intake of students to each institution and concern not only 
the quotas for each field of study but "the socio-economic levels and academic 
quality of students". (World_Bank, 1994, p. 52) 
Thus the World Bank's focus on quality control is used to justify the 
reconfiguration of who can produce knowledge, as well as who can have 
access to those institutions and benefit from that knowledge, thereby changing 
the membership of the field. This change in the membership of the field 
changes the relative value of the capital of each player in the field, whether 
institution or student (client). For example, public institutions potentially loose 
value in relation to private institutions in certain areas; the student as client 
potentially gains capital value in relation to the institution, private institutions 
potentially gain value in the student market, as institutions which are more 
orientated to vocational studies and labour markets. 
Accreditation bodies 
The World Bank has also recommended widening the certification bodies in 
tertiary education. The widening of the certification bodies is justified in terms of 
the discourse of accountability. If institutions of education were to be held 
accountable, they needed to be so not only in terms of the costs of their 
product, but also in terms of the quality of their product, and quality is measured 
in terms of outputs relative to inputs. (World_Bank, 1994, p. 51) 
Again, this measure seeks to procure the involvement of the private sector in 
accreditation processes, as it is recommended that colleges of professional 
bodies undertake the accreditation procedures. The participation of such 
bodies is justified in securing the pertinence of the programme contents to 
professional working practices and with providing benchmarking for the student 
as 'client' and for potential employers: 
In many countries, professional associations fulfil important coordinating and 
planning functions to monitor, evaluate, certify, and accredit higher education 
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institutions. This is intended to promote standardization of programs and is 
useful in ensuring the equivalence of degrees, diplomas, and certificates 
awarded. (World_Bank, 1994, p. 70) 
In Mexico professional associations have been set up to undertake these 
procedures, yet it is a government induced procedure given that the principal, if 
not perhaps only, reason the universities seek accreditation is the impact of 
these results on performance indicators and hence funding quotas. As see in 
chapter three, entrance into the elite CUMEX group of universities in Mexico 
depends on having 70% of the university undergraduate programmes 
accredited. Similarly, in England, Ron Barnett refers to the 'Pontius Pilate 
Syndrome', where the state having created a system where improvement is 
always based on comparison, in which universities are either 'celebrated' or 
'exposed' in the mass media publication of league tables, will nevertheless 
disclaim responsibility for public opinion and its impact on university enrolment 
(Barnett, 2003, p. 77). 
Yet this 'invisible hand' of performance indicators is set to become even more 
elusive as the World Bank suggests that its task now is to establish international 
standards in accreditation and qualifications: 
In addition to the support through accreditation projects in individual countries, 
the World Bank will contribute toward the goal of establishing an international 
qualifications framework through consultations with partners in the donor 
community and specialized professional associations, as well as through grants 
from the Development grant Facility. 
It can be seen that as a result of the purported interest in guaranteeing 
'internationally recognised' standards of quality, the World Bank is increasing its 
relative capital in the field through the influence it will have in determining the 
indicators for the different quality assurance standards. It can also be described 
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as a clientalist strategy of cooption on the basis of its control over the 
distribution of resources.34 By implementing a system of worldwide indicators of 
quality evaluation it will increase its control over the exchange of symbolic 
resources, and if a particular country attempted to resist such a strategy it could 
only do so on a basis of marked inequity. 
Hence, it can be seen that the introduction of new players in terms of 
certification procedures has a potentially strong impact in terms of the relative 
power of the players in the field. The state looses its monopoly of power in this 
field as professional bodies are included as certifiers of programmes. Students 
gain capital as clients entitled to quality services, at the same time as loosing 
capital in the sense that it is not the client but the accreditation bodies which 
decide what is to be considered as quality. Teachers stand to either gain or 
loose capital according to the performance of their students in the league 
tables, but loose capital in another form, as they no longer evaluate the quality 
of the student's acquisition of knowledge, nor design of the programme's 
content. Institutions stand to gain or loose capital according to their place in the 
national and international league tables. Finally the state and international 
policy agencies gain capital to the extent that they are involved in determining 
the indicators on the basis of which the different evaluations are made. 
Finally, the widening of the 'authorities of delimitation,35 at the same time as 
introducing centrally defined indicators for evaluation, and the production of 
league tables, is key to the NPM strategy of creating quasi-market conditions of 
34 See discussion of Schefner in chapter 3. 
35 Foucualt uses this concept in defining the conditions of emergence of a 'serious speech act' 
(Foucault, 1972) 
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competitiveness in the education sector whilst maintaining central government 
control. 
Human sources management and social capital 
The neoliberal vision of a 'knowledge economy' not only considers specialised 
human resources as an essential ingredient in the achievement of the 
knowledge niche of economic development, but also it is a model which 
assumes how such human resources will comport themselves in terms of social 
capital in response to particular performance management strategies. It is 
argued that individuals will competitively seek to enhance their advantages in 
the knowledge 'market', and are encouraged to do so by the a management 
model based on the competition for resources. The introduction of this 
performance management strategy and its effects has been comprehensively 
described by social analysts in Britain. 
Clarke and Newman (Clarke & Newman, 1997) in describing the transition from 
the welfare state to the managerial state during the 1970's and 80's, refer to the 
fact that this model not only introduces change, but also justifies that change as 
the only possible alternative (Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 36); they analyse the 
role of incentives schemes to create competitive quasi-market environments 
(Clarke & Newman, 1997, pp. 85 -86) and the reinventing the public as 'client' 
(Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 123). 
The 'managerial state' model marked a transition from a benevolent 
bureaucratic state model to the 'evaluative state' (Neave, 1990) model, one 
which requires efficiency and accountability in the use of public resources. The 
'managerial state' model was further developed under New Labour, becoming 
what Hood (Hood, 1991quoted in Bottery (2000)) called New Public 
Management model (NPM). The NPM model adopts the managerial strategies 
of those used in the neoliberal market model, producing a model of strong 
centralised management with decentralised quasi-market peripheries. 
Standard indicators allow centralised control and the de-centralised 
management of the peripheries through a system of centralised evaluative 
regulation. This also makes possible the creation of 'quasi-market' conditions at 
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the peripheries. Standardised indicators are thus a key strategy of New Public 
Management. Hierarchical, centrally controlled, systems are combined with 
competitive quasi markets at the periphery, where the individual either as 
human resource or client, takes a large part of the risks. In the education 
sector the introduction of the NPM approach involves institutions being 
encouraged to compete against other institutions, departments against 
departments and individuals against individuals for resources, and thereby to 
better 'perform' and meet the challenges of creating knowledge 'market niches'. 
This competitive view of human agency is based on an 'individualistic' or 
'economic approach' to the notion of social capital. It is one which presupposes 
that an individual will share his/her own capital in order to maximise that same 
capital: 
The economic literature draws on the assumption that people will maximise 
their personal utility, deciding to interact with others and draw on social capital 
resources to conduct various types of group activities (Glaeser, 2001). In this 
approach, the focus is on the investment strategies of individuals faced with 
alternative uses of time. (OECD, 2001, p. 40) 
Such a simplistic account of agency and social capital is, according to Clark and 
Newman, (Clarke & Newman, 1997) characteristic of 'public choice theory'. 
They observe that "public choice theory is rather limited in its capacity to explain 
processes of change and their uneven impact. It thus reflects the under-
socialised model of the person, in which actions (outcomes) are seen as a 
direct response to motivational pressures (incentives) that dominate economic 
theory (Clarke & Newman, 1997, p. 86). 
The above account indicates how neoliberalism, in the form of New Public 
Management, seeks to introduce the logic of the market not only into public 
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services, including education, but also into the lives of the practitioners within 
those services.36. The NPM approach combines a centralised hierarchical 
control of social organisation combined with the attempt to organise social 
practice in terms of decentralised quasi-market environments which construct 
agency competitively. Ball considers this 'hands off' approach as an essential 
attractive characterisitic of these policy models for politicians: "It distances the 
reformer from the outcomes of the reform. Blame and responsibility are also 
devoled or contracted out. And yet, by use of target setting and performative 
techniques, 'steering at a distance' can be achieved" (Ball, 1998a, p. 125) The 
agent takes a large part of the risks in these competitive environments, with 
varying percentages of income depending upon performance related bonuses, 
and in some situations, the employment itself depends upon performance. 
In chapter three, it was seen that performance related income can be more than 
100% of an academics salary in Mexico or 50% of his or her income, an amount 
which is lost in times of illness or retirement. Richard Sennet (Sennet, 1998) 
has described the levels of stress that this type of competitive environment 
creates, and the effects of this type of strategy on social capital in terms of a 
"corrosion of character", a "loss of life narratives", and consequently of social 
values and family disintegration. Even in those countries and environments 
where performance related income is not such a high percentage of salary, 
such as British universities, educationalists suggest that this type of 
environment nevertheless engenders a 'cult of selfishness': 
What is achieved in the establishment of the market form in education, as in 
36 This is example of what Habermas would refer to as the colonisation of the lifeworld in 
modernity by instrumental rationality. Habermas' employed the metaphor of 'threshold' to 
identify the point of contact between governmental systems of social regulation, and the 
life world understood as daily human practices coordinated according to tacit social norms and 
social networks. Habermas considered that threshold was transgressed, which attempted to 
'colonise' the life world. (Habermas, 1984, 1987) 
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other sectors of public provision, I want to suggests, is a new more environment 
for both consumers and producers. Thus, schools are being inducted into what 
Plant (1992 p. 87) calls a 'culture of self interest' .... Within the market form both 
consumers and producers are encouraged, by the rewards and punishments of 
'market forces', and legitimated, by the values of personal standpoint, in their 
question for positional advantage over others, what Kenway (1990 p.155) calls 
the 'cult of selfishness'. More generally this is part of what Bottery terms the 
'pauperisation of moral concepts in the public sphere' (Bottery, 1992, p. 93) 
(Ball, 1998b, p. 30). 
Incentives strategies to reward human resources according to short term 
performance rather than relative advances in relation to a general career path 
may, if effectively administered, increase the academic capital of staff who 
achieve high rewards internal to the institution, or scientific capital if they 
achieve high rewards in national research programmes, but at the cost of 
personal autonomy, of being trapped into the logic of the field. In this respect 
Stephen Ball refers to what he considers, as the 'deprofessionalisation' of 
teachers and their 'reprofessionalization' according to "the new vocabulary of 
performance" (Ball, 2003, p. 218). Teachers are dis-empowered in terms of 
education standards and goals and re-empowered according to performative 
criteria established in relation to new national and international standards and 
goals in education. Performance management has as its objective of the co-
option of academic staff into a system of permanently seeking to maximise their 
capital according to 'objective indicators'. Those indicators are established by 
the World Bank in the tertiary education field. 
The control of capital values in the field of tertiary education 
In addition to the impact on the relative values of capital in the field of new rules 
of membership and accreditation, a surplus value is generated by the fact that 
these new rules sustain and promote each others role. Thus teachers, 
students, institutions, become enveloped in the logic of the field controlled by 
the strategic measures of the World Bank: Institutions are motivated to refer to 
the independent accreditation bodies in order to validate their mechanisms of 
quality control in view of the opportunity of being included in the national league 
tables. High league table ratings will increase student demand for their 
programmes, both because of their quality and because of the improved market 
value of their graduating students, as well as the consequent access of their 
students to national and international grant systems. And finally, the personal 
aspirations of education workers are aligned, via appraisal and rewards 
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systems, with the objectives of the particular institution which reflect the 
objectives of the state and international institutions. 
Thus, in the neoliberal model of the tertiary education field, individual players in 
the field, whether academics, institutions or States, have little possibility of 
incrementing their overall capital given the control exercised by international 
agencies over the relations between the different capitals in the field. The 
justification is that the winner will be the market: institutions will produce better 
qualified human resources in areas where there is most market demand. All the 
players will respond to the logic of the market, at the cost of a loss of autonomy 
and with it the space for ethical decisions, as well as an increase in personal 
stress. 
Hence the World Bank model of tertiary education is built, as mentioned above, 
upon the principle of systems theory where "the evolution of a system's 
performance can be predicated if all of the variables are known" (Lyotard, 1984, 
p. 55) If this research concerns the apparent disjuncture between international 
policy and local realities, then, with regard to World Bank policy, disjuncture will 
most probably be explained either by the extent to which all the variables could 
not be known, and consequently centrally controlled, or one variable was 
misinterpreted. One such variable is that of the 'rational agent' which will 
always act 'rationally' to increase his or her own advantages. 
The OECD model 
The DECD focus on the transferral of knowledge 
The OECD CERI (Centre for Educational Research and Innovation) project on 
'Knowledge Management in the Learning Society' notes that although 
economists consider knowledge as an input in terms of competences, and 
outputs in terms of innovation, nevertheless, non-economists and education 
experts are more concerned with "the issue of how knowledge - in terms of 
competences and innovation - is produced, mediated and used" (OECD, 2000, 
p. 13). In short, the focus is upon understanding the process, rather than 
evaluating the product. 
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They are interested in the transferral of knowledge because they believe that it 
is essential to the performance of a 'knowledge economy' in a 'learning society'. 
Nevertheless, they observe that our understanding of this process "remains 
partial, superficial and partitioned in various scientific disciplines" (DECO, 2000, 
p. 11) Furthermore, the issue of the transferral of knowledge also raises a 
question of ownership: 
Is knowledge public or private? Can it or can it not be transferred? Is the 
consent of the producer needed for the mediation to be successful or can 
knowledge be copied against the will of the producer? How difficult is it to 
transfer knowledge and what are the transfer mechanisms? Is it possible to 
change the form of knowledge so that it is easier (more difficult) to mediate? 
How important is the broader socio-cultural context for the transferability of 
knowledge? (OECD, 2000, p. 14) 
Their comparison of the experience of knowledge transfer in different sectors 
leads them to differentiate four sectors, producing a matrix based on two 
principal variables: whether knowledge is tacit or codified and whether the 
sector is competitive or non-competitive (table 5 below). An example of the use 
of tacit knowledge in a competitive environment is that of consulting activity, and 
in a non-competitive environment, teaching is a prime example. The use of 
codified knowledge in a competitive environment is the field of biotechnology 
and in a non-competitive environment, that of public library management. 
Table 5: Comparison of knowledge base 
Environment: Competitive Non-competitive 
Knowledge is poorly 
Articulated (tacit) Consulting activity Education (teacher) 
Knowledge is highly Biotechnology Higher Education 
(codified) Library management 
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The CERI project also adopts four modern categories of knowledge which they 
compare to Aristotle's distinction of episteme, techne and phronesis. 
Nevertheless, it can be seen that the modern categories do not capture the 
ancient distinction between phronesis and techne: 37 The modern taxonomy, 
does not take into account the normative and context specific aspect of 
knowledge which phronesis takes into account, instead the concept of 'know 
how' combines aspects of techne and phronesis by including 'experience-
based' and 'common sense' forms of knowledge. The category of 'know-who' 
absorbs a version of the social aspects of phronesis in the form of social skills 
like 'co-operability', 'sociability', 'communication skills', but again these skills, 
whilst they may be learned from experience, are also considered as personal 
skills which are transferable from one context to another, rather than culturally 
specific as in the concept of phronesis (Dunne, 1993; Macintyre, 1981). In the 
interests of the transferability of knowledge, phronesis is substituted for 'know-
how' and 'know who'. 
Table 6: Comparing modern and ancient taxonomies of knowledge 
Modern Taxonomy of knowledge Aristotle's Taxonomy of knowledge 
Know-what Knowledge about facts 
Know-why Knowledge about principles and Episteme Knowledge that is universal and 
laws of motion in nature, in the theoretical 
human mind and in society 
Know-how Skills, the ability to do Techne Knowledge that is instrumental, 
something, intuition, experience context-specific and practice-
based learning related 
Know-who Information about who knows 
what, social ability to co-operate 
and communicate with different 
kinds of people and experts 
Phronesis Knowledge that is normative, 
experience-based, context specific, 
common sense: practical wisdom 
37 This is a failure which Habermas claims is at the heart of the problems of modern knowledge 
(Habermas, 1984) 
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The codification of tacit knowledge 
Despite recognising that different forms of knowledge are intrinsic to different 
fields of knowledge, the focus of the CERI project on the importance of the 
transferral of knowledge in a 'learning society', explains their interest in the 
possibility of the codification of tacit knowledge. They are conscious of the fact 
that such a process involves both advantages and disadvantages: it allows for 
the massive reproduction and diffusion of knowledge as information, codification 
can stimulate new classifications and arrangements of knowledge, yet in some 
cases only practical experience will suffice (such as in the case of aircraft pilots, 
surgeons, etc.), and in all cases something is lost in codification (a teachers 
expertise is reduced to a learning programme). 
The impact of the process of the codification of knowledge thus, on the one 
hand, continues to deprofessionalize the teacher and increase the role of 
central programme designers. On the other hand, in the search for the most 
successful teaching methods, the 'successful' teacher is increasingly an object 
of study, in an attempt to decipher and codify his or hers practical knowledge. 
The value of the capital of professional experience is thus repositioned in 
relation to other forms of capital in the field of tertiary education. Tacit 
knowledge of the habitus is repositioned as strategic capital of the field, thus 
transforming the habitus. 
The concept of social capital presupposed by the CERI project 
Hargreaves considers the problem of the transferral of teacher's practical 
pedagogical knowledge to be one of creating the right conditions for the 
communication of a private knowledge: "Teachers often take pride in the fact 
that their knowledge is intensely personal, carved slowly over the years out of 
private (not collective) experience" (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 229). Taking this 
description of the teachers perception as definitive of the problem, and thus 
clearly ignoring Wittgenstein's critique of this common sense view, 
(Wittgenstein, 1999), Hargreaves concludes "There is massive, innovative 
activity and potential locked up in the "tinkering" of teachers in their classrooms. 
We need to investigate and codify when and why this innovative activity does 
(or does not) work (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 231). 
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The problem then, for Hargreaves, is one of unlocking and disseminating this 
'personal knowledge': "All this would entail a significant re-conceptualisation of 
what is seen as the dissemination process which has conventionally been 
portrayed as a linear, centre-to-periphery process from research in universities 
out to teachers in schools" (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 232) Hargreaves suggests an 
'inside-out' approach where schools are "developed as centres of initial teacher 
training and research" (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 232), and this can be encouraged 
by giving research funds to schools not universities, thus motivating teachers to 
share their individual knowledge: "people are motivated to disseminate 
knowledge that they themselves created; and there are natural, but under-used, 
channels for easy dissemination" (Hargreaves, 2000, p. 232) Hargreaves views 
the problem of disseminating private knowledge as one that can be solved by 
the appropriate management of funds to 'motivate' dissemination. 
Hargreaves' apparently revolutionary concepts, turning things 'inside-out' may 
seem to make a lot of sense to many in the teaching profession, if one does not 
stop to reflect that he is in fact repeating a much questioned epistemological 
paradigm: "This reification of the disengaged first-person, singular self is 
already evident in the founding figures of the modern epistemological tradition. 
For instance, Descartes and Locke" (Taylor, 1993, p. 49). It is an 
epistemological position in which the human agent is considered primarily as a 
subject in terms of an 'inner space' or 'mind' capable of processing 
representations. It engendered such philosophical problems as how do we 
know 'other minds' actually exist, and how do we know whether what I mean by 
'green' is the same as that which my interlocutor means by 'green'. Taylor 
regrets that "It is this striped-down view of the subject what has made deep 
inroads into social science ... It stands in the way of a richer, more adequate 
understanding of what the human sense of self is really like ... "(Taylor, 1993, p. 
49) 
These inroads have been made despite, according to Taylor, the work of 
Heidegger (1927), Merleau-Ponty (1945), Wittgenstein (1953) and more 
recently Bourdieu's notion of 'habitus'. Bourdieu considers tacit knowledge to 
be embodied in social practices. The individual's socialization within a context 
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involves the appropriation of dispositions, which at the same time allow the 
individual to navigate that context without recourse to conscious representations 
of that context: 
The theory of action that I propose (with the notion of habitus) amounts to 
saying that most human actions have as a basis some thing quite different from 
intention, that is, acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and 
should be interpreted as orientated toward one objective or another without 
anyone being able to claim that that objective was a conscious design (it is here 
that the "everything occurs as if" is very important). (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 97-98) 
On this view, a teachers personal tacit knowledge can only be understood 
within a context of shared practices of the 'habitus', and any attempt to make 
that tacit knowledge explicit and codified must take into account those shared 
practices. Accordingly, collaborative social capital is not a prerequisite of the 
successful dissemination of tacit knowledge; it is an essential part of its 
construction as well as its dissemination. 
Because the CERI project does not take into account the extent to which tacit 
knowledge is constructed and transferred in particular socio-cultural and 
political contexts, it has a tendency to consider social relations such as 'trust 
and 'collaboration' as an important precondition of transferability rather than a 
factor involved in the construction and reproduction of tacit knowledge, and 
that, consequently, social capital is a prerequisite, rather than an evolving 
factor, of a learning society: "The relations among people involved in interactive 
learning are crucial for what is learnt. Mutual respect and trust are important 
prerequisites for this kind of learning" (OECD, 2000, p. 30) They warn that 
certain aspects of the knowledge economy, such as rapid change, rapid 
learning, and unequal opportunities, tend to undermine social cohesion, and 
"the result will be growing polarisation". They repeat categorically that "for 
sustainable reproduction of intellectual capital, there is a need to secure the 
reproduction of social capital"(OECD, 2000, p. 30). 
The OECD's adoption of this model of 'private' tacit knowledge which can 
gainfully be codified and disseminated through networks of trust in the scientific 
community, goes hand in hand with their promotion of ICT's as one of the four 
'innovation pumps' of a knowledge economy. ICT's affect the amount of 
information that can be created, the virtual nature of its creation, it connects 
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different actors in the process of knowledge creation, it permits decentralisation 
of that process and allows for the "creation and expansion of virtual 
communities" (DECO, 2004, p. 56) A recent article by Stambach and Malekela 
on the incorporation of ICT's in Tanzania, concerns the extent to which instead 
of technology improving life in Tanzania, it instead reinforces regional 
hierarchies (Stambach & Malekela, 2006) In the context of this research, this 
article underlines the argument that policy needs to take into account local 
social capital to resolve possible disjuncture between policy objectives and local 
realities. 
The DECO's approach to a 'knowledge society' means, then, that they are less 
concerned with the market value of the product of tertiary education and more 
concerned with improving the transfer of knowledge within and across sectors, 
as well as the codification of tacit knowledge. Yet, these objectives, assume as 
a prerequisite a concept of social capital based on networks of trust and mutual 
support. The strategies designed to achieve those objectives also have a 
potential impact on the relative values of capital in the tertiary education field. 
The impact on Capital Values in the global field of education 
The transfer of knowledge within the education sector 
The importance in the DECO approach to the knowledge economy of the 
transfer of knowledge means that institutions are encouraged to participate in 
programmes for student and staff mobility, as, for example, in the Bologna 
agreement in Europe , (Rector's & (CRE), 1999) and the various agreements 
signed by Mexico with Canada, the United States, Germany, Spain, ((Didout-
Aupetit, 2000: 65). Such programs are seen to depend on the prior condition of 
the harmonisation of qualifications, made possible by 'recognised' accreditation 
bodies. Thus the emphasis on mobility enhances the premium of standardized 
evaluation procedures. This in turn has the effect of increasing with time the 
transfer of standardised knowledge between standardized peer groups. As 
such, the strategic importance of knowledge transferral is undermined. 
Encouraging the evolution of research communities 
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The encouragement by the Mexican PROMEP programme of the formation of 
research groups both within universities and at national and international levels, 
responds to the OECD's promotion of the "knowledge-based communities as 
agents of economic change" (OECD, 2004, p. 20). Specialists or practitioners 
who share a common technical language, are disposed to share their 
knowledge and comment upon others, make knowledge communities efficient in 
the transferral and enhancement of knowledge. Whilst business-to-business 
communities do exist, sharing some aspects of research, in general such 
groups are public or semi-public spaces where private ownership is excluded. 
Hence, in this and other respects, economic capital competes with intellectual 
capital in the tertiary education field. 
The transfer of know/edge from the end-user to the producer 
The OECD's emphasis on knowledge transfer includes an interest in the extent 
to which the sites of emergence of knowledge are changing, and the way in 
which the 'end-user' is involved in the development of knowledge. This model 
of bottom-up knowledge generation was developed in the 1990's by Gibbons et 
al (Gibbons, 1994), and argued for a reconsideration of the role of the university 
as the site of the production of knowledge, and in a later work (Nowotny et aI., 
2001), argued that this involved a change in the epistemological approach to 
the nature of 'knowledge'. 
The "problem-focused, trans-disciplinary, heterogeneous, hybrid, demand-
driven, entrepreneurial, accountability-tested, embedded in networks" 
(Hargreaves, 2000: 235) characteristics of Mode 2 knowledge, puts different 
demands on the traditional university structure. Nevertheless, those demands 
are not new, and neither are they dissociated from the same development of the 
university. Like Drucker, Gibbons et al draw attention to the fact that it was the 
massification of the university, and the growth of an educated professional class 
which lead to the increased development of research outside the university, 
creating networks of relations "between people located in different institutions, 
and typically include business people, patent lawyers, production engineers and 
others located outside the university" (Gibbons, 1994, p. 70) Gibbons et all 
focus on the extent to which the university is becoming one element in 
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knowledge networks which extend across different sectors, and the way in 
which the university needs to reorganize to respond to problem-based demand 
for research and construct liaison programmes to respond to this new reality. 
A combination of factors such as the massification of the university, the 
evolution of extra-university networks, the increased social demands on 
knowledge, all have increased the participation of the end-user in the 
generation of knowledge. This relative value of different capital in the field of 
tertiary education has consequently been transformed. The capital of the 
university as the principal site of research has lost value in relation to other 
research sites; the intellectual capital of the faculty has been diminished as 
research has moved into centres linked to external projects, at the same time, 
within the university, the value of research in relation to teaching activities has 
increased. Market demands on education have opened the door to market 
models in management, yet the centralisation of management control enters in 
conflict with the tendency to decenter knowledge generation; and society 
demands a higher profile of moral leadership in issues arising from scientific 
developments (different aspects of genetic research, for example) at the same 
time that there is an increasing move towards a business training school ethic. 
The DECO, like the World Bank, promotes moves towards the standardization 
of knowledge in order to increase mobility and hence the transfer of knowledge. 
The DECO approach also involves individual experience loosing value as 
capital in the education field, as a result of the effort to codify and distribute 
such tacit knowledge, whilst the wider social community stands to gain from the 
increased distribution of knowledge. The university also looses capital in the 
knowledge field in relation to other Sights of production of research, whilst 
knowledge communities, geographical or virtual, gain in capital. Public 
knowledge maintains a difficult relation to private knowledge. 
In general, the DECO approach to the tertiary education field is one which 
recognises difference, and for that reason proposes modular forms of 
management. In this sense it is quite distinct from the World Bank model which 
proposes to define and centrally control all the variables of an autonomous field. 
Nevertheless, both the World Bank and the DECO approaches make certain 
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assumptions concerning the nature of social capital in the tertiary education 
field. The World Bank proposals concerning the effectiveness of linking funding 
to reform as well as the use of incentives schemes are based on assumptions 
concerning the existence of an individualistic competitive social capital in the 
field of tertiary education. The DECO's proposals concerning knowledge 
transfer are based on assumptions concerning the existence of a collaborative 
form of social capital in the field of tertiary education. 
Concluding remarks 
Tertiary education policy in Mexico, has, since the late 1980's, been closely 
linked to the transition to the neoliberal economic approach. As noted in 
chapter three, tertiary education policy in Mexico initially followed a World Bank 
vertical approach based on competitive reward induced performance 
management. In the mid 1990's the horizontal collaborative performance 
management approach of the DECO was introduced through the PRDMEP 
programme. These different strategies correspond to two different models of 
post-industrial society: the World Bank approach involves a model of tertiary 
education as an autonomous sub-system supplying qualified human resources 
for the productive sector, whilst the OECD considers tertiary education as a key 
link in the transfer of knowledge in society. 
Nevertheless, some of the strategies are similar although with different 
objectives: the World Bank seeks to standardize inputs and outputs according 
to international indicators to produce a product exchangeable on the 
international market, the OECD seek to codify knowledge and qualifications to 
increase mobility. The difference lies in the different concepts of knowledge 
which underlie these strategies. The World Bank considers knowledge 
functions more efficiently as a private commodity to be bought and sold, the 
OECD considers that knowledge increases its value the more it is transferred, 
and hence functions better as a public product. 
Both models make assumptions concerning social capital in the field of tertiary 
education which support their particular viewpoints concerning society and the 
economy. The World Bank assumes that social capital in this field is made up 
of rational agents seeking to maximise their personal benefit whilst the OECD 
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consider agents in this field as principally collaborative, disposed to share their 
knowledge and experience. 
Both policy models have a potential impact on both the field of tertiary education 
and the habitus of particular institutions. The standardization of knowledge in 
relation to international indicators increases the value of the capital of 
international policy agencies as well as national government through centralised 
systems of evaluation at the expense of institutions and teachers. The latter 
can, nevertheless, build up a different form of capital if they accept to compete 
against other institutions and teachers in league tables and incentives 
programmes. 
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Figure 3: The inter-relation of the university field to other fields within the social 
space: including two distinct models of international policy 
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In relation to the original heuristic framework represented in figure 1, it can be 
observed that the market is indeed impinging on the field of international policy 
and this on national policy and on universities. Nevertheless, the argument for 
increasing the sphere of public knowledge is still being fought. For this reason 
two distinct fields of international policy have been introduced in the heuristic 
framework, Whether universities will become habitus which are in general 
characterised by individualistic competitive individuals or by collaborative 
horizontal academic communities will depend partly on the outcome of this 
public private debate concerning the role of knowledge in post-industrial 
societies. 
In Mexico, the linking of funding to the introduction of such reforms and income 
to performance is another factor which affects the values of capital in the tertiary 
education field, and also has an impact of the habitus at the institutional level. 
Hence, this framework outlines the potential impact of the reform model in 
Mexican public institutions. In the following two chapters, I shall describe and 
analyse the actual impact of the reform programme in particular institutional 
contexts. 
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Chapter 7: Three case studies of the 
impact of performance management 
strategies in universities in Mexico. 
In this chapter I shall first provide an analysis of each case study and my 
conclusions about the impact of the tertiary education reform programme in 
each institution. In the second part of this chapter I will undertake a 
comparative analysis of the impact of the reform programme in these three 
different contexts. 
Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) 
The creation of the UAM and its organizational structure 
The Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM) is a relatively young institution, 
created in the 1974, occupying three different campuses in different parts of 
Mexico City, with a fourth campus opened in 2005. The UAM was designed 
according to a model of decentralization both functionally and administratively, 
each university has a rector, with a fifth General Rector in separate premises. 
Each university is organized in a departmental structure, 3 in each campus, and 
from the beginning the university was organized according to knowledge areas 
to offer new vocational degrees. The UAM Azcapotzalco included the 
departments of Basic sciences and Engineering, Social Sciences and 
Humanities, and Sciences of Arts of Design; the UAM Iztapalapa offers Basic 
Sciences and Engineering, Biology and Health Sciences, and Social Sciences 
and Humanities; the UAM Xochimilco includes Biological Sciences and Health, 
Social Sciences and Health, and Sciences of Art of Design; and the UAM 
Cuajimalpa offering Communications and Design Sciences, Natural Sciences 
and Engineering, and Social Sciences and Humanities. 
(http://www.uam.mx/i ndex.shtml) 
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The relative value of different capitals prior to the reform 
programme 
The UAM broke with the tradition of the faculty structure in Mexico, where each 
faculty has its own director, reporting directly either to the General Secretary or 
the Rector, and sitting on the university council. The UAM design instead 
sought to promote academic interdisciplinary collaboration, as well as horizontal 
power structures, in an attempt to establish a more effective system of 
communication and relations between the powers in the UAM than those which 
existed in the UNAM and which had failed to prevent the confrontation of 1968. 
The design of the UAM thus attempted to avoid conflict in the universities by 
breaking with vertical organizational structures in favour of more horizontal and 
structures and the avoidance of the formation of group identities in distinct 
faculties. This was to be achieved in part by the balance of the relative capital 
of the different players in the social field of the university. However, the 
principal players were considered to be management and full-time academics, 
part-time academics, students, the cleaning, maintenance and administrative 
staff were not represented. So in the original organic law of the UAM the 
power between its collegial organs, one strategiC, the other academic, was 
balanced (Ibarra Colado, 1993, p. 269). The strategic organ consisted of the 
council of directors and the patronato (a voluntary council with honorary 
members to raise and administer funds) where membership was restricted. The 
academic organ consisted of the academic college, academic councils and 
divisional councils, all open to the ample participation of the full-time academic 
community. (Ibarra Colado, 1993, p. 267) 
The lack of formal institutional representation for various sectors of the social 
space of the university may have been one of the reasons why the UAM also 
broke with the tradition of separate unions for workers and academics, forming 
a single union. The second was that the 1968 UNAM strike had seen an 
alliance between students, academics and workers concerning social injustice 
in Mexico, and many academics in the UAM were graduates from the UNAM. 
The first long UAM strike in 1976 resulted in the union negotiating an 
advantageous agreement for its members. Nevertheless, the union overplayed 
its hand in its attempts to capitalise on its increase in relative capital in the 
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university by initiating a number of successive conflicts. It lost credibility 
amongst academics as a result of its "incapacity to negotiate in new contexts" 
(Ibarra Colado, 1993, p. 279). Finally, in 1981, the Federal Commission of 
arbitration withdrew certain academic clauses, including hiring, promotion and 
academic stability, from the collective contract between the union and the 
university. (Ibarra Colado, 1993, p. 279) The same year saw the academic 
collegial organs loose power to the strategic organs as a result of changes to 
the organic law. Numerous commissions were created as a strategy "of 
mechanisms of exhaustion" designed to neutralize those sectors of the 
university which could not participate in the collegial organs open only to full-
time academics. 
This displacement of the vital zones of the decision process has permitted the 
consolidation of power of the strategic organs subordinating, many times 
through clientalist agreements, important sectors of the community, resulting in 
the establishment of control of the strategic organs within the collegial organs 
(Ibarra Colado, 1993, p. 269). 
Hiring procedures and academic networks 
A second set back to the original organizational design of the UAM to promote 
horizontal collaborative relations was the fact that the creation of the UAM 
coincided with a period of expansion of higher education at a national level. 
The result was that few formal procedures were followed in hiring academics, 
"at the beginning (hiring procedures) were completely fraudulent" ("Interview 
M1," 2005). In the absence of formal institutional regulations, traditional social 
practices pertained and academics proceeded to include their friends and form 
power groups: "From the beginning interest groups existed to include friends 
with tenure, and form power quotas" ("Interview M1," 2005); "At the beginning 
hiring was an uncontrolled process, it re-created the old clientalist systems, and 
these have not disappeared, although it has slowly got better" ("Interview M4," 
2005). 
Possible reasons why things "slowly got better" may include the first devaluation 
of the currency in 1984 meant that the creation of new tenures became much 
rarer. Another factor is the departmental structure of the UAM which 
encourages academic collaboration: "Different interest groups exist, at the 
beginning their presence was very strong, but there was a process of 
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institutionalization, there is an intense collegial life and academics are 
represented in the governing bodies (of the university)" ("Interview M1 ," 2005). 
So the restrictions on new tenure and the departmental structure of the 
university allowed a gradual increase in the value of academic capital in relation 
to the social capital based on personal networks. 
Nevertheless, whilst a gradual progress towards more horizontal collegial 
relations increased the value of a more objective academic capital, at the 
management level things developed differently. Interest groups continue to 
have an impact at different management levels. There are groups which are 
internal to each of the three divisions or university campus, and other groups 
which are internal to each of the 3 departments in each division. 
Things haven't changed much from the beginning, at the division level in 
Xochimilco the biologists and medics have dominated the university for a long 
time, the Rector has come from this group the last 3 times; in Iztapalapa the 
physicists dominate, the last 5 Rectors have come from this group and the last 
3 or 4 General Rectors also.("lnterview M3," 2005) 
The interest groups at the divisional level intervene in the decisions concerning 
which departments get new tenures, and at the department level interest groups 
influence the profile of the tenure which is to be advertised. This is called a 
'retrato hablado' (spoken portrait), where the job profile is written to fit the 
curriculum of a particular person whom the director, or those above him, wants 
to get the job. 
Of course there are interest groups. They are basically internal within the 
divisions and each department. First the interest groups at the division level 
determine to which areas they give the tenures, that are the distribution of the 
tenures, and at the second departmental level the interest groups decide the 
profile of the tenure. ("Interview M3," 2005) 
In addition to the distribution of tenures, through their control of resources, 
department heads and managers control interest groups among academics who 
attempt to procure resources for their department or research project, "interest 
groups originate within the academic departments to defend interests created 
around budgets" ("Interview M2," 2005); "half of the resources continue to be 
handled by the rectors and the directors, there is no accountability, ... groups 
jostle to try to get on the good side of the department head ... there is no relation 
between academic achievement and the application of resources... it is a 
market of exchanges of favours" ("Interview M5," 2005). 
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It would appear, then, that at a management level the formation and 
consolidation of certain groups has predominated over the formation of 
horizontal relations of collegial collaboration. This has also served to increase 
management capital in relation to other forms of capital in the university, given 
that the perpetuation of management capital in the hands of a particular group 
acts as an intimidatory factor to any form of new proposals which might be seen 
as a questioning of the power of the dominant group. The relations between 
those internal power groups and external groups, is also strong. One of the 
General Rectors of the UAM went onto lead the National Association of 
Universities (ANUIES), and from there went on to occupy the post of 
Undersectretariat of higher education. 
The impact of incentives schemes 
The reform programme increased the value of management and administrative 
capital in relation to academic capital, primarily because it is based on a model 
in which management control the performance of their institution through the 
lever of financial incentives. 
There are three incentives schemes in which full-time academics in the UAM 
can participate apart from the National System of Researchers:, 
Name of Year Period of Levels of evaluation Basic elements evaluated 
programme evaluation 
Annual incentives 89 Every year A-C Research and teaching, diffusion, 
for productivity 
Grants for 90 Every five Corresponds to Teaching (with a limit of 1050 
antiquity years tenure status: 7 points per year), research, 
categories: diffusion. It is orientated towards 
associate A, B, C, rewarding the publication of 
D;jI titular A, Bye. results of research 
Grants in 92 Every year Categories A,B,C,D Teaching, production of didactic 
recognition of materials, tutorials and thesis 
teaching careers supervision 
Two of the programmes promote research and teaching and one is dedicated to 
teaching: 
There is no difference between the Annual incentive for productivity and the 
Grant for Antiquity. Both are based on the same criteria; evaluate the same 
activities, etc. The key is that the productivity incentive was created first and 
was seen to have deficiencies in terms of securing stability in the incomes of 
the professors. As it is an annual incentive, it's difficult that a research teacher 
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can maintain the same rhythm of publications and obtain a similar level of 
stimulus year upon year. It is this inconvenience which the grant for antiquity 
was supposed to resolve because it was given for longer periods and permitted 
the professor plan her activities without experiencing the situation of seeing her 
income reduced. This grant does achieve the objectives of supporting research 
and diffusion. However, the initial scheme has not been withdrawn due to the 
opposition of some professors. It's considered as a "plus" which one can 
benefit from in the years one publishes a lot. The authorities have tried to 
withdraw it but have been unable to and currently the amount given, which 
varies from one year to the next, is much reduced, and for this reason it is not 
attractive. But there are professors that insist in maintaining it and to avoid 
major conflicts they have maintained it. Nevertheless, it is destined to 
disappear. ("Interview M1 ," 2005) 
Clearly despite the introduction of a reform programme based on performance 
management, strategic manoeuvres such as that of leaving the first scheme in 
place but reducing the value of the incentives, continue to be used alongside 
the new more 'objective' strategies. 
This multiplication of administrative procedures is also resented by academics, 
along with the perceived authoritarian message: 
The perspective of imposing a system from outside is very simplistic, the idea 
that the professors need to be controlled is authoritarian and the creation of so 
many committees only reproduces the clientalist system. The cultural vision of 
those who are imposing reform is very poor, whilst the vision of the engineers is 
very strong, and those sociologists who partiCipate follow the 'old' model. 
("Interview M4," 2005) 
This increase in management and administrative power in relation to academic 
capital results in the deprofessionalisation of academics at the same time that 
the reform programme is supposed to 'enhance' performance 
Since last year (2004) there has been a strong attempt to regularize many 
activities in terms of evaluation "with its consequences of rewards and 
punishments". The new regulations for the rewards programmes means that 
"one has to elaborate didactic material obligatorily, participate in courses of 
teacher training, independently if one is a prestigious researcher, this appears 
to me to be ridiculous, they are going to introduce the same in the other 
programmes, it's a generalized tendency. Here it makes people very annoyed 
because the professors have practiced with a lot of liberty and informality and 
this has given good results, now they try to change the concept, it's the concept 
that the professor is naturally lazy and its necessary to watch him all the time, it 
is necessary to regularize all the time because if not, s/he is not going to work. 
It is an old concept of the end of the century of Frederick Taylor. ... "("Interview 
M4," 2005) 
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The exchange of professional capital in return for increased financial capital is 
also apparent to academics, as well as an increase in government control and 
centralisation: 
This policy came directly from the Secretary of Education which imposes the 
programmes, it has imposed a lot of programmes, and they give prizes, if one 
participates one is given prizes, but one accepts to be supervised, the forms are 
immense, it's a bureaucracy, the type of people that design this and evaluate 
the forms are office employees, not academics, and finally they evaluate the 
people, the programmes, the research groups. It is a centrally planned 
neoliberalism, that is, to be ironic, it is similar to centrally planned state 
socialism, one reports more to the SEP than one does to the university. The 
people were accustomed to another type of work, which propitiated more 
creativity, now the people tend to rationalize to meet the number of points they 
need. (M4 ref my translation and resume) 
Nevertheless, the same academic expressed the opinion that, in relation to 
other universities in Mexico, the "system in the UAM is the best"; s/he even 
boasted that the UAM invented the incentives programmes and undertook the 
pilot scheme. And although s/he acknowledged that the evaluation in the UAM 
was more quantitative than in other universities, s/he still defended the scheme 
on the basis that "in the clientalist culture the qualitative is not always the most 
just, instead a small elite receive a lot" Hence the loss of academic capital is 
not only accepted in return for financial capital but quantitative evaluation is also 
perceived as the only option to avoid rampant clientalism, even though it 
creates its own forms of clientalism: 
Everything that one does in life is represented by points, there is a minimum 
and a maximum, if I send a book they have to at least give me the minimum, if I 
am the friend of someone in the commission, the maximum; in the UNAM there 
is a commission which can give the book very high rewards or nothing, the 
dilemma is that discretionality can permit quality but also abuse. ("Interview 
M3," 2005) 
It is also considered to have an impact on the type of research produced. The 
fact that academic work becomes organised according to a points system 
means that the quality of the research produced becomes affected in different 
ways. "80th (the national and internal incentives schemes) increase 
productivity but at the cost of repetition, of doing things in a hurry (al vapour), 
numbers are increased but not quality", ("Interview M4," 2005); "everything is 
very quantitative ... it undermines any incentive of quality .. " ("Interview M3," 
2005). Academic capital is again undermined by the focus of quantitative 
systems on quantity over quality. 
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This undermining of the purpose of evaluation to improve the quality of 
academic work means that the evaluation process looses respect amongst 
academics and so prestigious academics refuse to participate in the evaluation 
process resulting in respect for the process being further undermined: 
.... the very composition of the commissions, there is not sufficient distance, the 
academics are mediocre, they are not peers, that is what most worries me, the 
best academics do not participate, because it is a process of bureaucratic 
certification, in the UNAM it is different, in the UNAM what is important is the 
substantive of each case, here the best looses and the most wily wins, the best 
do not want to evaluate in this way, before the reforms I participated in the 
commission ... ("Interview M5," 2005) 
Quantitative evaluation also affects social capital within the academic 
community. The pOints system of evaluation based on quantity of output, has 
encouraged an individualistic approach to research focused on short term 
projects, because on the basis of this type of research the required points for 
the 3 different schemes that award research can be more securely obtained: 
The more important of the incentives are the individual; they have helped the 
individual more than the group.. an individual article is worth more.. (the 
incentives schemes have affected personal relations, those that are in this logic 
do not loose their time in personal relations, reading groups, seminars which 
have no points for participating ... ("Interview M4," 2005). 
Nevertheless, the university has attempted to rescue the original collaborative 
focus of academic work by introducing more incentives schemes, this time 
focused on collaborative research, and it has worked in some instances: 
In my area we are obliged to work collectively, although one can work 
individually, the UAM incentives promote work in academic areas, there is a 
prize for research areas where there is collective publications, the organization 
of events, and this is to counterbalance the effects of the SNI which can be 
individualistic. ("Interview M1 ," 2005) 
From another perspective, it is considered as a bureaucratic imposition by the 
"authorities" to form research groups in the academic areas "which do not work" 
("Interview M4," 2005); collaboration is considered as something which cannot 
be imposed, "it destroys research groups, it favours short term research, 
individual work, I can do more short term research alone, there is no 
comprehension of academic work, it is not standardized work, it requires 
another model.." ("Interview M5," 2005). The attempt to introduce collaboration 
through rewards schemes is considered as a lack of comprehension of the way 
in which academic collaboration evolves. 
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The current model is considered to improve the capital of certain forms of 
academic capital over others. The evaluation programme is considered to have 
been designed by physicists, and works only for the natural sciences "In physics 
it works very well, the problem is to apply the model in general, in the social 
sciences it is more important to publish a book than an article in a journal.." 
("Interview M5," 2005)38 
Concerning the issue of whether performance management strategies of 
evaluation require a culture of evaluation or create a culture of evaluation, data 
supports the former argument as evaluation processes are appropriated for 
clientalist aims, and only gradually does an evaluation culture emerge: 
The culture of evaluation is new in Mexico, it a cultural change, it gives way to 
arbitrariness, helping friends, taking revenge on enemies, ... the cultural 
problem has improved, evaluation has been extended to many aspects .. 
("Interview M4," 2005) 
Yet, not only does performance management require a culture of evaluation and 
only slowly helps to create it, it would also appear, at the same time, undermine 
the conditions for such a culture, given that the new system repeats the same 
basic structure as the old in that it is a system based on rewards: 
but there is still much to do, everything is in terms of rewards, it's a clientalist 
system, it hasn't disappeared, although it has slowly improved ... ("Interview 
M4," 2005) 
The fact that performance management is based on a system of rewards 
means that it sustains the existing culture of clientalism based on rewards which 
is embedded in the history of the institution as well as in the wider social 
practices. In this context, the strategy of obtaining increased performance 
38 This comment is a reference to the fact that the scheme was introduced in Itztapalapa where 
the physicists have controlled the Rectoria for the previous five periods (each of four years), and 
the three have gone on to be the General Rector and one General Rector went on to be the 
Executive of ANUIES and is the current Sub-Secretary of Higher Education. 
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based on self-evaluation by means of a reward system, is only partly 
successful, often the product is a new version of the old clientalist practices. 
The only advantages the incentives schemes are considered to have achieved 
is the "resolution of an adequate income" ("Interview M5," 2005) for academics, 
but it is an increase in the academic income achieved without negotiation with 
the union, and so it has left the academic "unprotected, for if one falls ill, ones 
income can be reduced by a third" ("Interview M3," 2005) It is considered to be, 
on the one hand, a policy of the Secretary of Finances to not increase salaries 
of government employees, and on the other hand it is considered to be a means 
of increasing academics incomes without having to negotiate the problem of 
pensions with the unions. At the moment pensions are salary linked, if the 
salary increases the pensions increase, but the contributions to the pension 
fund have not increased sufficiently to pay the numbers now pensioned, both 
because quotas have not increased and because the working base has not 
increased at the same pace as the retired base. Some universities pension's 
funds are bankrupt as their payouts in pensions are more than they receive in 
contributions. SES is pressing universities to resolve this problem, to reach an 
agreement with their unions on different ways to increase contributions to the 
pension's fund, but in the UAM no significant advances have been made. As a 
result, the question of academics incomes is only superficially resolved by the 
incentives schemes, which create as many problems as they resolve: 
The incentives schemes resolved the problem of academics income, even to 
the levels of 74, but under perverse conditions, this distortion has generated a 
very strong distortion, and a system which does not evaluate, which only 
generates paper, certificates, almost everyone has some ... it is destroying the 
social and ethical meaning of the institution. ("Interview M5," 2005) 
Conclusions to the UAM study 
An account emerges in which academics in the UAM prefer the quantitative 
evaluation system to qualitative systems, as the latter are equated with the 
reopening of the door to rampant clientalism experienced in an initial 
"uncontrolled" phase of university expansion. Nevertheless, it has also become 
apparent that there are various 'costs' this quantitative shield against 
cliental ism. These include the loss of value of academic capital in various ways 
such as the imposition of constant evaluation measures, the increased value of 
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quantity over quality of academic work, the increase in simulation. Personal 
self-value is also reduced as individuals are pressured to focus constantly on 
obtaining points. Social capital is also diminished by an increase in 
individualistic strategic thinking and decreasing participation in discussion 
groups etc. Schemes including incentives for collaborative work are only 
partially successful. Quantitative evaluation undermines the legitimacy of the 
evaluation procedures because prestigious academics refuse to participate in 
them. The more they refuse to participate the more evaluation committees are 
considered to be in the hands of middle management academics and other 
academics do not consider themselves to be evaluated by their peers and so 
they feel further de-professionalized. The situation seems to have generated its 
own dynamic of a downward spiral and in this sense the UAM is perceived as 
"heading towards a crisis". ("Interview M5," 2005) 
On the other hand, the existence of interest groups around resources and 
budgets both at the top and intermediate levels of management has not been 
affected by the schemes. Instead management capital has increased at the 
expense of intellectual capital as the schemes have been duplicated due to their 
use by management as new tools of manipulation vis a vis the union. This has 
undermined any positive effect the schemes may have had in terms of 
introducing a culture of evaluation. But whilst the reform programme continues 
to strengthen administrative hierarchical relations at the expense of horizontal 
collaborative relations, the conditions for such a learning process are also 
undermined. (See Bensimon's research with regard to problems of institutional 
learning in Mexico, chapter 2) Any learning process can only consequently be 
very slow, and whilst a situation of crisis may possibly be avoided in the UAM in 
general, the situation in the social sciences does not look at all promising. The 
introduction of a culture of evaluation has also been undermined by the 
quantification of the evaluation procedures which further reduces intellectual 
capital, but it is argued that this is the price to pay for avoiding the return of 
clientalist relations. 
In Woolcock's terms of structural analysis, the programmes the institution has 
developed to improve academic transparency shows high levels of 
administrative coherence and capacity and low levels of comprehension of the 
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academic culture. The impact of the reform programme has decreased synergy 
between macro and micro levels of the organization and reduced social capital 
to a level of individualistic fragmentation typical of anomie, which Woolcock 
describes as a form of social capital where individuals' linking to other social 
groups is high, whilst the ties of their own social group are weak or non-existent. 
From Bourdieu's approach of relational analysis, the reform programme has 
changed the economy of capital in the institutional field. It has increased the 
value of certain forms of capital, particularly bureaucratic capital, in relation to 
intellectual and social capital. But perhaps the more serious underlying impact 
of the reform programme is to be found is in terms of the affect on the habitus 
where that capital is formed. In this respect my analysis of the data showed 
that recently horizontal collaborative relations amongst researchers had begun 
to replace clientalist relations as a result of a gradual process of 
"institutionalization" ("Interview M1," 2005). Nevertheless, the impact of 
numerous evaluation procedures was having a negative effect on social capital 
formation by reducing time available for participation in department seminars 
and was promoting individualistic goals amongst academics. At the same time 
the strategic attempt to introduce collaboration had only a partial success. The 
quantitative nature of the evaluation procedures was also undermining 
academic motivation in that they perceived themselves as no longer evaluated 
by their peers, at the same time that peers participated less in such procedures 
and also spent less time in the university. 
The impact of the reform programme can thus be seen to occur at two levels, 
that of the field and that of the habitus. Strategic pOlicies at the level of the field 
designed to improve the value of collaborative capital were undermined at the 
level of habitus as the social spaces of collaboration were reduced. Similarly, at 
the field level, strategies sought to replace discretional criteria of evaluation with 
objective criteria, but at the level of the habitus the practice of control through 
rewards distributed from above strengthened clientalist frameworks of 
perception and practice which continued to undermine the development of a 
culture of evaluation. 
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Hence it can be seen that performance strategies based on a quantitatively 
designed rewards system obtained increased production at the price of 
simulation, and at the same time the reward system reinforced a clientalist 
framework of perception and practices. Indeed, it could be concluded that the 
reinforcement of the clientalist framework of perception explains the simulated 
products. 
The National Autonomous University of Mexico 
(UNAM) 
The prestigious history of the UNAM 
The University of Mexico was created in 1547 on the basis of the model of the 
University of Salamanca, although alternative sources cite 1551 as the date of 
its foundation by Royal decree, and 1553 as the date of opening, making it the 
second oldest university in Latin America after the Autonomous University of 
Santa Domingo. It was reconstituted in 1910 as the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico, (UNAM) by Justo Sierra in 1910. It is the largest 
university in Latin America with 269,000 students, and considered in a study by 
Beijing university study to be the most important in the Spanish speaking world. 
It has also produced a significant number of Nobel Laureates: Alfonso Garcia 
Robles (Peace), Octavio Paz (Literature), and Mario Molina (Chemistry). 
It occupies an extensive campus in Mexico City, the size of a small town, as 
well as having a number of schools and colleges dispersed around Mexico City. 
It is based on a faculty organizational structure, with separate research 
institutes and research centres. (http://www.unam.mx/acerca/index.html) As 
mentioned in chapter two, it has been criticised in the past for its vertical internal 
structure at the cost of horizontal relations of collaboration between equals 
which was considered to slow down scientific creativity and productivity, (Adler 
Lomnitz, 1994). Due to the semi-autonomous level of administration of each 
Faculty, Institute, Centre, and School, combined with a hierarchical structure, 
there had been little overall coordination of objectives in the UNAM. Each 
Faculty or centre was a small kingdom where the director maintained a high 
level of discretional power. This situation affected many aspects of institutional 
practices. One was the fact that by the eighties the UNAM was offering 320 
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post-graduate programmes, many constituting virtual repetitions of the same 
programme but offered by different parts of the institution. Attempts to achieve 
a more rational system based on institutional collaboration finally achieved 
success in 1996 post-graduate programmes were organized under one 
"University System of Postgraduate studies" offering 47 programmes in four 
different areas of knowledge. Faculties, research institutes, research centres 
and external research centres participated in each programme. 
The university has also played an important role in social mobility, the forming 
of a national identity and the creation of values, shared amongst a majority of 
political leaders during the mid 20th century who were graduates from the 
UNAM39, whereas in the late 20th century that percentage was reduced. The 
UNAM was also a space for freedom of expression and social conscience. It 
has also been the site of a number of strikes, that of 1968 and 1999 being the 
most politically significant. The UNAM has recovered rapidly from the crisis of 
1999: in 2004 it reached the position of 195 in The Times Higher 'The Top 200 
World University Rankings'; in 2005 it had climbed to 95; in 2006 it had climbed 
a further 29 places to 66. Yet, more than internal collaboration, it was external 
links with the political field which played an important part in the strike and its 
aftermath. 
39 Presidents who have graduated from the UNAM include Carlos Salinas de Gortari (President 
of Mexico 1988-1994), Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (President of Mexico 1982-1988), Jose 
L6pez Portillo y Pacheco (President of Mexico 1976-1982), Luis Echeverria Alvarez (President 
of Mexico 1970-1976), Miguel Aleman Valdes (President of Mexico 1946-1952), Abel Pacheco 
de la Espriella (President of Costa Rica 2002-2006), Alfonso Portillo (President of Guatemala 
2000-2004) http://www.bookrags.com/wi kilNational_ Autonomous _ University-oC Mexico 
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The UNAM and Mexican Society 
The high level of links between the UNAM and national politics were considered 
an important factor in the prolongation of the strike (Trejo Delarbre, 2000, p. 
267), yet they were also an explanation for the end, rather than solution, to the 
strike. Dr Barnes Rector found himself in a situation in which he was unable to 
negotiate a solution to the problem, given the degree of political parties' 
participation in the strike and the lack of willingness of the government to 
intervene. At this time the following Rector, Dr Juan Ram6n de la Fuente, was 
Secretary of State for Health, and when he took over from Dr Barnes he 
convinced the President to send in the army to break up the strike, and 
succeeded in repossessing the university installations. But since then he has 
set up different negotiating forums to discuss the problems considered to have 
contributed to the strike (Mendoza, Latapi Sarre, & Rodriguez, 2001; Russell, 
2005). But these links between the university and the government are not new; 
they are formally embedded in the structure of the organization in determining 
the election of Rector: 
Both the internal council of each area and the 'junta de Gobierno' which elects 
Directors and Rectors, are constituted by representatives of each discipline, 
and within each discipline there are power groups, occupying a hierarchical 
relation within the discipline. The relative power of each discipline depends 
upon the power of representation of that discipline. The latter depends either 
on the relative power of an individual within that group or the importance of the 
discipline within the country. The latter is an international phenomenon, for 
example, in the 1980's the strength of the economists in the University of 
Chicago was high due to the influence of their ideas on the national economy, 
similarly today the strength of the economists in the UNAM is low, nowadays it 
is the ITAM (Autonomous Mexican Institute of Technology) which produces 
Secretaries of State, etc. A discipline can also have linking with the exterior 
through a particular person. For example Jorge Carpizo, (Rector of the UNAM 
from 1985 to 1989), was The General Procurator of the Republic (89-90), the 
founder of the National Commission for Human Rights (90-93), the Secretary of 
the Interior (93-94) although he was not a member of the PRI, he is also the first 
authority on the initiation of Democracy in Mexico. When Carpizo was Secretary 
of the Interior, the Research Institute of Jurisprudence had a relatively high 
weight in the strength of the university. The more internal/external links which 
exist, the more power a disciplinary group wields. The leader of a group 
although internal to the university, is the one that wields more power externally. 
Although a group may try to consolidate their power, the periods are limited and 
the 'junta del Gobierno' secures that there is no continuity between one group 
and another. There are 15 members of the junta and care is taken that no one 
group or political party acquires hegemony. The profile of the members is both 
political and academic; it cannot be only the first. The members change every 
15 years or at 70 years of age, each year one member changes and the Rector 
proposes candidates to the 'consejo universitaria' who elect a new member. It 
is a structure which functions better than direct election. ("Interview N16," 
2005) 
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The above data demonstrates in Woolcock's structural terms the synergy 
between the university and society. In terms of Bourdieu's relational analysis, it 
shows that the forms of capital present in the UNAM field consist of more than 
intellectual prestige, celebrity and university capital. Formal and tacit 
regulations in the governing council of the university attempt to assure that no 
one disciplinary group permanently increases the value of its capital in that field. 
In the Social Sciences Research Institute, the data showed that academic 
networks were generally considered to be collegial with the situation 
transforming in times of crisis. 
In the Institute the researchers work above all according to affinity of 
perspective, but in critical situations they respond to other types of interests, 
according to different conceptions of what the university should be and external 
interests. There are different types of groups, one is the 'claustros academicos' 
which include all the academic personnel and in some the Director also. There 
are 'Academic Colleges' in other parts, which are somewhat corporative in 
character and do not permit the opinion of individuals, and these divide 
academics in both their opinions and how they should group themselves. 
Some of these groups have their origin external to the university but the origin 
of the activation of a group is internal, there is no permanent external pressure 
on academic life. The leaders of the groups are internal and part of their 
prestige is academic, relations are vertical and corporative, whilst in other 
groups there are no leaders and the relations are horizontal and dynamic. 
These groups seek to extend their power but in normal situations what prevails 
is academic activity. ("Interview N14," 2005) 
Whilst different data sources confirmed the existence of two different political 
groups in times of crisis, it showed a divergence of perspectives concerning the 
extent to which in 'normal situations' these political differences remain latent, 
and whether they are based on social differences: 
Informal power groups exist, some more powerful than others. In the Institute a 
'college' exists, more aligned to the PRO, and also a less formal group based 
on trust networks, not necessarily thematic affinity, but rather political and 
ideological affinity and a shared lifestyle. These groups were not so well 
defined before the strike but they are more so now, nevertheless these groups 
do not disappear between moments of crisis but instead continue latent, there is 
a type of resentment towards our group, we are accused of being more 
privileged, even though members of the other group can be earning twice as 
much. And in fact we are more critical, the other group would not consider, for 
example, criticising the union. ("Interview N15," 2005) 
The Institute would seemed to have limited links to external political interests, 
whilst the data gathered from the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, 
showed the extent to which its members perceived at close hand the 
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intervention of political parties during the strike and spoke of a more political 
perspective on the question of academic networks. One person interviewed 
was of the opinion that interest groups in the university "represent the interests 
of political parties which are the most protagonist, the left of the left." ("Interview 
NF18," 2005) Another academic also considered that the interest groups in the 
Faculty represent the interests of political parties, but that these "are 
associated with different attitudes to forms of government, attitudes to academic 
work as a vocation which implies excellence and quality, and others that view it 
as salaried work which brings certain benefits" ("Interview N15," 2005) But the 
political nature of the interest groups also reflect "the history of how they ( 
interest groups) acted in the past, and the people continue to identify with that 
past (1968 university demonstrations). What's more, the Faculty concentrates 
many of the contradictions of the country, it is very heterogeneous" ("Interview 
N15," 2005). 
So where as the university in general has links with society through the profiles 
of its disciplines and different individuals within those disciplines, the links of the 
Faculty with SOciety are much more related to political transitions at a national 
level. For this reason, the changes of the situation in the Faculty also reflect 
changes in national politics. The PRI maintained a very hierarchical 
paternalistic political system in power for more than seventy years (see chapter 
3). The events of '68 however, politicised the student population, and as the 
political and academic fathers of that student generation gradually retired, a 
highly politicised group remained, many of which are now academics. During 
the late 70's and early eighties this politicisation finally leads to the formation of 
a breakaway group from the PRI, and the formation of the PRO: 
The first I knew of political groups was when Carpizo (Rector from 1985 to 
1989) announced consultations. The change was from a paternal university to 
a political university, before the 70's everything was very paternalist, the 
academic leaders had much more weight and all the rest were young. Students 
were politicised and later their leaders retired and those that were left were 
more politicised and we politicised the university .... The origin of the groups is 
internal, and also later the political parties entered, before the PRI controlled 
everything, but political parties began to emerge, the idea of a community was 
lost, the right in the university continue to use the idea of a community, the 
unions also entered the scene ... ("lnterview NF19," 2005) 
The PRO has recently moved further to a left populist stance, and its leader 
was, at the end of 2005, the favourite candidate to win Presidential elections in 
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2006. This context of national politics was considered by academics to colour 
their predictions of the development of the situation in the UNAM, although less 
so in the Institute than from the Faculty. There was also a view that the 
situation was very unpredictable because it involved what happened in the 
country, the city and the university. "When Cardenas won, there was not more 
control within the university because (his supporters) went to work with him, its 
very difficult to foresee" ("Interview N 15," 2005) Nevertheless, the precedent of 
negotiation with the PRO was set when the 'Junta de Gobierno' , had had to 
negotiate with the PRO during and following the 1999 strike, and the wife of a 
prominent PRO member and famous scientist, was given a seat on the council, 
but "the council makes sure that no group and no political party is hegemonic" 
("Interview N16," 2005) 
In the Faculty, there was a definite sense that the PRO has a high profile, "the 
presence of politics is more direct in the Faculty, through one political voice: the 
PRO" ("Interview NF18," 2005). There was also the view that this high 
presence of politics was cyclical: "now the major problem of the university is 
national politics ... some academics leave to enter into national politics, they are 
less interested in internal politics ... ("Interview NF19," 2005) There was also the 
opinion that in times of crisis or elections the interest groups "tended to identify 
themselves" .. But that slowly there was a "greater differentiation of academic 
work, and more importance was given to academic work than political positions, 
but the progress is very slow ... the UNAM grew massively in the 70's and hired 
people of distinct levels, it takes time to reach a balance again, it wasn't until the 
80's the tendency to professionalisation was introduced" ("Interview NF17," 
2005) 
Data thus reveals that the field of university power in the UNAM not only 
extends well beyond the institution but also it is inter-related with other fields of 
power such as the political field. Nevertheless, the level of inter-relation varies 
from Institutes to Faculties and between disciplines, the Faculty of Political and 
Social Science is considered as one of the most politicised faculties. This level 
of inter-relation of the field of university power and the national field of political 
power permeates all levels of the university including the university council, and 
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results in internal conflicts being extended due to external interests, but also the 
resolution of conflicts if the government has the political will to intervene. 
Faculties and Institutes and have their own formal and tacit regulations for hiring 
and promotion which in turn affects the relative value of their capital in the field 
of university power. 
Formal hiring and promotion procedures 
There are two procedures for hiring full-time academic staff in the UNAM. The 
first is for a 3 year contract based on a specific project under article 51; the 
second is by 'public' announcements (concursos abiertas) for tenure, the 
pOSitions being announced in the internal magazine of the UNAM. In the 
Faculties 'concursos abiertos' also exist for teachers paid by the hour for 
teaching particular academic subjects, to apply to be titular of the subject. 
Hiring under article 51 is a faculty of the director. For a position of tenure, the 
internal councils (consejo interno) of each faculty or institute make a proposal to 
the decision making committee (comisi6n dictaminadora) who decide the level 
and category of the position and it is ratified by the technical councils (consejos 
tecnicos), it is then announced, and the comisi6n dictamina dora chooses the 
best applicant. 
The internal council of each area which elects Directors is constituted by 
representatives of each discipline. The 'decision making committee' is formed 
by two researches from the same faculty or institute, and two external. They 
are assigned on the basis of an election process. There are also two 
representatives of the internal council and the director. The 'technical council' 
includes representatives of the directors of all the institutes of social sciences 
and humanities. 
The degree of horizontal and collaborative relations currently practiced in the 
Research Institute of Social Sciences, is shown by the fact that the academics 
there voted that all the members of the decision making committee for the 
Institute are external and the director agreed not to be present in the committee. 
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In the Institute, there was a certain level of anticipation that the current talks will 
bring much needed internal reforms. Nevertheless, there was also awareness 
that the advances achieved in terms of horizontal relations were based on 
informal agreements with the discretional power of the Director still formally 
present. Although the current Director chose not to use that discretional power, 
there was no guarantee that the following Director would do the same: "if a new 
Director enters, they have the faculty to put all previous agreements into 
reverse, there is a margin of discretionality that can be used negatively" 
("Interview N14," 2005) 
Tacit hiring procedures 
The opinions on the transparency of the hiring process vary greatly between the 
Institute and the Faculty. In the Institute the view taken is that although the job 
profile is written by the internal council to fit the professional profile of someone 
who has already been hired by the Director on a 3 year contract under article 
51. It is the role of the 'comissi6n dictaminadora' to make sure that the job 
profile is appropriate for the position offered, and that the person that is actually 
chosen is the applicant with the best curriculum. Nevertheless, because the 
Statute for Academic Personnel was created in the 1930's and was reformed in 
1973, the regulations are not equivalent to the requirements demanded by the 
'technical council'. The regulations require only an undergraduate degree to 
enter the Institute, whilst the technical council requires a doctorate, so whilst the 
process is considered impartial, it is agreed that it is not transparent. The 
current reform of the statutes as a result of the conflicts of 1999 should resolve 
this discrepancy: 
It is considered that there are 'retratos hablados' (verbal portraits) on the basis 
of which the job descriptions are drawn up with a particular person in mind, 
normally someone who has been hired on the basis of a 3 year contract for a 
special project. The Director who has the power to hire people for specific 
projects also has the responsibility for writing the job descriptions. The 
'Comisiones dictaminadores' have a structure which guarantees transparency 
in that they make sure that those who apply fulfil the requirements, and there 
have been cases where someone looses the 'concurso'. There is impartiality 
but not transparency because the requirements are not very clear. An appeal 
process exists in which different commissions are involved and this has 
functioned successfully. ("Interview N14," 2005) 
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It can be seen that the hiring process is initially a discretional process and 
gradually assumes a more objective institutional process. Social capital is 
initially important, as well as intellectual capital given that those that enter under 
article 51 often do so because they have personal contacts with the director, 
but, even so, they have to have the required academic profile. Whilst the 
tenure announcement may be written to mirror the particular area of research of 
the person the director wishes to promote, that person has a better chance of 
being selected if he or she has high intellectual capital, not only a doctorate 
degree but a research history and membership of the SNI. In the final stages of 
selection, then, intellectual capital has a higher premium than social capital, 
although it is still limited by the fact that the public announcement is only made 
in the internal university magazine. Nevertheless, academic networks in Mexico 
City assure a wider diffusion of the announcement, although certainly not at a 
national level. Nevertheless, it is sufficient for the process to be considered 
"impartial" and to not lead to the formation of clientalist groups: 
In the hiring process the academic level is important, but also networks, job 
profiles are written for specific people who have contacts to promote them with 
the Director. Nevertheless, systems of appeal do function and the network 
system functions for someone to enter the Institute but not to remain loyal to a 
particular group that helped him or her to enter. ("Interview N 15," 2005) 
The situation is different in the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences. In the 
Faculty the relation between article 51 and tenure was also considered a 
"double process where one entered under article 51 and ones position was 
regularized through a 'concurso'''. ("Interview NF17," 2005) Nevertheless, this 
"double process" has been affected in the last 1 0 years since it has become an 
open competition (concurso abierto), because things have become complicated 
and politicized for a number of reasons: 
It is a very long process and it is delayed a lot because of impugnation, it is a 
very complicated process due to personal reasons and internal politiCS. The 
problem is not the transparency but the long and tortuous process. The 
technical council of the Faculty writes the profile. There are so few tenures that 
before a tenure is opened the profile is determined in relation to themes that are 
required, and this creates more pressure. ("Interview NF17," 2005) 
Not only has the 'transparency' measure of open competitions for tenure made 
things more complicated and politicised in the Faculty of Political Science, it has 
also made the role of the three different committees involved in the hiring 
procedures, a target of political manoeuvrings: 
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There were years in which no 'concursos' were opened, from 1975 to 1985 
practically no 'concursos' were opened. During this time people entered under 
article 51, that was very arbitrary ... in 1985 concursos were opened and the 
demand was saturated and political problems started. There were even some 
cases which took years to resolve, as they went from committee to committee ... 
from that moment on things became vitiated, as they were the first 'concursos', 
from that moment we began to realise that it was important to be a member of 
the commission, and be in the technical council, or the internal council, one 
cannot be in all three ... ("Interview NF17," 2005) 
The situation seems to have been aggravated due to the freezing of tenures for 
a long period and then the opening of too few tenures for the number of people 
who had entered under article 51 during that period. The situation of the 
tenures is another aspect which distinguished the Institute from the Faculty. In 
the Institute there are now only two ways to enter, through article 51 with a 
three year full-time contract, or through full time tenure. Associate tenures, 
often given to students finishing their PhD, were eliminated by the Rector 
Saruhkan in the 1970's, "to change the tendency for people to study and work in 
the same institution all their life" ("Interview N15," 2005) after which a PhD was 
the minimum (informal) requirement to enter the Institute. The situation in the 
Faculty is otherwise, there the policy is to offer contracts for teaching particular 
subjects, and teachers have different levels of qualifications. At the moment the 
situation is calm, because many of the teachers are receiving financial 
assistance to finish their masters or PhD's, but the situation is set to come to a 
head as they all finally graduate: 
The policy is to gradually reduce full time tenures, to give contracts only per 
academic subject, the wages are lower in that way, there are some which have 
a subject contract for 20 years, tenure is never offered to them, and few tenures 
are offered. The Director is not worried that as a result there are not many 
doing research, most are doing their master or doctorate thesis and receive a 
grant for that, and they receive incentives from 'PAPIME' (incentives 
programme for teaching) but later this is going to have to be rethought.. .. 
("Interview NF19," 2005) 
Another aspect of this problem has already been encountered in the Institute 
where nearly all members now have titular status. There are 3 levels of 
associate status and 3 levels of titular status, and a PhD is required for the 
latter. Yet the differentiation between salaries is minimal, "incomes are very 
similar" ("Interview N14," 2005), regulations for promotions are also out of date 
so that what is required for promotion from level 1 of titular to level 2 or 3 is not 
clear, "the requirements are very low, and so it is not very clear" ("Interview 
N14," 2005). The result is the lack of a career path: "it feels as if its arbitrary, 
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there is no career process in itself, the clearest distinction is between 
associates and titular, you need to have a titular level to be responsible for a 
research project, but practically all those in the institutes have titular level. 
("Interview N14," 2005), "there is not much differentiation between levels and 
not much competition" ("Interview N16," 2005) It was thus considered that the 
incentives programme has in this sense introduced competition and 
differentiation that no longer existed due to lack of a career structure after the 
doctoral level. 
The impact of the incentives schemes 
The UNAM introduced the programme PRIDE in 1990 (Programa de Primas al 
Desempeno del Personal Academico de Tiempo Completo, Reward 
Programme for performance of full time academic personnel), which was 
designed for the benefit of full time teachers/researchers who undertake both 
teaching and research. A second programme 'The Programme for the 
promotion of teaching' (Programa de Fomento a la Docencia para Profesores e 
Investigadores de Carrera) was opened in 1993 and was designed to also 
reward full time academic personal who dedicated time to teaching. There is a 
similar programme of incentives for teachers with contracts per academic 
subject, as well as programmes for incentives to initiate research, and to 
incorporate full-time personnel (whilst they build up productivity to enter in the 
other programmes). There are also various programmes for grants for 
academic development and to support research, and for this reason the UNAM 
is not in the PROMEP programme, research and staff development is paid from 
its own budget, not by SES. It is the only public university in Mexico which 
currently has this level of financial autonomy in its research programmes. 
Researchers from the UNAM do however compete for funds from CONACYT, 
and have joint research programmes with industry. 
The impact of performance management in terms of the incentives schemes 
was considered by those in the Institute to have some positive impacts." it's 
more a question of strategic thinking ... what is best for me in this moment..." 
("Interview N15," 2005) "It allows you to submerge oneself in a intense level of 
productivity and to acquire a sense of the pragmatic" ("Interview N16," 2005); "it 
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increases productivity, and professionalisation: one learns to determine specific 
objectives and time limits etc." ("Interview N14," 2005). The SNI incentives 
scheme was considered to be more focused on research, whilst in the case of 
the internal incentives programme: "The PRIDE is more integrated, its point of 
departure is that you are working for the institution, it takes you into account in a 
more integrated way, what different things you did, it even permits you to give 
value to yourself. It takes into account diffusion ... it gives more importance to 
research, but is not so pressurizing .... " ("Interview N15," 2005). PRIDE was 
considered in the Institute to have achieved its goal of introducing a culture of 
evaluation in certain respects: "it has created a culture of evaluation, although 
with many defects but it is a culture of being accountable" ("Interview N14," 
2005). 
Although, as mentioned above, the PROMEP programme which promoted 
collaborative research groups was not introduced in the UNAM, both funding 
UNAM and CONACyT funding sources promote collaborative research. It was 
noted that it was "easier to receive funds when one is in a group, there is no 
funding for individual projects and few which are internal to the Institute" 
("Interview N14," 2005). Data revealed that there were no fixed research 
groups, but whilst many group research projects are simulated to meet funding 
requirements, producing a collection of individual articles, others are forming 
due to the interdisciplinary development of knowledge areas, but it depends on 
the disciplinary area. In some areas the same "development of the sciences is 
going that way ... my research area is taking me towards a more 
interdisciplinary focus" ("Interview N15," 2005) Data also revealed that this 
interdisciplinary focus of knowledge is generating more group research: 
Collaborative research "has increased more due to the complexity of the 
research problems than due to incentives programmes, due to the self-same 
dynamic of how knowledge is created, Before, we were the only collaborative 
research group, but currently there is more group research than individual 
research. ("Interview N14," 2005) 
In general the SNI incentives programme was criticised more than the internal 
programme. It was considered less transparent, "the top levels are very 
closed" ("Interview N16," 2005); the top levels were determined at the beginning 
of the programme in 1984 and "there are people that have published little, that 
got to be there in an opportune moment.. it creates inter-institutional conflicts 
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because one institution controls this level and promotes their own people .. ". 
("Interview N15," 2005) The issue is that to be an evaluator in SNI, level 3 is 
required, and at this level "sometimes there are very clientalist groups, who let 
only some enter, and stay there for 20 years without doing anything .. " 
("Interview N14," 2005). Other negative effects involved the fact that it leads to 
the "abandoning of teaching, academics only continue supervising postgraduate 
theses ... SNI is very individualistic, it affects collaborative work" ("Interview 
N14," 2005), "it privileges research over teaching ... it creates conflict with the 
Faculty and other Institutes because everyone needs to supervise theses .. " 
("Interview N15," 2005) "it creates a culture of paper ... the need to deSign 
strategies of publication above those of production, quality is medium or low, it 
leads to short term research" ("Interview N16," 2005). 
The internal incentives programme creates discontent in the Institute in so far 
as it is perceived to be a "salary compensation" ("Interview N14," 2005); "its 
unjust that it is not incorporated in pensions, and so people do not retire ... " 
("Interview N15," 2005); and it seems to create more problems than the benefits 
of the salary compensation it provides, conSidering "how many hours it costs 
the institution, it would cost less to raise salaries, and its difficult to lower a 
person from one level to another. .. it creates enemies, if you don't evaluate 
someone well it brings a lot of enemies .. if there is impugnation then someone 
from the evaluation committee has to defend the evaluation in the technical 
council of humanities ... " ("Interview N15," 2005). The fact that it is perceived as 
a salary compensation more than a performance management strategy is 
underlined by the fact that it is awarded despite its objectives not being met: "It 
was never understood that for the incentive one has to do research and 
teaching and in the institute there is no teaching but they are still given the 
incentive, but not vice versa in the Faculty and this creates discontent. .. " 
("Interview N14," 2005) 
The strongest negative issue was the impact of both internal and external 
evaluation schemes on the individual, both in terms of the impact of the 
evaluation process on ones perception of oneself: "its very wearing, one lives 
with a lot of stress, if they lower your level it's a devaluation of your work, your 
prestige, your income ... " ("Interview N15," 2005); as well as in terms of the 
197 
impact on ones relation to ones work: "ones work looses meaning, one does not 
know why one is working, it's a work dynamic which has little reflection, 
research has periods of reflection, learning, the programmes put a lot of 
pressure, the repetition of work with the objective of incrementing the number of 
publications, following the same research line ... " ("Interview N14," 2005); "every 
year one has to be thinking in what evaluation year one is in each programme, 
and that is going to determine what one is going to do ... "("Interview N16," 
2005). 
In the Faculty the benefits of the SNI were few as people "have never had good 
conditions, the space is reduced, time is shared with giving classes, there are 
few materials and there are not computers for each professor... so the 
incorporation in SNI was slow, although now there are quite a few, ... at the 
beginning it was considered a very closed process, it has changed, now it is 
more of an open process .. "("lnterview NF17," 2005). Whilst the SNI was 
considered to have little impact up until recently, the internal programme: 
PRIDE, was considered unjust because it did not take into account the 
conditions of the Faculty, indeed it was even considered as an external 
programme in the sense that it was designed for the institutes: 
The criteria are just in general, but the problem with external evaluations is that 
they tend to use their own criteria relative to their own conditions and between 
the faculties and the institutes there is an enormous difference... in the 
institutes they go to seminars, present their research, whilst in the faculty we 
don't go to conferences etc., some are given help others not. .. to go and 
present a paper costs more than 5,000 pesos, (aprox. 500 dollars) and in the 
Institute they are paid to go and with those criteria they judge the professors in 
the faculty, they don't take into account the time we dedicate to 
teaching ... "("lnterview NF19," 2005) 
Nevertheless it also has advantages in forcing one to be more disciplined about 
covering all areas of academic performance "because one undertakes an auto-
evaluation, and one try's to make an effort to diffuse ones work although one 
wants to dedicate oneself to research" ("Interview NF19," 2005). Finally, 
despite all these political and policy pressures the data provided no evidence of 
a sense of an institution in crisis, instead, procedures were considered lengthy 
but just, evaluation could result in reprisals but appeal procedures existed, 
political differences existed at times of crisis but academic objectives prevailed 
in between crises, external political interests influenced the governing body but 
were controlled and had the benefit of maintaining the institution closely 
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connected to the pulse of the nation. A sense of institutional ethos emerges 
from the data: "the Faculty and the University is a very noble institution, it gives 
a lot of liberty to its professors, there is always a way of doing things, one can 
open spaces .. " ,," ("Interview NF19," 2005) 
Conclusions concerning the UNAM 
The UNAM is an institution whose field of capital is linked to the political field at 
a national level, as well as academic fields at the national and international 
levels. Public prestige is a capital which is as important as political capital. The 
organization of the Institution is such that it can go through moments of crisis 
and survives; improve rapidly in terms of moving up in international league 
tables. The institution is slowly changing from a highly hierarchical institution to 
a more horizontal institution, especially at the level of postgraduate studies and 
in the research institutes. Nevertheless, in the case of the research institutes, 
any progress in this sense is based on informal agreements and the fact that 
power remains discretional, concentrated in the person of the director, means 
that the shadow of the possible reversal of achievements hangs over the staff. 
The possible eruption of new crises in the university fuelled by external events 
also hangs over the university. The lack of resources and tenures in the Faculty 
would appear to have done nothing to help the politicisation of the situation. The 
abrupt transformation of the habitus of its community in the massification of the 
seventies, and to a lesser extent in the strike of the late nineties has meant that 
the situation is still very heterogeneous, especially in the faculties. 
A significant aspect of the study of the UNAM is that there seems a lot of trust in 
the Institution, it has its own ethos: in the Institute the hiring process is 
considered impartial, even though it is acknowledged that it doesn't begin 
impartially and that it is not transparent, nevertheless it is considered that justice 
will prevail finally; the Faculty and the University are considered noble, even 
though conditions are considered unfavourable for research in the faculties, 
academics are not supported, and the environment is heavily politicised, 
nevertheless, there is a view that academics have a lot of liberty and can find 
ways of getting things done. 
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The impact of the incentives performance management strategies was 
considered positive in terms of introducing a culture of accountability and 
negative in terms of lowering the quality of research activity. On balance the 
impact is considered positive in the Institute where conditions are more 
homogenous and a certain level of horizontal collaborative relations had been 
established. The impact in the Faculty has been lower. In both areas the 
evaluation process is considered qualitative and undertaken by peers, the 
problem in the Faculty is not the evaluation process but the criteria of 
evaluation, even the UNAM's own incentive scheme is considered an 'external' 
system. The cost for the individual of such performance management 
strategies in introducing a culture of evaluation is considered high, and 
unnecessary if an adequate career programme was set out with a system of 
continual evaluation. 
The reform programme has attempted to manage the social capital of that 
community without taking into account these differences and the impact of the 
programme seems to have consequently been accommodated with different 
levels of success in the Institute and in the Faculty. The highest immediate 
price appears to have been paid at the level of the personal lives of the 
academics, whilst the overall consequences of the increase in short term 
research remain to be seen. 
The impact of the incentives schemes does not appear to have changed the 
relative value of bureaucratic in relation to intellectual capital in the UNAM, its 
impact is more at the level of social capital, promoting individualistic behaviour, 
and causing personal stress. 
The Autonomous University of Campeche 
A history of political intervention 
The Autonomous University of Campeche has its origins in 1714 in the Jesuits 
College of San Jose, which following liberal reforms, passed to State control in 
1859 and was renamed as the Institute of Campeche. The institute imparted 
secondary and tertiary levels of education. In 1958 the then Governor or 
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Campeche, founded the University of Campeche, within the Institute, but in 
1965, the following governor of Campeche, an ex-military general, resituated 
the university in its current installations next to the military cartel, and himself 
claimed to found the university, renaming it "The University of the Southeast". 
In 1989 the University returned to its original name, assuming, in principal, the 
status of autonomy from the State, and is now known as the "Autonomous 
University of Campeche". 
Nevertheless, the university has continued to live a rather unstable history. In 
1965 the Governor named Javier Cu as Rector, but he was removed in 1967 
when the new Governor, Sansores imposed his own candidate from 1967-1969, 
until he showed a propensity for defending the university interests above those 
of the political interests of the governor, and he was replaced by Ermilo 
Sandoval, a lawyer, who was Director of the Campeche Institute, and ran both 
institutions of higher education for 10 years. Perhaps because of the fate of his 
predecessors, Sandoval exploited the tradition of university 'porros' or vandals, 
to arm his own private guard, choosing sports players and rewarding them with 
student grants. He sent them out into the streets to burn buses and generally 
make a nuisance of themselves in order to pressure the Governor to give the 
university what they or the Rector wanted. The following Governor, by paying 
these same 'porros' to also work for him, finally managed to replace this rector, 
impose his own candidate, Umberto Lanz and introduce university legislation to 
determine a fixed 4 year term, with a maximum of one re-election. Umberto 
Lanz was Rector for 8 years followed by Tirso de la Gala in 1987, who oversaw 
the transition of the university from a state university to a national university, 
receiving funds directly from the Federal government. De la Gala did not finish 
his period, passing instead to be leader of the local congress in the team of the 
new governor, who put forward his own candidate as Rector interino and who 
was reinstated by formal elections at the beginning of the next four year period 
by the university council. The election of Jose Abud Flores followed in 1995 
with the Governor's support for his candidature depending upon his 
demonstrating majority support in the university council. Having served 5 years 
on that council first as a teacher's representative and subsequently as Director 
of the Faculty of Humanities, he was able to confirm a majority in support for his 
candidature. 
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From 1995 to 1997 Abud Flores was able to work without local government 
interference, presiding over the introductions of the national tertiary education 
reform programme, promoted by SESIC and ANUIES. Not all aspects of the 
reform programmes were received with enthusiasm due to the local interest 
groups embedded in the university administration and academic management, 
(a fact argued by Abud Flores with the then head of SESIC, to no avail). From 
the beginning of his administration, he introduced the 'Integral System for 
University Administration', a national programme for transparent accounting in 
universities, yet following continued delays in its implementation, made use of 
the first legal opportunity to change the president of the Patronato of the 
University. (The removed president resumed his control of the patronato in 1999 
after the new Governor had imposed his own candidate in rectoria). Abud 
Flores also oversaw the introduction of the PROMEP programme in the 
university, and the Director of ANUIES took the opportunity of his invitation to 
the Rector's final yearly report to praise the achievements of the university in 
relation to the high percentage of academics who had initiated post-graduate 
studies. 
Nevertheless, with the initiation of State elections, the Rector not only faced 
opposition from vested interests within the university but also from without. 
Signs of tension between the Rector and the Governor elect for the PRI 
emerged in 1997 when the Rector denied access to all political parties to 
canvas on the campus, resolving the issue by permitting the presence of the 
official candidates in a formal event where each candidate was invited to 
present a conference on their proposals for higher education. These tensions 
increased during the next two years as the Rector resisted the imposition of the 
new Governor's candidates for Faculty Directors and Research Centre 
Directors, on the basis that the curriculum of those proposed did not satisfy the 
universities objectives of seeking academic excellence. 
The new found status of autonomy of the university was violated in September 
1999, a month before the possible re-election of Abud Flores, when the 
Governor sent in the PRI youth league and plain clothed policemen, who broke 
into rectoria where the Governor's candidate called a press conference in the 
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middle of the night to declare himself the new Rector. The individual who took 
this task upon himself was the same person that earlier that day had been 
dismissed by the Rector from his post as Secretary General for his involvement 
in creating an atmosphere of instability in the university by inciting unrest and 
marches among teachers in one of the high school colleges belonging to the 
university. The PRI youth league and plain clothed police remained on campus 
for a number of weeks. The legitimacy of the imposed Rector was never 
recognised by the Secretary of Education at a national level, and the Governor 
convened a meeting of the university council 4 months later to vote in a new 
candidate as Rector, the head of the local base ball club and son of the 
previous Rector Cu Espejo who had been removed after a two year period by a 
previous Governor. 
The university did not see many changes subsequent to the violation of the 
university's autonomy in 1999, until the election of a new Governor in 2002, a 
candidate put forward by the outgoing Governor. The same year saw the 
election of a new Rectora, niece of Ermilo Sandoval who had been Rector from 
1969 - 1979, and Director of the Faculty of Accountancy. In 2003 the new 
Rectora continued pushing forward the national reform programme when she 
announced her plans to introduce new undergraduate programmes in all the 
disciplines, which would be based on a flexible credit system. The introduction 
of this new system has not been without set-backs and the initiation of the new 
programme has been postponed from September 2005 to September 2006. 
Nevertheless, this modernisation of the curriculum has been matched with a 
centralisation of all administrative procedures.4o 
40 For example, a recent attempt to reserve a room for post-graduate classes in the coordination 
of postgraduate studies in the Humanities faculty required six written requests: from the teacher 
to the office administrator, to the office post-graduate coordinator, to the Faculty Director, to the 
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The Organizational Structure of the University 
Like most provincial universities, the University of Campeche was based on the 
UNAM's faculty organizational structure. It has 9 Faculties: Medicine, Nursing, 
Dentistry, Chemistry and Biology, Engineering, Law, Accountancy, Social 
Sciences and in 1989 the Faculty of Humanities was created which included the 
undergraduate programmes of Literature, History, Psychology and the 
postgraduate programmes of Higher education and Psychology of Education. It 
has various centres of research studying tropical diseases, corrosion in 
materials, sustainable development and environmental problems, 
oceanography, social sciences, particularly archaeology, anthropology, and law. 
(http://www.uacam.mxlUacam.nsf?Opendatabase) 
The first master's programme was not opened until 1992 in Higher Education, 
and inscription was mainly from the same university staff. In 1996 no theses 
General Director of post-graduate studies to Director of Distance learning department, to the 
administrator of the seminar rooms. Clearly the written request arrived long after the course 
took place, which was finally agreed by a personal visit by the teacher to the administrator 
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had completed for examination. The university has currently 4 active master's 
programmes and 1 doctoral programme, with the current Director of 
Postgraduate Studies and Research insisting that programmes meet the 
minimum requirements of the PNP to remain active. The university also has 
two preparatory schools, one on campus and one off campus, and it can be 
seen that the administrative procedures of the preparatory school also prevail at 
the undergraduate level, with teachers required to report 2 monthly exam 
results each semester as well as end of semester exam results, and with 
students who fail end of semester exams being able to sit two other forms of 
examination in case of failure. Furthermore, undergraduate students have 
between 35 and 40 hours of classes per week, with programmes extending to 9 
or 10 semesters. Hence a paternalistic, teacher orientated university culture 
still exists despite the fact that national policy calls for the shift towards self-
learning research orientated programmes, as well as the introduction of 
distance learning programmes. 
The Director of each Faculty or preparatory school sits on the University 
council, along with a teacher's representative of each Faculty, the Directors of 
administrative areas and a student's representative. Nevertheless, it is the 
Directors which have most say in the council as the teacher's and student's 
representative are usually the Director's candidate. Consequently, the Rector 
normally tries to maintain the support of the Directors. For example, attempts to 
organize postgraduate studies under the general direction of Post-graduate 
studies, was rejected by the Directors as it was seen to diminish their status. 
On the other hand, the request by directors that they be required to give written 
approval to each document submitted by teachers/researchers to sustain their 
submissions to the incentives programme was approved. This increased the 
capital of Directors in the field of university power. Nevertheless, it continues to 
be the Governor who indicates his or her approval for the candidate for Rector, 
and the Directors are expected to vote accordingly. The capital of the Directors 
has increased in the field of university power in terms of internal administrative 
decisions, at the same time that their capital has diminished in terms of wider 
political decisions concerning the choice of a new Rector. 
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The introduction of incentives schemes 
The incentives scheme was introduced in 1990 for full-time teachers and 
researchers, and initially for hourly paid teachers, and a single scheme has 
been maintained, rewarding both research, diffusion, teaching and academic 
administration. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to have products in all areas to 
enter the scheme, so that a teacher who does no research may enter and 
aspire to the lowest grades of financial incentives, and may even achieve the 
highest grades through participating in various academic and administrative 
committees. On the other hand, researchers who do no teaching cannot enter 
the scheme. In September 2006 new regulations(Campeche, 2006) valid from 
January 2006, were distributed, redefining which activities will be accepted for 
productivity rewards in the evaluation process in 2007. In the new regulations 
research publications account for a maximum of 30% and only those 
undertaken with students. Given that post-graduate programmes are limited to 
a few areas, and only one doctorate programme exists, this means that Doctors 
will be required to publish with undergraduate students to receive incentives in 
the research area. The regulations manifest a return to an emphasis on the 
value of teaching over research. This shift is another example of the 
ascendance in the UAC of the more traditional vision of the university as a 
teaching institution, thus reversing the impact of the national reform 
programme's emphasis on full-time academics in Faculties participating in 
research. 
Procedures for hiring and promotion 
The analysis of data gathered from the interviews showed that academics were, 
in general, unaware of formal regulations concerning the procedures for hiring 
and promotion, it considered that in practice it depended on recommendations 
of the Director to the Rector, and the person "could have the academic profile or 
not.. but principally it was through clientalist networks" ("Interview C9," 2005) 
In the last year public competitions (concursos de oposici6n) have been 
opened, but not for full-time tenures, only for tenures in particular subjects, 
(normally a contract for 4 hours a week) 
... it is not by open competition, it depends on one's antiquity as an hourly paid 
teacher in a particular subject, and personal recommendations, and the 
decision belongs to the Rector ... (tenures given for individual subjects) is a 
process subject to political and union interests, the union requests quotas and 
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they are given to those who have helped (the union) ("Interview C8," 2005) 
Procedures for promotion are just as arbitrary, it was either "imagined that one 
(a regulations document) must exist"("lnterview C12," 2005), or it was known 
that regulations existed but that they were nevertheless "arbitrarily applied ... for 
the average person, yes, there are regulations ... " ("Interview C11 ," 2005); and 
for that average person, following those regulations based on "antiquity and 
academic grade" involves entering into a "battle of official letters", the result of 
which is finally decided by an evaluation committee apPointed by the university 
council, which includes the Director of Academic Development, and the Director 
of Postgraduate studies. 
Nevertheless, as a result of the national PROMEP programme, those full-time 
staff which have been awarded the PROMEP profile (on the basis of academic 
profile, research and publication) are also awarded life tenure on instructions 
from the Secretary of Education in Mexico City. On the other hand, all new full-
time appointments, whilst they should be made on the basis of the PROMEP 
guidelines and be approved by the SEP which grant the budget for new tenures, 
do not always follow such guidelines. 
Academic networks 
This 'arbitrariness' of the application of hiring and promotion procedures and the 
influence of personal relations or clientalist networks, reflected the situation of 
academic relations in the university. There are "academic groups and interest 
groups created around access to resources" ("Interview C11, II 2005); one 
perspective of the situation was that in general the type of relations that exist in 
the university involve" a bit of everything, relations are based on shared work 
experiences, on power and on friendships" ("Interview C12," 2005); whilst 
another more critical perspective was that "relations are based on economics 
and power" ("Interview C10," 2005). These perspectives on the type of 
relations that pertained in the university, were mirrored in the consideration of 
the type of groups which exist,: "there are networks based on academic 
interests, networks which seek to control the institution, individuals who know 
how to move themselves to obtain more resources, there are power groups 
more than academic groups .. amongst academics they are internal, amongst 
207 
directors they seek to make links with the higher levels of the state bureaucracy, 
the leaders of the groups are internal, they are based on controlling resources, 
even academic programmes .. ", ("Interview C8," 2005); 
Yet, it was more than a question of different groups or networks, it was also 
suggested that the individual outlook to things in general was one of "egoism ... 
an attitude of protecting oneself ... it is the culture of Campeche and of Mexico 
also, a result of paternalism ... there is someone who is going to solve my 
problems .. the one in control of my life is the one with power ... my boss, the 
governor. .. there is no structure which permits me to protect myself from this 
type of arbitrariness ... there is no security that someone cannot take away what 
I have, there is no security of employment, health insurance is limited .. life is 
precarious ... until recently the university was the only employer at the level of 
higher education ... tenure is considered a property ... tenures are obtained 
through power quotas ... " ("Interview C8," 2005). 
This perspective was supported to different extents by the other academics 
interviewed. It was suggested that there is a focus in seeking "self-protection, 
protection of ones work, protection from the rest of the people, for the 
development of ones own interests and not of the academia in general ... " 
("Interview C10," 2005); and this was because on the one hand, "where the 
rules are not clear there is an atmosphere of taking care of oneself, being 
careful with whom one has contacts ... 1 try not to fall in this 
psychology ... "("Interview C12," 2005); and on the other hand, it was because 
"the UAC is too near to the government, its subject to the power of the 
government in turn, and for this reason the ambience is defensive ... " ("Interview 
C11 ," 2005) 
Another person took a slightly different perspective, considering that "more than 
anything it's a mentality of a mixture of complexes: insecurity, a culture of my 
rights, of no responsibilities, a culture of little solidarity more than egoism, one 
of paternalism and no professionalism, a lack of a state of law, clientalism is 
everywhere, but in Campeche there is less solidarity ... " ("Interview C9," 2005) 
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It was considered that 'egoism' thrives in a hierarchical power structure, "each 
one feeds the other" and together increase the precarious nature of the 
situation. The paternalistic nature of the hierarchical structures means that the 
individual assumes the "position of the victim" with no personal responsibility for 
events. 
The impact of the incentives schemes 
Given that social networks are constructed upon this 'egotistical' basis of 
personal motivation, the 'meaning' of other social interactions become 
transfigured. For example competitiveness becomes a "competitiveness of 
obstacles", each one seeks to put obstacles in the path of the 'others' 
advancement, because "positive competitiveness is a menace to the 
established system", given that rewards based on merits threaten established 
power quotas. ("Interview C8," 2005) In this sense, the introduction of a 
competitive incentives programme, on the one hand increases personal rivalry, 
"competitive relations are very destructive, they don't care walking over 
whoever. .. it's an animals in the jungle situation .. "("lnterview C12," 2005), and 
on the other hand, is seen as a menace to the established structure of 
incentives based on power quotas. Yet competitive incentive schemes also 
become adapted to the established structure, so that they "don't promote 
academic competitiveness, but instead political and economic competitiveness" 
("Interview C10," 2005). 
The process and outcomes of the evaluation of the competitive incentives 
schemes are also considered to have little to do with the purported objectives of 
the incentives scheme. The fact that the documents to be handed in to the 
evaluation committee have to be first signed by ones immediate Director, 
results in the procedure being used as an instrument of control: "it functions to 
put a break on conflicts" ("Interview C8," 2005). In fact, a pun that is used to 
refer disrespectively to this scheme plays on the words "teaching career", which 
in Spanish is "carrera docente", which is transformed into "carrera indecente" 
(indecent career). Indeed, receiving a high level in the evaluation process is 
considered as a rather dubious achievement ("Interview C11 ," 2005); another 
perspective was that "the results were incomprehensible, the process is not 
considered trustworthy ... it would have to be an external (process) .. "("lnterview 
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C12," 2005); and similarly "the evaluation committee is considered arbitrary ... 
(and if seeking a better solution) any internal committee would be 
disqualified ... " ("Interview C9," 2005). 
Collaborative incentives schemes, on the other hand, are not transfigured into a 
more extreme form, instead they are "simply not understood, its an external 
model, there is no comprehension, although there is the ingenuity to protect 
forms, and produce artificial research groups, products of the Director's 
decision" ("Interview C9," 2005). They can also, therefore, be adapted to more 
traditional power structures: "they are not understood, the Director wants to 
control, the reaction of the professors is varied, there are those who seek the 
protection of the Director because they are not accomplishing the academic 
requirements, others try to follow the proposal, others simulate having a 
research group which is really a protection group, the same interest group forms 
a research group ... it (the reform programme) is putting them in a situation 
which they do not know how to do it, so they collect together to protect 
themselves ... " ("Interview C12," 2005) The impact of the collaborative research 
model is thus very limited because "the system resists change .. precariousness 
is an absolute, to be below is precarious, to be above is precarious, also the 
system is precarious ... " ("Interview C8," 2005). The result is that there "are two 
parallel models which do not make contact. .. the university is one section more 
of the government... the collective union contract is just more bureaucratic 
merits, due to a necessity for resources (the university) has taken on the 
neoliberal model which it does not understand, there are two systems or 
models ... " ("Interview C9," 2005). Finally, the collaborative schemes can make 
the situation worse in some aspects because by entering in one research group 
one is immediately identified with that group as if it were a clientalist interest 
group "one belongs to one group and therefore one is confronted by 
others ... "("Interview C9," 2005) 
As a result there is not much hope for the future, even for a slow learning 
process, "I don't believe there is any future, the immediate future is that they 
are going to continue adapting themselves, in 2006 if there is no results, it (the 
university) will become a State university" ("Interview C8," 2005); there will be 
no results and so we will "end up as a State university, the parallel system will 
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not be allowed (by SESIC) to continue .. " ("Interview C9," 2005). Another 
perspective is a little more hopeful in that the reform model has set up an 
alternative against which the old system is compared and this creates 
uneasiness: "there is no change but now things are uneasy, they are criticisms, 
this is a step on the way to change .. "("lnterview C1 0," 2005); as well as the fact 
that the PROMEP programme offers a new dimension in which to develop for 
the few who want to make the most of an alternative option "with the research 
groups there is the possibility to move oneself outside (the university in links 
with academics in other universities), .. this could be a light of hope ... " 
("Interview C12," 2005). This model "has brought in external people, and those 
that have been formed outside" follow the new model and the rest the old, "the 
local State context is also archaic, so its very difficult for the new model to have 
an impact.." ("Interview C9," 2005) 
The results of external evaluations in 2006 
As a result of the most recent violation of university autonomy (1999), the 
university corridors are periodically buzzing with rumours that the Governor is 
about to replace the Rector, and speculation about who will be imposed. This 
further increases the power of the Directors as the Rector seeks their overt 
support. It also potentially increases the power of whatever group in the 
university who are discontented, although it is difficult that such a group 
(students, teachers etc.) could achieve their goals without external support.41 
41 In June 2006 medical students organized a march to complain against the possibility of 
having the programme reduced from graduate to technical status for not having basic 
infrastructure such as operating rooms, and thus not meeting accreditation requirements. 
Nevertheless, it was also widely commented that support for the students march was given by 
the aspiring candidate to the position of Rector, the current local leader of the PRI and "close" 
friend of the Governor. 
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A new resource the Rector has at hand is the use of performance statistics in 
relation to national data. In her third year report the Rector made a lot of use of 
reference to statistics. Statistics on research included the number of research 
groups and lines of research, the number and type of scientific publications, the 
percentage of full time teachers-researchers, and the increase in staff with post-
graduate degrees and with SNI profiles. The increase in evaluated and 
accredited undergraduate programmes, numbers of computers and numbers of 
bibliographic material. At the end of her report, she observed the need for 
increased resources and thanked the Governor who was present for his respect 
for university autonomy. Given the context of rumours at that time concerning 
her imminent removal, two things are noteworthy, the insistence on positive 
performance of the university during her administration, using comparisons with 
national indicators, and the reference to autonomy. 
Similarly, when shortly following her third year report, two of the three 
programmes in Humanities received first class recognition from the GlEES 
evaluating body, it was observed that the Rectora firstly visited the governor to 
report the news personally, and then sent a report to the local newspapers to be 
printed in the weekend press. It was the following week when the teachers of 
the two accredited programmes were informed by the Faculty Director that their 
programme had achieved level one in the evaluation process. On the other 
hand, the academy of the programme which was not given level one, and 
perhaps not incidentally, was the academy which had criticised the internal 
organization of the UAG during the GlEES interviews, were not officially 
informed until 10 days later that the report explaining the result was pending. 
Meanwhile, the academy was subject to vicious rumours and hostile treatment, 
to which they decided to respond with a written statement to the Director and 
Rector. The president of the academy refused to sign the statement and 
claimed that it was thus not a statement of the academy, to which the members 
pointed out that the academy, was a collegial body and if the majority signed it 
was an academy document. (Academy, 2006) 
This recent series of events reveals important data. Firstly, the Rector is keen 
to use national indicators to defend her personal performance but not to 
improve internal transparency. The indicators are thus used to simulate reform, 
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not to undertake reform. Statistics are used as capital to gain advantage in the 
field of university power. Secondly, whilst the national institutional evaluation 
process (PIFI) did not accept this simulation, with the annual amount assigned 
to the UAC for special programmes falling for the third consecutive year, the 
national accreditation process would appear to have been prepared to sustain 
such a simulation of the reform programme, given that only the programme 
which was not given level one was also the only one of the three programmes 
which has the highest level of academic profiles, two SN I members, and the 
only research production at national and international level. This suggests that 
not all the national programmes maintain the same strict standards in 
evaluation, a fact the 2006 OECD report alludes to.42 Thirdly, the academy 
which spoke out and criticised the entire process was one which in the last few 
years the majority of its members have returned from doctoral studies in Mexico 
City and abroad43. This indicates that the results of the PROMEP programme 
are having an impact which was perhaps unforeseen by many, namely that they 
return with expectations in terms of undertaking research in conditions which 
are not met by the university, still organized according to arbitrary hierarchies of 
power. 
42 In the recommendations section the report suggests in relation to external quality assurance: 
It is important to ensure the good prearation of the staff concerned. Often, some of the reasons 
for the weakness of a quality assurance system are the lack of mechanisms of analysis of the 
information gathered during the external review, inadequacies of the selection process of and 
the training offered to evaluators and the lack of effectiveness of evaluation committees" 
~Brunner et aI., 2006) 
3 In the CIEES external evaluation of three career programmes in the Humanities Faculty, only 
the history academy are known to have criticised the arbitrary character of procedures in the 
university, and of the 12 members present, 7 either have recently completed or are concluding 
doctoral studies either in Mexico City or abroad, 4 have masters and 2 are graduates. In the 
other two academies where no critical remarks were made only one person in each academy 
was undertaking or concluding doctoral studies abroad, although a significant proportion of 
teachers had full-time tenures. 
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In the UAC the only collegially based organ provided for in the university 
legislature are the teacher's academies for each undergraduate programme, 
and this is the only organ where researchers can express their discontent. The 
teachers of each undergraduate programme (full time and subject) have the 
right to form an academy and elect the President and Secretary of the Council. 
The academies are supposed to revise the curriculum, make necessary 
revisions, and assign thesis supervision. In practice their performance differs 
from one faculty or preparatory school to the next, with the Director for the most 
part deciding each semester who will teach each subject. In those academies 
where the majority of teachers are on short term contracts paid by the hour 
there is little opposition to the directors decision. The academies thus acquire 
more potential capital as their full-time members increase or subject teachers 
acquire tenure for that subject. Yet the use of those rights to increase the 
capital of the academy would seem to largely depend upon the academic profile 
of the members and whether they studied locally or in Mexico City or abroad. 
Hence although the UAC signed agreements to adopt the PROMEP 
programme, and then the PIFI guidelines, which recommended universities to 
adopt a departmental structure, introduce more horizontal academic structures 
based on the research groups, the possibility of the university council deciding 
in favour of a candidate who would push through organizational reforms 
required by the PIFI guidelines are consequently very limited. On the contrary 
the ascendancy of the power of the Governor in the field of university power has 
reduced the power of the Rector and increased the power of the directors, 
although only in terms of internal strategic decision making. This has had the 
effect of accentuating traditional hierarchical clientalist structures where the 
Director is the cacique, maintaining a servile position in relation to those above 
him or her in return for power over those below him or her in the ladder of 
power. On the other hand, the effects of the PROMEP programme are 
beginning to be felt from the bottom up, with academics returning from post-
graduate studies in Mexico City or abroad less disposed to accept traditional 
forms of university organization. PROMEP has had less impact in the UAC at 
the level of university legislature, and more in terms of changing cultural and 
social capital. As intellectual capital is increased, social networks are affected. 
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Conclusions concerning the situation in Campeche 
Arbitrary and precarious, the need to look out for oneself, are the descriptions of 
the situation that kept cropping up in the analysis of the data gathered in the 
UAC. This context resulted in the introduction of competitive incentives making 
the situation worse in terms of personal rivalries, whilst the objectives of 
collaborative incentives were simply not understood by the majority and 
research groups were simulated. Nevertheless, there are a few academics who 
find a line of support in the PROMEP programme, now incorporated in the 
university planning exercise, the PIFI, evaluated by SES each year. 
The context of the UAC has meant that neither the individual or collaborative 
incentive schemes have had the expected impact. This is because 
competitiveness in the UAC is interpreted as putting obstacles in the path of the 
other due to the culture of 'looking out for oneself', and as a result rivalries have 
got worse. This rivalry extends to rivalry between groups, so that forming a 
research group on academic grounds can result in one being identified by 
others as 'belonging' to that group on more than just academic grounds, and be 
subject to the having more obstacles put in your path as a consequence. At the 
same time Directors have violated the principles of both the individual incentives 
scheme by requiring all documentation to be signed by them, and attempted to 
influence the formation of research groups to secure the inclusion of one of their 
'unconditionals' within the group. With regard to the latter objective, they have 
not always been successful as the research groups are evaluated and approved 
in Mexico City. 
It is thus clear that to introduce either of these schemes of performance 
management in the UAC, certain preliminary measures to reduce the 
hierarchical and arbitrary nature of the practices in the university were required 
thus relieving the precariousness of the situation of academics within the UAC, 
and providing the minimum basis on which relations of trust and collaboration 
could be constructed. Hence reforms needed to be introduced much more 
slowly after securing certain preliminary conditions; nevertheless, despite these 
difficult beginnings it would appear that things are changing as a result of 
academics returning from external post-graduate programmes as well as 
academics being hired from other institutions. 
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The modernisation of the UAC, in the sense of a gradual break with local 
clientalist structures and the adoption of academic principles of practice, was 
initiated by Tirso de la Gala in 1989 when the university achieved autonomous 
status, but was halted in 1999 when that incipient autonomy was violated by the 
State. In 2006 clientalist forms of organization are again in ascendancy, but at 
the same time the increased intellectual capital of the academic base as a result 
of the PROMEP programme is affecting social capital and the field of university 
power. Meanwhile modernisation continues to be simulated in terms of 
performance in relation to national indicators. The situation will possibly 
become more volatile as more post-graduates return. The question remains to 
be answered as to whether this increased demand from the academic base for 
less authoritarian forms of organization will lead to reforms or whether the 
restoration of university autonomy will have to await the election of a more 
enlightened State Governor. 
216 
Chapter 8. A comparative analysis of the 
three case studies 
The objective of the reform programme was to introduce the principle of funding 
linked to performance determined by evaluation in relation to 'objective' 
indicators. This required a move away from a habitus based on discretional 
decisions which often obeyed the as much clientalist as academic interests, 
towards a culture of objective evaluation. To understand the habitat, or 'culture 
of a university', involves, according to Bourdieu, recognising the regularities of 
relations and the forms of capital they give rise to. Determining the 
predominant factors at play in the cultures of the universities studied, is thus a 
first step in understanding how those cultures were transformed, or not, by the 
policies of 'external' fields. The intention of this chapter is to outline those 
predominant factors by means of a comparative analysis of the common factors 
that can be identified between the studies. 
This comparative analysis will be developed in four stages: firstly, on the basis 
of a descriptive appreciation of extent to which a culture of evaluation 
succeeded in being introduced in each university, either on the basis of the 
World Bank or the OECD model; secondly; with regard to aspects which 
distinguished the university 'cultures' or habitus and the impact of the reform 
programme; thirdly, in terms of the principal underlying factors common to each 
case; and fourthly in terms of the development of the initial heuristic framework. 
The impact of international policy models in local 
contexts 
In chapter six it was seen that both the World Bank and OECD models made 
certain assumptions concerning social capital. The national tertiary education 
reform programme's introduction of incentives schemes in Mexico followed the 
World Bank policy approach, whilst the PROMEP policies which promote the 
formation of research groups followed the OECD approach focusing on 
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knowledge transfer. The data reveals that these schemes had distinct impacts 
in each institutional context. 
The most positive impact achieved by the reform programme was in the UNAM 
Institute of Social Sciences where the incentives schemes were considered to 
be slowly introducing a culture of evaluation, as well as something approaching 
a career profile, a factor lacking in the current promotion options. Nevertheless, 
the schemes were also considered to result in high levels of personal stress and 
income insecurity which could be avoided if a coherent career promotion 
programme was designed. On the other hand, strategies to promote 
collaborative research tended to encourage simulated responses, unless it was 
already taking place, was due to the changing nature of the research projects, 
in which case such strategies were supportive. 
In the UNAM Faculty, the impact of the incentives schemes was low, even full-
time staff did not count on office space, access to computers, or financial 
support for conferences, so their research output was often low, although their 
time dedicated to teaching was high. Thus, it was considered that the 
incentives schemes were made for the institutes and had little to offer those in 
the Faculty as they rewarded mainly research and undervalued teaching. 
In the UAM the reform programme was considered to be imposed from above 
by administrators with little understanding of professional academic life, and 
was considered to deprofessionalize academic staff. The incentives schemes 
were considered a bureaucratic and financial exercise which was undermining 
the incipient evolution towards a collegial ambience in the department. The 
linking of funding to collaborative projects was also considered as just another 
facet of this imposition of policy from above. 
In the UAC the reform programme was considered parallel to the local reality 
based on hierarchical clientalist structures. Particular strategies of the reform 
programme such as the incentives schemes had been adapted to the economy 
of this local reality further increasing aggressive competition for resources 
based on clientalist practices. Attempts to adapt the PROMEP programme had 
been less successful due to the centralisation of evaluation procedures. 
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Nevertheless, the mere decision to collaborate in a research group on academic 
grounds rather than the preferences of the director was considered as a 
questioning of authority and also as identification with an 'interest group'. 
Hence, at an initial descriptive level, it would seem that strategies to encourage 
the evolution towards a culture of objective evaluation were most successful in 
the UNAM Institute where contractual conditions were homogenous, relations 
were horizontal and collegial and a relative level of autonomy within the 
university was enjoyed by the Institute. Whilst the UAM shared the same level 
of homogenous contractual conditions amongst full-time staff, the other 
conditions were not enjoyed, and the UAC benefited from none of these 
conditions. Furthermore, the UNAM also practiced qualitative evaluation 
procedures, yet these were highly criticised by the UAM, whilst in the UAC the 
issue was irrelevant because all procedures were considered a simulation. This 
last factor suggests a qualitative leap exists between the cultures of the UNAM, 
UAM and UAC, and it is thus necessary to understand the nature of this breach. 
Distinguishing factors with regard to policy impact 
The impact of the World Bank model of competitive market management styles 
at the level of institutional cultures can be interpreted in relation to the issue 
which arose concerning the benefit of transparent versus discretional forms of 
evaluation. In the UAM a model of transparent evaluation was defended by 
academic staff in comparison to what they considered as discretional, verging 
on 'obscure', evaluation procedures in the UNAM. Nevertheless, they were also 
aware that this transparency was achieved at a cost: quantitative evaluation 
procedures. 
At first this appears to be a zero-sum Situation, either there is qualitative 
evaluation and the risk of obscure discretional decisions or there is quantitative 
evaluation and transparent procedures. Nevertheless, in addition to the issue of 
'transparency' a question of 'legitimacy' arose. Firstly, there is the 
'transparency' of the evaluation methods, which in the UAM was based on 
quantitative analysis. Secondly, there is the legitimacy of the decision making 
committee (comisi6n dictaminadora). 
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The guarantee of impartiality of the committee in the UAM is based upon the 
fact that its members come from the three different universities which make up 
the UAM (recently four), yet, it was still perceived as necessary in the UAM to 
defend a quantitative method of evaluation to ensure that clientalism did not 
infiltrate the process. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the results 'produced by 
that committee were still questioned due to the fact that the members of that 
committee are not considered to be peers. The increasingly quantitative nature 
of evaluation procedures in the UAM had resulted in the reduced participation of 
the most prestigious academics of the institution. 
In the UNAM, evaluation of the incentives schemes is based on qualitative 
criteria, and academics of the highest prestige participate in the evaluation 
committees. There is an initial trust in the 'fairness' rather than the 
'transparency' of the procedures, because the impartiality of the discretional 
bodies is generally beyond doubt due to the scientific prestige of its members. 
Also there is a 'fair', if not 'efficient', system of appeal in those situations where 
it is claimed that undue external pressures were exerted. The system is not 
considered transparent in the case of promotion, due to the lack of a table of 
clear criteria yet there is a general confidence in the procedures because the 
committees are made up of prestigious members of staff and thus considered 
'legitimate'. The criticism by faculty members of the incentives schemes was 
not related to the process of evaluation, but the criteria of evaluation which 
favoured research over teaching. 
As a result, the evolution of the university culture towards a 'culture of 
evaluation' was considered to be advancing in the UNAM Institute, more slowly 
in the UNAM Faculty, whereas in the UAM a number of those interviewed 
considered the situation to be degenerating. In the UAC, on the other hand, the 
evaluation procedures were considered arbitrary, the results not trustworthy, 
and the whole process not just demeaning but "indecent". 
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Common factors with regard to policy impact 
The trust in the impartiality of the discretional decisions of the evaluation 
committee in the UNAM, and hence its legitimacy, depended upon the scientific 
prestige of the members of the committee. In the UAM scientific prestige was 
being undermined by the ascendancy of the discourse of transparency as a 
result of external pressure from the SES. In the UAC, social and political 
prestige was more influential than scientific prestige with the result that 
discretional decisions had no legitimacy 
A key relation which can be uncovered here is that between scientific prestige 
and university power. As seen in chapter three, in the UNAM, during the 
previous century, the path for promotion of prestigious researchers had been 
university managerial posts; scientific prestige had become linked to university 
capital in the UNAM. Membership of hiring, promotion or evaluation committees 
is also an acknowledgement of prestige in the UNAM. As mentioned in chapter 
five, such committees are considered by Bourdieu to play a key part in 
maintaining the status quo by reproducing the university habitus through their 
decisions of selection and promotion. 
The University council also plays a similar function in seeking to maintain 
equilibrium between disciplinary groups in the election of the Rector. Curiously, 
by linking in the election of a Rector scientific prestige to political capital, 
university autonomy was protected. The tacit assumption that the Rector would 
use his or her political capital to protect the university, and thus his of her 
prestige within the university, had been upheld by the results. 
In the UAM, the control of the Rector's position was considered to be in the 
hands of a distinct disciplinary group in each campus, creating a clientalist 
scientific capital. The controlling scientific group of one campus was also 
dominant in the SES and the national field of tertiary education policy. This was 
clearly not the case in the UAC where the Rector was de facto elected by the 
local governor, and scientific prestige was considered a possible debilitating 
factor. The result was that the university was permeated by the local political 
field, and the low percentage of tenure amongst academics meant they were 
prey to the clientalist relations of the current group in power. 
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In short, the success of the reform programme in terms of the introduction of a 
culture of evaluation based on 'objective' criteria depended upon the linking of 
scientific and university capital and the evolution of a university culture which 
sustained the legitimacy of discretional peer evaluation. 
Thus, although the situation in each university was distinct, nevertheless, these 
arise from distinct combinations of a limited number of factors: university capital, 
scientific capital, individual autonomy (tenure) and university autonomy. Where 
scientific capital and also personal and university autonomy was high, then 
scientific capital tended to be linked to university capital and horizontal 
collaborative relations were predominant. Where scientific capital was high yet 
university autonomy was low, then university capital tended to be linked to the 
capital of other fields, that is to say, that other fields were inter-connected with 
the capital of the university field. This university field was almost a virtual field 
in the situation where scientific capital was also low. 
The development of the 
framework 
initial heuristic 
These distinct outcomes and the principal factors involved are represented in 
figure 4 below. The university field is traversed by two axis: one indicating the 
type of relations which predominate: collaborative or competitive individualist 
relations; the other is the axis of university capital, either linked to high or low 
scientific capital. The location of a university close to the center of the field 
indicates high autonomy and towards the edge of the field low university 
autonomy. The right hand side of the university field is more closely related to 
an OECD model of the knowledge society involving public universites promoting 
knowledge transfer, and the left hand side of the university field is more related 
to the World Bank model of the knowledge economy and the competitive market 
exchange of knowledge as a commodity. The right hand side is also more 
closely related to the national political field, and the left hand side to the local 
political field. 
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It can be seen: the lack of autonomy of the UAM from the national field of 
tertiary education policy meant that high scientific capital and individual 
autonomy (tenure) in the UAM failed to become related to university capital. 
Instead university capital was linked to bureaucratic capital which was 
continuous with the bureaucratic field of national tertiary education policy. 
(represented in figure 4 by its location at the edge of the university field, at the 
right of this field where it is traversed by the field of national policy) 
On the other hand, in the UNAM Institute, high scientific capital and individual 
autonomy was combined with university capital resulting in horizontal 
collaborative relations. (for this reason the UNAM Institute is located firmly 
within the university field yet still linked to the field of national politics and also 
the field of the knowledge society). In the UNAM faculty, low scientific capital 
and low individual autonomy resulted in the low autonomy of the Faculty in 
relation to the field of national politics. 
The peculiar autonomy the UAC enjoyed from the policies of the SES, in the 
sense that the reform programme remained parallel to the local agenda, was a 
result of its complete lack of autonomy form the local clientalist forms of capital, 
facilitated by the low overall level of scientific capital and individual autonomy in 
the university (for this reason the UAC is represented as situated more in the 
field of local politics than in the university field). 
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The changing meaning acquired by the concepts of 'transparent' and 
'discretional' decisions depends on a complex relation of factors which 
Bourdieu's account of habitus, capital and field is able to uncover. Sufficient 
levels of individual and university autonomy permit the linking of scientific 
capital to university capital and the development of a culture of horizontal 
collaborative relations which sustains the legitimacy of discretional peer 
evaluation. 
The situation of the UNAM would also seem to sustain Woolcock's point 
concerning the importance of synergy at the macro level with the national 
context. As noted, the effectiveness of tacit assumption of the University 
Council in the selection of the Rector of the UNAM, that the candidate combine 
political and scientific capital is based on this combination of synergy with the 
national context and institutional integrity. In Bourdieu's terms, it involves 
choosing a person who has capital in both the particular field and related fields 
of the social space. 
The importance observed by Bowles and Gintis of a legal environment and the 
nature of the community norms is also seen to be relevant to the data analysis. 
In the UNAM, both the tacit norms and the legal framework of the governing 
council sustains a relative yet crucial autonomy of the university in relation to 
other fields. In this way the norms of the community develop into an institutional 
'ethos' which in turn reinforces university autonomy from other social fields, 
protecting the institution from the direct impact of policy changes at the national 
and international level. Instead, the university acquires a certain liberty to adopt 
and adapt national and international policy according to the needs of the 
university. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusions 
In answer to the Research Questions 
In order to understand why the Mexican tertiary education reform programme 
includes apparently incongruent objectives and strategies, as well as to explain 
the disjuncture between the policy objectives and outcomes, this research set 
out to answer the following questions: 
• Why does the Mexican tertiary education reform programme include 
apparently incongruent objectives and strategies? 
• Have the different performance management strategies achieved the 
'development of a culture of evaluation based on objective criteria or, 
ironically, has a traditional', non objective systems of relations been 
strengthened? 
• In what way and to what extent are different forms of capital 
embedded in the social structure of Mexican society and is it feasible 
to attempt to introduce an objective system of evaluation linked to the 
distribution of resources in the tertiary education in Mexico without 
taking them into account? 
• Does the impact of the performance management strategies vary 
between distinct institutional environments and, if so, what are the 
principal factors that account for these differences? 
• In what way can a deeper knowledge of the context of the reform 
programme improve policy design 
Personal experience in a provincial university lead me to doubt the 'lack of 
motivation' explanation for the uneven results of the programme, as well as the 
argument that more stringent linking of funding to reforms would resolve the 
problem. Instead, this research adopted an initial 'heuristic' framework that 
considered the extent to which the field of tertiary education in Mexico is able to 
maintain a degree of autonomy in relation to international, national and local 
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either political, economic or education policy fields, in order to explain the 
disjuncture between objectives and results in the reform programme. 
I began to develop this initial heuristic framework firstly with regard to the 
national fields of education policy and economic and political development. In 
the review of the development of the reform programme the answer to the first 
research question concerning the apparently incongruent objectives of the 
reform programme began to be developed. It was clear that the reform 
programme initially followed performance management strategies which 
promoted individual motivation and departmental and institutional competition 
for resources, whilst the PROMEP programme marked a shift to the promotion 
of collaborative research. 
The explanation for the objectives behind these distinct performance 
management strategies became clear and are reported in chapter six in the 
analysis of the extent to which the World Bank and the OECD policies intend to 
transform the relative value of capital within the tertiary education field, either 
directly or indirectly through different strategies of performance management. It 
was seen that each of the policy models have a potential impact on both the 
field of tertiary education and the habitus of particular institutions. Both models 
promote the standardization of knowledge in relation to international indicators 
and this increases the value of the capital of international policy agencies as 
well as national government through centralised systems of evaluation at the 
expense of institutions and teachers. The World Bank policy model also 
attempts to redefine the 'suppliers' and 'clients' of the field, sustaining this 
model on the basis of assumptions of an individualistic competitive form of 
social capital in tertiary education. The OECD, on the other hand sustains its 
model of knowledge transfer by assuming a collegial form of social capital 
based on systems of trust. 
The Mexican tertiary education reform programme combined both these models 
with the aim of introducing a culture of 'objective' evaluation of performance, the 
results of which would determine funding levels. This was described in terms of 
the transition from a 'benevolent' to an 'evaluative' model of state control of 
tertiary education. Nevertheless, pursuing a historical analysis of the tertiary 
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education reforms during the 20th century, it became apparent that whilst the 
reform programme involved a change of strategy in the funding procedures from 
discretional to an 'objective' framework for funding criteria, at the same time, 
continuity had been established through the unremitting use of the distribution 
of resources as a means of co-option and the maintenance of centralised 
control. Hence, in relation to my second research question concerning the 
achievement of the development of a culture of evaluation based on objective 
criteria, the initial contextual analysis suggested that this was undermined by 
the accompanying strategy of linking evaluation to funding. This development 
of the initial heuristic framework was supported in chapter three by scholarly 
reports pointing to the continuing recourse to simulation, as well as the analysis 
of data which showed the uneven results of the programme at a national level. 
The uneveness of the results of the reform programme was supported by the 
comparative analysis of the case studies. In the UNAM, the reform programme 
achieved a partial success in promoting the evolution of an objective culture of 
evaluation in the Institute, but not in the Faculty. In the UAM, on the other hand, 
the reform programme succeeded in undermining the incipient development of 
a culture of 'objective' evaluation. In the UAC the reform programme remained 
parallel to functioning of the university, being adopted only in those situations in 
which it could be adapted to reinforce local clientalist relations. So in reply to 
the question whether the different performance management strategies had in 
fact strengthened 'traditional' non-objective relations, the data analysis clearly 
showed that in the UAC, the linking of reform to the distribution of resources 
resulted in not only the adoption of those aspects of the reform programme 
which could be adapted to' traditional' clientalist practices, but that in fact the 
reform programme was thus used to strengthen those practices. 
The third question concerned the degree of embedded ness in Mexico of 
different forms of capital in the social structure of Mexican society and the 
feasibility of introducing an objective system of evaluation linked to the 
distribution of resources without taking them into account. An exploration of 
social history indicated the complex co-existence of hierarchical clientalist 
relations and horizontal relations of reciprocity in Mexican society, and the 
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extent to which the clientalist strategy of using the distribution of resources to 
maintain social control is a practice embedded in the social structure. 
Bourdieu explains such clientalist forms of capital as part of a symbolic 
economy for the exchange of resources which exists alongside a market 
economy. In Mexico this co-existence had been underpinned until the end of 
the century, by a post-revolutionary national symbolism. Nevertheless, a new 
form of neoliberal clientalism was seen to have emerged at the end of the 20th 
century, more impersonal, no longer symbolic, but also pursuing social control 
through the quasi-market competition for resources ... The comparative analysis 
of the case studies supported this interpretation given that the situation in the 
UAC can be considered as an example of the predominance of the more 
traditional symbolic economy, whilst in the case of the UAM, the more recent 
neo-liberal market economy was predominant. The situation was distinct in the 
case of the UNAM, as became clear in the answers to the remaining research 
questions. 
Hence the exploration of both the history of tertiary education and national 
socio-political structures suggested that the replacement of a complex symbolic 
social political system for one based on 'objective' criteria for the distribution of 
resources, was an issue which went far beyond that of a 'lack of motivation' to 
implement reforms due to a 'resistance to change' as the ANUIES report had 
suggested. Nevertheless, the comparative analysis of the case studies 
suggested that relations within each university were affected in distinct ways by 
national and local political and policy fields. 
In the UNAM the first mediator of the university interests' with the wider political 
structure is the rector, yet the university is also a symbol of social mobility, the 
values of the nation, and the social and political heterogeneity of the Mexican 
society. And even in the Institute of Social Sciences where a tentative degree 
of autonomy had been achieved, this did not survive moments of political crisis. 
The UAM enjoyed less autonomy given that it was permeated by power and 
interest groups from the upper echelons of the administrative and academic 
structure to the lowest, although not in such an undisguised manner as in the 
UAC. The field of the latter was virtually co-extensive with the local political 
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field. Thus the analysis of data from the case studies revealed that distinct 
forms of capital embedded in national hierarchical and horizontal social 
structures also assumed distinct forms at a local level according to the field 
analysed and its degree of autonomy from other fields. 
It was this analysis of the extent to which each university maintained autonomy 
from the various political, economic and education fields which provided the 
basis for the development of the answer to the fourth question concerning 
whether the impact of the performance management strategies varies between 
distinct institutional environments, and if so, the principal factors which account 
for these differences. The analysis of the data from each case study showed 
that the impact of the reform programme not only varied between each 
university but also, in the case of the UNAM between the Faculty and the 
Institute. Only in the latter was the reform programme considered to have a 
partially positive impact. In the Faculty, the impact was virtually insignificant, 
whilst in the UAM and in the UAC the results were distinct but both negative. 
The comparative analysis of the case studies determined that the main factor 
for these differences was based on the principal of autonomy. Each university 
achieved the maintenance of different levels of autonomy from the various fields 
in different ways according to the particular factors involved in the historical 
development of each university. Yet, it also became clear in the analysis of the 
quantitative - qualitative issue over evaluation procedures, that what varied in 
each case was the same factor: levels of individual and institutional autonomy. 
Hence it was possible to conclude, at a general level, that sufficient levels of 
individual autonomy as well as the autonomy of the university field in relation to 
other fields, encourages the linking of scientific capital to university capital and 
the development of a habitus of horizontal collaborative relations which sustains 
the 'legitimacy' of discretional peer evaluation. 
So to return to the aim of this research, namely to understand why the Mexican 
tertiary education reform programme includes apparently incongruent objectives 
and strategies, as well as to explain the disjuncture between the policy aims 
and outcomes, it can be concluded that this was the result of the inclusion of 
incongruent international policy models which were in turn unsuitable with 
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regard to the local context. Hence the national aim to introduce an 'objective' 
and hence possibly 'democratic' system of indicators to determine university 
funding was undermined by the adoption of unsuitable performance 
management strategies from international policy models. Both models 
presuposed forms of social capital which did not reflect the local reality, yet on 
the other hand, and somewhat ironically, the World Bank model involved 
performance management strategies which too closely mirrored the clientalist 
relations which it was the aim of the reform programme to replace. 
Policy Implications 
The reason for this unfortunate combination was due to the lack of sensitivity to 
the local context when designing the strategies to introduce an 'objective' 
culture of evaluation. Hence the explanation of the disjuncture of policy aims 
and outcomes leads on to the last question concerning the way in which a 
deeper knowledge of the context of the reform programme can improve policy 
deSign. 
The lack of sensitivity to, or comprehension of, the local context on behalf of 
policy designers, was also related to the international 'hegemony' of the policy 
models, particularly the World Bank model which was also linked to funding. 
This global hegemonic discourse relies on concepts such 'transparency', 
'accountability', and 'legality'. In this comparative study, only the university 
culture of the UNAM, the oldest and most prestigious university in Mexico, has 
thus far been able to withstand the hegemony of this discourse. 
The 'lack of sensitivity' was also based on the collective misrecognition of the 
fact that this model closely mirrored the clientalist practices it was supposed to 
replace As noted in chapter five, when analysing a symbolic economy, 
Bourdieu explains how individual self-deception concerning the acts of 
domination and aggression that are present in an exchange of gifts are 
sustained in a "veritable collective misrecognition inscribed in objective 
structures (the logic of honour which governs all exchanges - of words, of 
women, of murders etc.) and in mental structures, excluding the possibility of 
thinking or acting otherwise." (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 95). The fact that a national 
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reform programme can adopt strategies of implementation which closely mirror 
the practices the reform programme aims to overcome, can only be understood 
in terms of this concept of collective misrecognition. 
Indeed, it can consequently be anticipated that the argument employed in the 
ANUIES 2000 report, namely that any problems related to the implementation of 
the reform programme involve 'a lack of motivation' resulting from 'inertia and 
tradition', will be continued to be employed in rejection of the conclusions of this 
study. However, to the extent to which this study performs what Lingard refers 
to as 'socioanalysis', and helps individuals become "reflexively aware of the 
structural determinants of their practice" (Lingard, 2006, p. 291), it will have 
opened a space for questioning the 'objectivity' of the neoliberal model. 
Nacional Policy Implications 
The comparative analysis of the impact of the incentives programmes in three 
distinct contexts has shown the significance of the extent to which the linking of 
scientific capital to university capital is related to the degree of autonomy of the 
university field in relation to other fields. Where scientific capital is linked to 
university capital, evaluation procedures tended to be less hierarchical, more 
qualitative, and were more likely to be considered legitimate. Where scientific 
capital was divorced from university capital, discretional decisions were not 
considered legitimate and the discourse of transparency based on quantitative 
evaluation was adopted, with the negative consequences of undermining the 
academic habitus. Where scientific capital was low and university field was 
continuous with the field of local politics, not even quantitative evaluation 
procedures were considered transparent, they were merely considered a 
simulation of transparency, a mask behind which the· reality of discretional 
decisions based on clientalist interests continued as the normal procedure. 
In this sense, the findings of this research support the recommendations of the 
2006 OECD report (Brunner et aI., 2006: item 306) to extend and strengthen the 
PROMEP programme, not only in the provision of grants to academic staff, but 
also in the provision of financial resources and impartial systems of career 
development support for returning post-graduates, all measures which increase 
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scientific capital. Given the extent to which the PROMEP programme allows 
researchers and research. groups to develop independently of local power 
groups, there is clearly a need to extend financial support for fledgling and not 
only consolidated research groups The research findings also suggest that 
increasing scientific capital strengthens collegial practices, although tenure is 
also an important factor in this respect. 
These findings suggest that the OECD's proposal of modular systems of 
knowledge management (DECO, 2004) supports more horizontal collegial 
practices where scientific capital is high and contractual conditions 
homogenous, and in such conditions it enhances horizontal collegial practices. 
The level of heterogeneity both within and between institutions in Mexico 
provides the basis for a strong rejection of a policy approach where one model, 
under central control, fits all. 
International Policy Implications 
This research contributes to a growing interest to explain the unexpected results 
of policy reforms, the disjuncture between policy objectives and policy 
outcomes, the disjuncture between policy assumptions and local realities. 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Grimmett & Crehan, 1992; Halse, Kennedy, & Cogan, 
2006, p. 593; Stambach & Malekela, 2006; Woolcock, 1998). Its contribution to 
this growing body of literature lies in having shown that different international 
models of tertiary education reform make distinct assumptions concerning 
social capital which are not only incongruent amongst themselves, but also 
potentially incongruent with the context in which they are applied. 
This research has shown that the adoption of Bourdieu's approach of social 
fields constituted by relative values of capital is a coherent and congruent 
methodological approach for this type of analysiS of the impact of international 
policies in local contexts. As noted in chapter two a similar approach has been 
adopted by Naidoo and Jamieson in terms of the impact of market values on 
university capital. 
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This approach permits, on the one hand, the analysis of the extent to which 
international policy proposes to change the relative values of capital in the field 
of tertiary education, and on the other hand, to analyse the particular university 
fields and the extent to which their autonomy is limited in relation to other fields. 
Analysis at both these levels permits an understanding of the particular 
disjuncture of policy and outcomes, as well as the comparative identification of 
factors involved in each case. 
Furthermore, this approach has permitted the development of an understanding 
of Mexican social and political structures in terms of a complex relation of 
symbolic and market economies. A historical approach to this analysis has 
thrown light on the transformation of the forms of clientalist practices, up to the 
current 'neoliberal' form of clientalist practices where co-option in justified by the 
discourse of quasi-market performance management strategies. As a result, it 
can be seen that World Bank performance management strategies closely 
resemble clientalist practices and consequently are most unsuitable in those 
contexts where such practices are firmly embedded. Indeed this research has 
shown that in such contexts, instead of encouraging reform, at the least they 
undermine fragile collegial habitus and, in the most symbolic economies, they 
reinforce traditional clientalist practices. 
Hence despite the specificity of the Mexican context in which these international 
policy models were introduced, this research has developed a heuristic 
framework which is applicable in those contexts where similar economies can 
be identified. Furthermore, even in established market economies, the results 
of the current research are also particularly relevant due to recent proposals to 
changes in the funding of university research to allocation on the basis of 
metrics. In the case of the United Kingdom the Times Higher Education 
Supplement concentrates on the threat this proposal presents in terms of issues 
of diversity, (Lipsett, 2006), yet the current research suggests that the threat is 
much more serious with regard to, on the one hand, university cultures, 
particularly in the case of the newer, less prestigious universities, and, on the 
other hand, individual levels of stress and self-esteem. 
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Appendix 1. Notes on section one of the 
interview guideline, and the guideline 
The following categories were used to determine the types of capital of the 
interview sample: 
Demographic, economic and social capital: 
Age 
Birthplace 
Number of children 
Place of residence 
Profession of father, mother and grandparents 
Children's professions 
These categories are the same used by Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 227) 
except for the last two indicators which were added to register the degree of 
social mobility, which during the 20th century in Mexico, following the revolution, 
was often high. The profession of the children was added to determine whether 
a trend of upward mobility continues. 
Cultural capital 
Academic success 
Bourdieu defined academic success amongst French academics in terms of 
success in the 'concours general'. (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 231) In this research I 
will define it in terms of academic qualifications, including periods of post-
doctoral studies. 
Capital of university power 
University selection and promotion committees 
Department heads 
Bourdieu defined this indicator in terms of belonging or not the university 
selection and promotion committee. (Bourdieu, 1988, p. 223) Here I used the 
same indicators initially, but these findings were compared with the results from 
questions on the power of clientalist groups within the university in the second 
section. 
235 
Capital of scientific power and prestige 
Grades acquired in the National system of researchers (SNI) 
A similar indicator to that used by Bourdieu: the Centre Nationale de la 
Recherche Scientifique (CNRS). 
Intellectual celebrity 
Publications in national newspapers 
Mass market publications 
Participation in television or radio 
Here I have used the same indicators as Bourdieu, adding only radio 
participation, which is a popular form of communication in Mexico. The 
participation of academics in these medium is relatively high, and in addition, 
the UNAM and the National Polytechnic (IPN) have their own television and 
radio channels. 
Political or economic power 
% of income based on incentives programmes 
Political posts 
Here I have used neither of the indicators of Bourdieu, neither the holding of 
public posts nor the indicator of extra teaching undertaken at a prestige 
institute. Academics do realise extra teaching in other institutes, but they are 
not government posts as in France, and so giving extra classes has less to do 
with political or economic power and more to do with relations through 
academic networks. Furthermore, during the eighties, following the devaluation 
of the currency, giving extra classes, or holding public posts, was often 
undertaken to supplement incomes. 
Nevertheless an important factor that effects the economic power, (by which I 
understand the relative value of their incomes in the national economy); of 
individual academics in Mexico is the proportion of academics salaries which 
now depend on incentives programmes. The high percentage of their income 
which these payments represent reduces the power of academics to reject 
these procedures, and the model of tertiary education reform of which they are 
part. (See research of Bensimon referred to in chapter two) 
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Also, academics in Mexico, particularly academics from the social sciences, 
tend to assume political posts, either in an advisory role or in popular 
representation, and so I have included this category in the interview structure. 
Interview guideline 
Interview no.: INSTITUTION: 
DEMOGRAPHIC CAPITAL 
How old are you 
Where were you born 
Do you have children and if so how many 
ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
Where do you live 
SOCIAL CAP IT Al 
Where did you undertake your basic education 
What was your fathers level of education and profession 
What was your mothers level of education and profession 
What were your grandfathers level of education and professions 
What were your grandmothers professions 
What are your children's professions 
CULTURAL CAPITAL 
Where did you undertake your first degree, 
date, name 
Where did you undertake your masters, date, name 
Where did you undertake your PhD, date, name 
have you undertaken, and where and when, post-doctoral studies 
research visits 
Current Academic position 
how long have you had that position 
Which year did you first hold full-time university position 
do you give classes in any other institute 
UNIVERSITY POWER 
have you held positions of an administrative capacity 
have you held positions in staff selection or promotion committees, 
or incentives evaluation committees 
have you held positions in CONACYTevaluation committee 
have you held positions in any other type of committees 
SCIENTIFIC POWER AND PRESTIGE 
Are you in the SNI, if so: since when and at what levels 
Do you participate in the UAM's programme of academic incentives. 
- estimulos anuales ala productividad 1989 (Anual productivity incentives) 
- becas a la permanencia, 1990 (grants for antiquity) 
- Becas al reconocimiento a la carera docente, 1992 (Grants for the recognition of teaching 
career) 
What is its level of consolidation according to PROMEP criteria 
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INTELLECTUAL CELEBRITY 
Have you published in a national newspaper 
Have you published in mass market publications 
Have you participated in television or radio 
POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC POWER 
Have you held public posts 
WHA T percentage of your income is based on incentives programmes 
TYPES OF CAPITAL OF UNIVERSITY POWER IN THE UNIVERSITY 
how often are tenures opened in your department/faculty/investigation centre 
Is this a completely transparent process or do other factors influence this process? 
Is the promotions procedure considered a completely transparent process or do other factors 
influence this process? 
Is the evaluation procedures for the incentives programmes considered a completely 
transparent process or do other factors influence this process? 
ACADEMIC NETWORKS 
Are relations in the university generally based on collegial values or doother types of relations 
exist? 
If different interest groups exist, do they originate in the university or are they part of larger 
interests groups in the academic communi!y at large, or political interests at a national level? 
Is their a leader of the interest group within the university, or is the leader external to the 
university 
If there is a leader, is his/her position based on academic power or on the power of intellectual 
prestige, or another type of power 
How do these different interests groups seek to extend their influence? 
Since when have these types of relations existed 
Have they changed over time? 
How do you foresee the situation developing? 
If transparency has improved, what makes it possible for the process to suffer a setback ... 
finally how transparent can procedures be? 
ACADEMIC NETWORKS (CHANGES ONLY FOR UAC INTERVIEWS) 
Are relations in the university based on collegial values or on other types of interests? 
What is your opinion of the view of a colleague that within the academic community there is a 
culture of 'Looking out for oneself' (Egoismo) , resulting from a psychology of the oppressed, of 
not being in control of ones destiny, of precariousness 
If such a culture exists: 
How does such a culture affect competitive relations? 
As a consequence, would it be better to reduce or accentuate competitive relations? 
Are vertical relations prominent in the university? 
How does such a culture of egoismo work within a vertical structure? 
Does a vertical structure reduce or accentuate sensation of precariousness, of not being in 
control? 
Does it compensate in terms of paternalism? 
How does this culture impact efforts to promote horizontal relations, such as collaborative 
research groups? 
do different interest groups exist in the unversity? What is the dynamic of the relation between 
these interest groups and the culture of egosimo? .. 
Do these different interest groups originate in the university or are they part of larger interests 
groups in the academic community at large, or political interests at a national level? 
Is there a leader of the interest group within the university, or is the leader external to the 
university 
If there is a leader, is his/her position based on academic power or on the power of intellectual 
prestige, or another type of power 
How do these different interests groups seek to extend their influence? 
Since when have these types of relations existed 
Have they changed over time? Do they change in moments of crisis, and if so what are the 
criteria for the new set of relations? 
How do you foresee the situation developing? 
If transparency has improved, what makes it possible for the process to suffer a setback ... ? 
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Sistema Nacional de investigadores (SNI.) what was the level and type of academic 
activity/production prior to the introduction of SNI in 1984 
Did different interest groups in the university have an impact in that production 
What was the impact of the SNI system of individual rewards based on performance on : 
research productivity 
the type of research productivity 
the type of academic activity 
relations in academic community 
Does it create discontent 
It is not considered a transparent procedure 
The criteria are not considered just 
what proportion of an academics salary do the internal incentives progs. represent 
how do they differ from the SNI 
Does it create discontent? 
is it considered a transparent procedure? 
Are the criteria considered just? 
Is the creation of competitive rewards beneficial for: The individual 
The institution 
The establishment and consolidation of research groups 
The academic community in general 
How would you compare the transparency and effectiveness of the system with other 
institutions? 
Is it considered fair to financially reward staff for their productivity instead of a decent salary ? 
Do you think it is useful to have two systems of rewards: both the institutional and the national 
system? If so why? 
What are the sources of finance for research in the university. 
Has collaborative research practice increased or decreased in recent years? 
What has been the impact of criterias of finance in the level of group research? 
What has been the impact of incentives programmes in research collaboration? 
Have other factors influenced this process, such as type of research, complexity, 
interdisciplinary etc. 
If you are you a member of a research group, then when was it formed 
What was the process of forming it 
Has its collaborators changed? 
In the formation of a research group which of the following factors have an influence in forming 
the group: 
Research interests 
Previous contacts in department or faculty 
Personal friendships 
Hierarchical relations within department or faculty 
Interest groups within the university 
What are the difficulties encountered working in research groups? 




Interest groups within the university 
Pressures of a competitive environment 
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Appendix 2. Examples of approaches to 
issues of trust involved in validation of 
data gathering and analysis and 
triangulation of interviewees comments 
In an interview in the UAM the interviewee said that s/he considered the hiring 
and promotion procedures in the UAM to be transparent, and in the UNAM 
closed and discretional, but when I continued with questions about whether 
different interest groups exist in the university the answer was immediately "por 
supuesto que hay" (of course there are) and went on explain how different 
groups controlled each campus, the biologists (including medicine) controlled 
Xochimilco and the Physicists controlled Itztapalapa, a situation which this 
person considered should change but was unlikely to in the short term. So at 
this point I considered it 'natural' to ask whether the existence of such interest 
groups affected the transparency of the hiring and promotion processes, and at 
this point the person interviewed was more disposed to explain that although 
they are transparent at one level, there are different levels in which influence 
can be applied. The question of in which department a tenure will be opened 
for 'concurso' depends on the interest groups as well as deciding the profile 
required for the tenure. The profile can be written to fit a particular person 'un 
retrato hablado' (literally a 'spoken portrait'), and give that person an initial 
advantage in the 'concurso'. 
What becomes apparent from this example, is that the questions concerning 
the type of networks which exist among academics raised a set of issues which 
related back to the transparency of the hiring of promotion procedures, such 
that, in this case, I could arrive at the conclusion that the procedures were not 
as transparent as the interviewee initially claimed. Furthermore, because I 
personally undertook each interview, and because the introductions through 
recommendations established a minimal level of confidence from the beginning 
of the interview, which, using interpersonal skills, I was able to build upon during 
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the interview, in such situations, I was able to push certain points without 
offending the person interviewed. So in this example, I was able to pose a 
question in the form of a reflection arising from the interview contents, whether 
the procedures mentioned affected or not the transparency of the 'concurso'. 
To this question the person replied 
there are always the possibility that someone else would win the 'concurso' 
because the determining committee is transparent., that was what I meant by 
referring to the process as 'transparent', influence can be applied in the first 
stages, but the 'concurso' is transparent, the committee can decide in favour of 
an external candidate which unbeknown to the particular interest group, had 
submitted his or her papers and which better fitted the profile of the position. 
This is an example of how, through establishing trust as the interview 
proceeded, I was able to ask a question of clarification, which although it 
appeared to contradict a previous reply of the interviewee, nevertheless the 
interviewee was prepared to clarify his/her previous answer. It is then, also, an 
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